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ABSTRACT OF DISSERATION

THE POWER OF MULTIPLYING: REPRODUCTIVE CONTROL IN AMERICAN
CULTURE, 1850-1930
Prior to the advent of modern birth control beginning in the nineteenth century,
the biological reproductive cycle of pregnancy, post-partum recovery, and nursing
dominated women’s adult years. The average birth rate per woman in 1800 was just over
seven, but by 1900, that rate had fallen to just under than three and a half. The question
that this dissertation explores is what cultural narratives about reproduction and
reproductive control emerge in the wake of this demographic shift. What’s at stake in a
woman’s decision to reproduce, for herself, her family, her nation? How do women, and
society, control birth?
In order to explore these questions, this dissertation broadens the very term “birth
control” from the technological and medical mechanisms by which women limit or
prevent conception and birth to a conception of “controlling birth,” the societal and
cultural processes that affect reproductive practices. This dissertation, then, constructs a
cultural narrative of the process of controlling birth. Moving away from a focus on
“negative birth control”—contraception, abortion, sterilization—the term “controlling
birth” also applies to engineering or encouraging wanted or desired reproduction. While
the chapters of this work often focus on traditional sites of birth control—contraceptives,
abortion, and eugenics—they are not limited to those forms, uncovering previously
hidden narratives of reproduction control. This new lens also reveals men’s investment in
these reproductive practices.
By focusing on a variety of cultural texts—advertisements, fictional novels,
historical writings, medical texts, popular print, and film—this project aims to create a
sense of how these cultural productions work together to construct narratives about
sexuality, reproduction, and reproductive control. Relying heavily on a historicizing of
these issues, my project shows how these texts—both fictional and nonfictional—create a
rich and valid site from which to explore the development of narratives of sexuality and
reproductive practices, as well as how these narratives connect to larger cultural
narratives of race, class, and nation. The interdisciplinary nature of this inquiry highlights

the interrelationship between the literary productions of the nineteenth and twentieth
century and American cultural history.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The history of reproductive control is a complex tale reflecting the
interests of two distinct factions: those pushing to control the
reproductive capacity of others and those determined to control their
own reproductive choices. The former have attempted to control the
choices available to women, presuming the latter cannot intelligently
and rationally choose for themselves.
Simone Caron, Who Chooses?
This breakdown of the history of reproductive control from Simone Caron’s Who
Chooses? American Reproductive History Since 1830 offers the traditional critical view
of the field of reproductive control, one that victimizes women and vilifies men. It pits
men against women and imagines the history of reproduction as a zero sum game where
one group’s reproductive losses are another’s gain. What this view fails to take into
account is that reproductive control is a much more culturally fluid concept. It operates,
not in a unilaterally and punitive fashion for women, but in a myriad of ways that are
used by variety of groups for disparate purposes. This prevalent critical account fails to
fully examine the larger societal forces at work in women’s reproductive processes,
ranging from men’s own engagement in birth control practices to the way that women too
could subvert the ideology and rhetoric of reproductive control to suit their own purposes.
In large part, the emergence of modern birth control in the nineteenth century is a
foundational historical development, leading to seismic shifts in both the actual
reproductive practices of women and in the ideological weight of reproductive control.
During that century, technological advances, such as the invention of vulcanized rubber,
allowed the widespread production of condoms and diaphragms, and the discovery of the
ovulatory circle and the invention of the curette greatly improved the safety of surgical
abortions. This created a general population of women who were, more than they had
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ever been in the past, able to control their reproductive rates.1 The subsequent decline in
the rate of reproduction of white, middle- and upper-class women in the nineteenth
century speaks to this shift.2 While the reproductive rate for these women at the turn of
the nineteenth century was 7.04, that rate had fallen to 3.56 by the turn of the twentieth
century, a decline of nearly half.3 In order for a population to experience a change in its
reproductive rates of this magnitude and for that change to occur in less than a century,
women must have been using birth control methods frequently and effectively.4
This emergence and successful application of birth control in the nineteenth
century then led to a foundational shift in women’s relationship to reproduction and made
reproduction a hotly contested and ideologically fraught cultural site for society. Prior to
the advent of modern birth control, the biological cycle of pregnancy, post-partum
recovery, and nursing dominated women’s adult years. Because the average birth rate per
woman in 1800 was just over seven and given that the span of the reproductive cycle is
two to four years, women were statistically likely to be engaged in the reproductive cycle
during the entirely of their reproductive lives. On a global population level, the equation
was simple—if you were a sexually active woman, as most married women are, then
children would come with statistical regularity. This equation changed, though, when
1

See Ch. 1 for a historical discussion of the rise of modern birth control and the use and prevalence
of available methods of birth control.
2
The trend occurred across a broader demographic segment than just middle- and upper-class white
women. However, the decline was most drastic in this population, and given the dearth of research on
other minority and ethnic groups’ reproductive practices and uses of birth control, this dissertation limits
claims about reproductive demographic trends to middle and upper-class white women, although clearly
more research is very much needed on the reproductive practices of minority groups in the United States,
including the African American population and immigrant groups.
3
Janet Brodie, Contraception and Abortion in Nineteenth Century America (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1994).
4
There is some critical disagreement still about the role that voluntary abstinence played in
reducing the birth rates effectively in the century, but most scholars generally concur that to so effectively
reduce reproductive rates in such a small timespan, artificial methods of birth control were most likely
employed by a significant number of women.
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women began to be able to, with ever increasing certainty, manage their rate of
reproduction. No longer at the mercy of Mother Nature, mothers could now choose how
often they wanted to be pregnant, how many children they wanted, and how regularly
they wanted to experience the reproductive cycle. The significance of the shift in
reproductive rates cannot be overstated, not only for women personally but on a societal
level. Reproducing on average only three to four times in their lifetimes meant that
women could for much of their adult years not be engaged in reproduction. Rather than
statistically spending most of their lives either pregnant, recovering from childbirth, or
nursing and caring for an infant, women could have more years free to engage in a host of
other activities and duties. Untying women from the tethers of their reproductive cycle
opened the door for them to pursue other roles in the family and in society. In the home,
with fewer children to care for, mothers could devote themselves more fully to each
child, resulting in changes to our conception of childhood itself.5 With fewer children to
care for and consequently fewer obligations in the home, women could, and did, take on
new roles outside of the home, working, becoming educated, and participating in civic
and political life. Fathers too could, and did, begin to reimagine their own roles in the
family, including taking a more direct role in childcare and the household. It is because of
these changes that family life could shift to the nuclear version that came to dominate the
twentieth century. Without a doubt, foundational shifts in society occurred because of the
rise of modern birth control.
5

For a host of complex economic, sociological, and familial reasons, the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century witnessed changes to the meaning and cultural value attached to childhood as a
developmental state. Largely, our modern conception of childhood as a special developmental state
separate from adulthood emerged during this time period, and the decrease in family size played a large
part in this change. See Viviana Zelizer’s Pricing the Priceless Child (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1994) and Steven Mintz’s Huck’s Raft: A History of American Childhood (Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press, 2004).
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On the other hand, while “birth control” is arguably the most important tool that
emerged in the nineteenth century to enable changes in family life and women’s roles, it
has also led to a host of complicated ideological issues for women and for the rest of
society. Once a woman could attain, with a reasonable degree of certainty, the ability to
control the rate at which she reproduced, she opened herself up for political and societal
manipulation of this ability. The story of reproductive control in the twentieth century
centers around these political and societal debates. As Leslie Reagan points out, “Over
the course of the twentieth century, Americans have moved from focusing on the
problems of reproduction overall to treating each conception as a singular and significant
event. The victories of the public-health movement and feminist reproductive-rights
movements together reduced the danger of child-bearing in the United States and
increasingly make pregnancy and childbearing a choice rather than a mandate” (Reagan,
“From Hazard to Blessing to Tragedy” 370). For Reagan, the movement of reproductive
history has been towards an understanding that “reproduction is controllable” (370).
However, the knowledge that reproduction is controllable consequently poses the
question: who controls it?
Prior to the advent of modern birth control, the only real avenue open to society to
control birth was either the sanctioning or endorsing of some sexual practices—like sex
within marriage or even the culturally sanctioned sexual coercion of slave women to
increase slave populations—or the prohibiting of sexual activity. Beyond that, though,
for individual women, whether or not to reproduce was not a real question, because there
were no viable alternatives for sexually active women.6

6

Voluntary motherhood, a term which emerged in the nineteenth century and was used to denote
suffragists and women’s rights advocates’ view that women should have the unilateral right to refuse her
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It was only once reproduction could be controlled that the issues of who should
reproduce, how often, and what the ramifications of those choices meant for their family,
husbands, selves, and society began to emerge. It was only when reproduction became a
choice, not a biological given, that it became a politically and ideologically fraught
concept. The question that this dissertation aims to answer, then, is who controls
reproduction and to what end? Who gets to decide who reproduces? How often? For
what purposes? In other words, who gets to control birth?
In order to explore who controls reproduction, it is necessary to broaden the very
term “birth control.” Scholars and historians of reproduction typically use the term “birth
control” to denote the technological and medical mechanisms by which women limit or
prevent pregnancies. Historical and cultural analysis of birth control generally fall into
one of three categories: the technological and medical histories of contraception and
abortion; the profiles of prominent historical and cultural figures of the birth control
movements; or the narratives of birth control as a “social issue and social movement”
(Gordon xii). Simon Caron’s work, which “traces the emergence of contraception and
abortion as social, medical, and legal issues” and examines three sites of reproductive
control—abortion, contraception, and sterilization—serves as a typical example (2). Janet
Brodie’s foundational text Contraception and Abortion in Nineteenth-Century America
explores the rapid decline in the reproductive rate of women in nineteenth century by
examining their access to, and knowledge of, particular forms of contraceptives. Linda
Gordon focuses on the emergence of a cultural separation of sex from reproduction
necessary for large-scale use of birth control. Several works, including James Mohr’s
husband’s sexual advances, offered women limited reproductive control only through abstinence. See
Linda Gordan’s Woman’s Body, Woman’s Rights: Birth Control in America (New York: Penguin, 1990)
for a useful discussion of the sexual and reproductive politics of the voluntary motherhood movement.
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Abortion in America, Marvin Olasky’s Abortion Rites: A Social History of Abortion in
America, and Kristen Luker’s Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood focus on a
particularly culturally contentious form of reproductive control—abortion—and explore
the ways that conflicts within the medical, societal, and religious communities have made
abortion the site of cultural and ideological conflicts of reproduction. More recent works
have continued this trend. Angela Franks’ Margaret Sanger’s Eugenic Legacy: The
Control of Female Fertility explores the question of how current contraceptive practices
emerged out of such anti-women’s policies as forced sterilization and eugenically-driven
agendas. Lara Marks’s recent work Sexual Chemistry: A History of the Contraceptive Pill
and Elaine Tyler May’s America and the Pill examines the pharmacological, medical,
and cultural history of the birth control pill.
While these works have been extremely important to uncovering the cultural and
historical narratives of birth control, and to legitimizing reproductive studies as a
culturally significant site of critical inquiry, my project moves from the use of the term
“birth control” to the use of the term “controlling birth,” which includes any force at
work on women that seeks to either encourage, channel, facilitate, prevent, or limit birth.
In other words, rather than seeing birth control in purely medical and physical terms, the
story of controlling birth is about the political, cultural, and societal forces at work on
reproductive practices. Fundamentally, the term “birth control” refers to the products that
limit or prevent birth, while the term “controlling birth” refers to the societal and cultural
processes that affect reproductive practices. Birth control, then, is the medical, physical,
and personal means that one takes to limit progeny; controlling birth is the psychosocial,
cultural, and political means that are used to either encourage or prevent the reproductive
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processes of women. Creating a distinction between the terms “birth control” and
“controlling birth” helps to articulate what is at stake in my project. Controlling birth,
then, becomes a form of societal control that seeks to channel reproduction for its own
purpose, whether that purpose is limiting the reproduction of less desirable groups, or
exerting cultural pressure on reproductively “desirable” women to reproduce, or creating
cultural narratives about pregnancy, motherhood, and fatherhood that seek to encourage
reproduction, or constructing reproductive rhetoric that makes reproduction either a
“duty” or a “choice.”
This dissertation is interested in the process of controlling birth, which is not
exclusively concerned with the use of contraceptive products or medical procedures, but
is also interested analyzing the ongoing cultural processes of controlling birth that can
and do affect reproductive practices. It is important to understand that while birth control
as a term is almost universally used in association with what could be termed “negative
birth control,” the prevention of birth—contraception, abortion, sterilization are, after all,
medical items and procedures that prevent birth—the term “controlling birth” does not
simply mean the prevention of unwanted conception or pregnancy. The control of birth
can also be applied positively, by the means of engineering or encouraging wanted or
desired reproduction. For us to truly understand the complete history of birth control, we
have to look at both sides of this coin, although historically, much of the critical attention
has been focused on the preventative side of controlling birth. Expanding the term, then,
allows me to explore narratives of reproduction and reproductive control that might
previously have been overlooked. While the chapters of this work often center around
traditional sites of birth control—contraceptives, abortion, and eugenics—they are not
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limited to those forms. Instead, I seek out all forms of cultural and literary narratives that
in some way aim to control reproduction, and in looking at other forms of controlling
birth beyond contraceptives and birth control, my dissertation uncovers hidden narratives
of controlling birth.
Women, as a part of society and not simply outside of or subject to it, are then
part of this process of controlling birth, not just the victims of it. As such, women could,
and actively did, engage in controlling birth.

Contrary to other historical narratives of

birth control, women were often able to integrate such reproductive practices and the use
of birth control with traditional gender norms and expectations. But this new lens of
controlling birth also reveals how men, traditionally seen as removed from the concerns
of birth control, could engage in controlling birth as a means of either encouraging or
discouraging the reproductive practices of women, as well as shows how the practices of
controlling birth could act upon men’s lives and choices. As a term for understanding the
complex political stakes of intervention in reproductive practices, “controlling birth”
serves as a much more fruitful than “birth control.”
By focusing on a variety of cultural texts—advertisements, fictional novels,
historical writings, medical texts, popular print, and film—this project aims to create a
sense of how these cultural productions work together to construct narratives about
sexuality, reproduction, and reproductive control. Relying heavily on a historicizing of
these issues, my project shows how these texts—both fictional and nonfictional—create a
rich and valid site from which to explore the development of narratives of sexuality and
reproductive practices, as well as how these narratives connect to larger cultural
narratives of race, class, and nation. This methodology is indebted to several recent
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works, in particular Beth Widmaier Capo’s Textual Contraception: Birth Control and
Modern American Fiction, that operate under the understanding that fictional accounts,
because of their ability to both reflect and mold cultural views and attitudes, serve as an
excellent way to explore the cultural forces at work in the circulation of ideas in society.
The interdisciplinary nature of this inquiry highlights the interrelationship between the
literary productions of the nineteenth and twentieth century and American cultural
history.

Chapter 1: Sexual Agency, Birth Control, and “Passionlessness”
By examining the rise of modern birth control in the nineteenth century and by
historicizing that development within medical narratives of women’s bodies and
reproductive knowledge, this chapter explores the confusing, and often contradictory,
medical views of the female body and its relationship to physical health, reproductive
health, and sexual desire and procreation. I explore how the cultural dictates for women
in the nineteenth century were fundamentally in conflict and how this conflict actually
opened the door for greater sexual agency and reproductive choice control for women.
An analysis of the rhetorical logic of birth control advertisements reveals the way ”birth
control” products permitted greater sexual agency for women, not simply because of the
practical prevention of pregnancy or birth, but because of the advertisers focus on
reproductive control as a matter of health, not sex. This logic creates a cultural space for
the use of birth control, while the medical and societal focus on women’s natural
“passionlessness” provides a rationale for their declining procreation. Ultimately, the
chapter argues that the supposedly restrictive medical view of the female body in the
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nineteenth century and its innate “passionlessness” actually functioned in a way that
allowed, rather than precluded, greater sexual agency and reproductive control for
women.

Chapter 2: Dysgenic Reproduction and Sexual “Containment”
This chapter provides an analysis of the little-known novel The Island Neighbors
(1871) by Antoinette Brown Blackwell, a prominent women’s rights activist, amateur
scientist, and eugenics supporter. Blackwell’s text serves the important purpose of
offering an early fictive example of the emerging eugenics movement where The Island
Neighbors acts as a fictive “laboratory” for Blackwell to imagine both a dysgenic
reproductive problem and a social-containment solution. Featuring the story of a wealthy
Boston family and their dysgenic maid’s summer trip to an idyllic island retreat, the
novel explores themes of reproductive control and eugenics by presenting the reader with
the potential, and clearly undesirable, sexual union of Margaret, the maid, with a local
island sailor. The novel circumvents the problems of dysgenic reproductive by ending
with a resolution about sexual containment, requiring that the couple remain on the island
where they are free to reproduce but unable to infect the greater society with their
dysgenic reproduction. Like the sexologists of the late nineteenth century, Blackwell
hoped for a “modification of lust by love…as a slow ‘evolutionary’ process” whereby
“the instincts of individual self-preservation [would be] eventually modified by the social
instincts.” In other words, The Island Neighbors presents the hope that individual selfpreservation would lead to self-imposed reproductive quarantine for the good of the
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social body. The chapter argues that this early eugenic narrative connects reproductive
control to larger cultural fears of containment and contagion.

Chapter 3: Choice, Duty, and Sexual Shame
Chapter 3 traces the shift from the rhetoric of “duty” to the rhetoric of “choice” in
imagining women’s reproductive practices. Operating from the assertion that greater
access to birth control in the nineteenth century resulted in the promise of greater sexual
freedom for women, the societal recasting of reproduction as a “choice” allowed women
to feel that they retained their ability to manage their reproduction freely. Of course,
because this movement from duty to choice emerged from within already established
cultural narratives—namely, narratives of class, race, sexuality, and gender—the actual
ability to freely make reproductive choices is a social construction that is every bit as
prescriptive as the earlier narrative about duty was. As two Progressive-era cultural texts,
Edith Wharton’s Summer and the 1917 anti-abortion film Where Are My Children that
depict abortion as a matter of choice reveal, this new rhetoric offered the illusion of
freedom and personal agency while at the same time encoding those reproductive choices
with gendered, racialized, class-based tropes. Choice, then, became a subversive way for
eugenic advocates to press their reproductive agendas at the expense of reproductive
freedom. Reproductive “choice” in abortion was then cast in what modern readers will
recognize as familiar, gendered tropes—that of the choice to be a “selfish woman” or a
“good girl.” The chapter argues that sexual shame functioned in the absence of notions
of reproductive “duty” to circumscribe women’s reproductive choices. In doing so, the
chapter makes a key contribution to an understanding of how controlling birth goes
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beyond an understanding of the particular birth control methods available to women and
reaches for an understanding of how the rhetoric surrounding those birth control methods
affect women’s ability to choose.

Chapter 4: Paternal Longing, Fathers, and Reproductive Control
This chapter traces the emergence of the “new father” in the nineteenth and early
twentieth century in order to explore how this new version of fatherhood, and the related
cultural depiction of paternal longing, functioned as a form of reproductive control. The
chapter reveals that this shift emerged from within the gendered politics of reproductive
control and that paternal longing, combined with the increase in the father’s involvement
in the daily care of children, emerge out of a culture alarmed by women’s lack of
“natural” maternal desire and motivation to reproduce. The former consisted of an
emotional appeal to women to engage in reproduction, whereas the latter served as a
practical appeal. Given that the popular culture depicted, usually negatively, this new
father as the result of women’s lack of maternal desire and investment in reproduction, it
clearly seems to have been imagined as a way to address perceived problems in the
reproduction rates of women and the decline of the American family. If society wanted
to encourage their (reluctant) women to reproduce, then a “new father,” one who longed
for offspring and who was willing to be an active and involved partner in raising them,
would seem to help mitigate the reasons women could voice for limiting, postponing, or
opting out completely from having children.
An analysis of a series of columns devoted to fathers in Parents Magazine that ran
from 1932 to 1937 reveals how this rhetoric of the “new father” can be read as a form of
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controlling the reproductive practices of women. By reimagining the father and moving
away from the “tyrant” father of old to a new, involved father, both emotionally and
practically, in the lives of his children, society could reconstruct parenthood as a joint
effort, thereby further reducing the burdens of childcare for women. Because this new
father was often placed in contrast to the women reluctant to reproduce, this new paternal
figure clearly seems to have been imagined as a solution to the problem of women’s lack
of maternal desire.

The Power of Multiplying
By examining of the narratives of controlling birth in American culture, I uncover
a new narrative of reproduction that addresses the question of who’s controlling birth in
American society. This new narrative shows that as women gained control over their own
reproduction, various societal, cultural, and political forces attempted to control birth for
purposes that served the perceived societal good or their own subversive societal
agendas. Reproductive control intersected with already established narratives of class,
race, gender, and nation, often in surprising and unexpected ways, and attempts to control
birth ranged from medical to authoritative to emotional. Through it all, reproduction
remains a contested site of cultural power struggles, although the terms of the debate, the
desired outcomes, and the methods used have changed throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Controlling birth ultimately reveals, as Theodore Roosevelt terms it,
the “power of multiplying” (qtd. in Dryer 124).
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Chapter 2: “Peculiar Functional Interruptions:” The Rhetorical Logic of Birth Control
Advertisements in the Mid-Nineteenth Century and “Unnatural” Motherhood
In E.D.E.N. Southworth’s mid-nineteenth century sentimental novel The Hidden
Hand, Traverse, an upstanding youth devotedly in love with Clara, goes to see her
protective, loving father Doctor Day to ask for her hand in marriage. The doctor’s
concern with the marriage, though, is strangely not with whether or not Clara should
marry Traverse (this he has already accepted) but with at what age should she marry. He
asserts, “My child is but seventeen” and although “she will do anything in conscience
that you ask her to do,” he asks him to wait until she is at least twenty to marry (228).
His concern is for her health. He states,
No girl can marry before she is twenty without serious risk of life, and
almost certain loss of health and beauty; that so many do so is one reason
why there are such numbers of sickly and faded young wives. If Clara’s
constitution should be broken down by prematurely assuming cares and
burdens of matrimony, you would be as unfortunate in having a sickly
wife, as she would be in losing her health. (228)
Traverse, in turn, assures the doctor that his “affection for Clara is so pure and so
constant, as well as so confiding in her faith and so solicitous for her good,” that he can
wait until she is physically ready to be married (228).
This brief moment from a popular mid-nineteenth century novel provides a clear
point of entry into the complex nineteenth century discourse over women’s physical
health, reproduction, and sexuality. In the story, Doctor Day’s concern over his
daughter’s physical health manifests itself as a concern about her reproductive health.
The Doctor’s fears that his daughter taking on the “burdens of matrimony” prematurely
would result in a “certain loss of health” and perhaps even “serious risk of life” clearly

14

allude to concerns about the physical dangers of childbirth for women, and with good
reason, given the high rates of maternal mortality in childbirth in the nineteenth century.7
This acknowledgement of the physical risks of childbirth for women opens the
door for a reexamination of the primacy of the cultural dictate for motherhood in
sentimental culture. The nineteenth century witnessed the rise of the Cult of True
Womanhood, a cornerstone of which was the veneration of motherhood.8 Critics have
tended to focus on this aspect of true womanhood, and particularly the degree to which
these tenets placed restrictions on women, without fully exploring how the very tenets of
femininity were fundamentally in conflict and how these conflicts opened the door for
women to have access to the kind of sexual agency and reproductive control that they
appeared to preclude.9 Carroll Smith-Rosenberg and Charles Rosenberg have argued that
“men […] employed medical and biological arguments to rationalize traditional sex roles
as rooted inevitably and irreversibly in the prescriptions of anatomy and physiology”

7

Maternal mortality rates did not begin to significantly fall until the 1930s or 40s,
with the advancing of the germ theory and the resulting changes in hygiene and
sanitation. Prior to this point, childbirth all too often resulted in death or physical
damage for women. See Judith Walzer Leavitt and Whitney Walton’s “’Down to Death’s
Door:’ Women’s Perceptions of Childbirth in America” for a discussion of women’s
attitudes towards childbirth (Women and Health in America: Historical Readings
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999).
8
Barbara Welter’s foundational essay defines the Cult of True Womanhood as
piety, purity, submissiveness, and domesticity. Carroll Smith-Rosenberg describes it as
having “prescribed a female role bounded by kitchen and nursery, overlaid with piety and
purity, and crowned with subservience.” (Disorderly Conduct, 13). Even in SmithRosenberg’s figuration of it, the conflict between it being bounded by “kitchen and
nursery” and yet “overlaid with piety and purity” is apparent.
9
Several critics and historians have argued convincingly for how the Cult of True
Womanhood and dictates of femininity allowed women more social, moral, and political
agency but few have examined how the tenets themselves created a conflict in sexual
identity that conversely opened the door for greater, not less, sexual agency and
reproductive control.
15

(12). Simone Caron has argued a similar point about women’s ability to control their
own reproduction:
The history of reproductive control is a complex tale reflecting the
interests of two distinct factions: those pushing to control the reproductive
capacity of others and those determined to control their own reproductive
choices. The former have attempted to control the choices available to
women, presuming the latter cannot intelligently and rationally choose for
themselves. (2)
However, this argument, and the concurrent focus on the way the “men” used
physiological arguments to perpetuate “traditional sex roles,” fails to take into account
how the conflict between a dictate for women to be sexually “passionless” and a call for
women to be mothers opens up a subversive cultural space for women, one that actually
allows women to explore the limits of their sexual and reproductive agencies. I argue
that critics fail to sufficiently recognize the inherent conflict between decorous
anorgasmia and fecundity, one which allowed for, rather than precluded, greater access to
sexual agency and reproductive control for women.
I further argue that an analysis of the rhetorical logic of birth control
advertisements reveals the way that these products permitted greater sexual agency for
women, not simply because of the practical aspect of the use of birth control, but because
of the advertisers’ focus on reproductive control as a matter of health, rather than sex.
This logic created a cultural space for the use birth control, while the medical and societal
focus on women’s natural “passionlessness” provided a rationale for their declining
procreation. As a result, if women did not have children in as great of numbers as
women had had them in the past, it could be assumed that this was the result of their
“natural” passionlessness and not because of their use of birth control products. In other
words, passionlessness could function as a moral screen for the “immoral” use of birth
16

control by allowing women to seem virtuous in the lack of, or limited, production of
offspring.
The confusing, and often contradictory, medical views of the female body and the
relationship between physical health, reproductive health, and sexual desire and
procreation aided in creating this conflict. The medical community, despite its
ideological opposition to birth control products, actually helped create a rhetoric of the
female body and female sexuality that purveyors of contraceptives could capitalize on as
justification for using their products. Advertisers of birth control products managed to
create a subversive view of the female body that posited pregnancy as “unnatural,”
allowing women even greater ability to control their procreativity.
This chapter will describe how the medical view of women’s sexuality and
reproduction and the contradictions inherent within the Cult of True Womanhood
provided women in the nineteenth century with a means of managing their reproduction.
Whereas previously women had been largely at the mercy of their reproductive practices,
several factors, including the rise in birth control knowledge and products, the medical
community’s view of women’s sexuality and reproductive health, and the rise of
passionlessness as a central virtue of womanhood, came together in the mid-nineteenth
century and allowed women to assert greater control over their reproduction.
The argument for this chapter, then, is threefold: first, that the medical discourse
over women’s health, sexuality, and reproduction ironically presented pregnancy as an
unnatural state for women’s bodies; second, that the cultural dictates of decorous
anagosmia, or passionlessness, and the primacy of motherhood were in conflict, and
third, that purveyors of birth control products could capitalize on these two discourses
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(one medical, one moral) to create a moral screen that permitted the use birth control
products and still allowed women to seemingly remain within the realm of “proper”
womanhood.

The Rise of Modern Birth Control
One of the most profound and significant demographic shifts of the nineteenth
century was the decline in the reproductive rates of native-born, white middle class
women. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the birth rate for these women was 7.04
(Brodie). By the turn of the twentieth, that rate had fallen to 3.56, a decline of nearly
half. This precipitous drop in reproduction had far ranging effects on society, and
historians have tied it to a range of factors, from the changing value of children as
productive members of a household to the more modern view of them as “priceless,” to
the growing women’s rights movement and controversy over women’s roles, and from
status in nineteenth century society, to the eugenic and anti-immigrations movements of
the latter part of the century. Other discussions consider to what extent this decline is
reflected in other populations, particularly the working class, immigrants, and ethnic
groups. While all of these historical factors are certainly relevant in discussing the birth
rate’s decline, this chapter is less focused on what socioeconomic and demographic
factors led to this decline and more focused on how to understand this decline within the
terms of the nineteenth century Cult of True Womanhood.10 In other words, if the
10

While most probably the rise of birth control knowledge and its use provided the “how” of the
decreased reproductive rates of white, middle-class women, the why is a bit more complicated. One
significant socio-economic factor for this decline was that with the move from an agricultural/productive
family unit to urban/consumptive family unit, children became, for middle class families, economic
liabilities rather than assets. Whereas in previous centuries, more children meant more hands to work the
family farm or business, in the nineteenth century, the rise of the priceless child and the emphasis on
childrearing rather than childbearing made children costly, time and labor-intensive members of the
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message of motherhood was as culturally dominant as has been thought, how do we make
sense of such a dramatic demographic shift that seems to prove otherwise?
What is clear is that the technical answer to how this decline occurred can be
found in the rise of the knowledge and use of birth control in the nineteenth century. The
notion that nineteenth century couples achieved this decline in birth rate predominantly
through sexual abstinence seems, in the face of growing historical inquiry, increasingly
more a product of outdated views of Victorian sexuality than of any genuine historical
evidence.11 Clearly, to effectively decrease the rates of reproduction by nearly half in one
century, couples were practicing some form of birth control beyond simple abstinence.
Indeed, over the course of the nineteenth century, public discussion of contraception
increased significantly. In fact, the rise of the modern birth control movement can be
traced to 1831, with the publishing of two significant works on contraception: Dr.
Charles Knowlton’s Fruits of Philosophy, also titled The Private Companion of Young
Married People, and Robert Dale Owens’s Moral Philosophy. Knowlton’s book
contained the most comprehensive medical information on contraception of its time and
also advocated for family planning. Demonstrating that this rise of birth control
knowledge was not uncontested, Knowlton was tried for disseminating immoral materials

household, particularly with the increasing delayed onset of adulthood and the rising cost of education. It
simply no longer made economic sense for middle-class families to have a large number of children, and in
fact, it made sustaining a middle-class lifestyle significantly more difficult. For perhaps the first time in
American history, the number of children had an inverse relationship to the acquisition of wealth. On the
other hand, having fewer children was politically and socially advantageous for women. Women could
devote themselves more fully to the now greatly expanded demands of childrearing, with the particular
Republican Mother goal of raising pious future citizens, and also have more time to devote to social and
moral causes such as abolitionism, temperance, health and medical reform, and woman’s rights
movements. See Steven Mintz and Susan Kellogg’s Domestic Revolutions, Viviana Zelizer’s Pricing the
Priceless Child, and Carl Degler’s At Odds: Women and the Family in America form the Revolution to the
Present for a discussion of these factors that led to the changing family norms for middle class families in
the nineteenth century.
11
Janet Brodie notes that contrary to the notion that nineteenth century couples limited fertility
through sexual abstinence, her research indicates that sexual intimacy was a valued part of marriage.
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and spent time in jail for his work. And yet despite this Puritanical reaction to
Knowlton’s work, the public tide had turned. In the decades after Knowlton and Owens
published their works, public lectures on birth control practices became common, dozens
of pamphlets and books on contraception were published, and the number and types of
birth control products increased immensely.12
Prior to the nineteenth century, the major methods of contraception were limited
to coitus interruptus, abortion, and prolonged lactation. The nineteenth century, however,
witnessed a rise in reproductive technology with the invention, and increased use, of
douching, vaginal sponges, cervical caps, vaginal diaphragms, and condoms. For some of
these products, dating their origins is somewhat difficult. For example, the invention of
the first actual diaphragm is generally attributed to German physician Wilhelm Peter
Mensinga, although American versions of this product can be traced to patents in the
1840s and were generally circulating in advertisements by the 1850s. These cervical
caps, or “womb veils” as they were called, could actually be traced even further back to
German practices of midwives in rural farming communities at the turn of the century.
This difficulty in tracing the exact origins of these contraceptive products indicates a key
aspect of birth control culture: often the knowledge and use of birth control existed in the
shadowy background of women’s lives, passed down between women and regulated by
the female midwives who ministered to their “female” needs. This oral culture of
knowledge began to change in the nineteenth century, though, as birth control came out
of the woman’s closet and into the public sphere of medical discourse and advertisers. In
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Brodie’s Contraception and Abortion, James Mohr’s Abortion in America, and Leslie Reagan’s
When Abortion Was a Crime provide extensive discussions of the history of contraceptives in America,
including discussions of the proliferation of birth control products in the nineteenth century and increasing
regulation of their dissemination and use.
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fact, Janet Brodie notes that knowledge of birth control practices was sometimes recorded
in family bibles or cookbooks, a clear indication of contraception’s movement from the
whispered words to the written practices of women.
This dramatic decline in birthrate combined with the increase in types of, and
available knowledge about, reproductive technologies clearly indicate that women used
reproductive control practices to limit progeny. The three major methods of reproductive
control in the nineteenth century shifted to coitus interruptus, or withdrawal, which
continued to be popular, douching syringes, made more easily and inexpensively with the
vulcanization of rubber in 1844, and the rhythm method, which was introduced in the
1840s with the discovery of the ovulatory cycle.13 Other methods resulting from
advances in science and medicine such as condoms, mass produced for the first time in
the 1840s, intrauterine devices (IUDs), which were made out of wood, rubber, and metal,
and pharmaceutical contraceptives such as sponges, suppositories, spermicides, and
chemically coated tampons were also common. The number and type of these products
increased exponentially throughout the nineteenth century, as did women’s knowledge of
them through increases in public lectures and pamphlets or tracts on birth control
products, as well as through advertisements in print mediums.14

Sex, Passion, and Motherhood
The significant increase in the use of contraceptives occurred alongside the rise of
the Republican Mother and a dramatic increase in the veneration of motherhood. Carroll
13

Jill Matus’s Unstable Bodies: Victorian Representations of Sexuality and Maternity (New York:
Manchester University Press, 1995).
14
See Jill Matus’s Unstable Bodies, Linda Gordon’s The Moral Property of Women, Lana
Thompson’s The Wandering Womb, and Brodie’s Contraception and Abortion in Nineteenth Century
America for a discussion of birth control technologies and practices in the nineteenth century.
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Smith-Rosenberg and Charles Rosenberg have noted that “motherhood was woman’s
normal destiny, and those females who thwarted the promise immanent in their body’s
design must expect to suffer” (13). It was woman’s job to “fulfill her ordained role as
mother of numerous and healthy offspring” (187). This argument, while having held
critical sway for quite some time, fails in some ways to recognize the complexities of the
dictates of womanhood for sentimental culture, as well as the demographic realities of the
failing birthrate. While the reverence of motherhood as the highest state of womanhood
in some ways became fetishized in the nineteenth century, this fetishization did not
operate in a unilateral and punitive fashion, or, in other words, solely by society placing
expectations on women and imposing sanctions against those who failed to live up to
their roles. As many feminist critics have noted, women, and the women’s rights groups
who advocated and spoke for them, were often active agents in the fetishization of
motherhood because it allowed them greater access to societal influence and legitimated
their role in society.
Despite the political and social gains this fetishization allowed, I argue that the
belief in women’s “natural” lack of sexual desire complicated this call for fecundity by
exposing the inherent tension between these two gender expectations. The relationship
between sex and passion in the process of reproduction is central to understanding these
conflicting views of femininity. Passionlessness has long been viewed as a cornerstone
of Victorian femininity. This view of women’s utter lack of sexual drive or desire is
perhaps best represented by Dr. William Acton’s claim in his work Functions and
Disorders of the Reproductive Organs that “the majority of women (happily for them) are
not very much troubled with sexual feeling of any kind” (qtd. in D’Emilio and Freedman
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79). Critical debate over whether or not this view is actually representative of the
medical view of women’s sexuality at the time and of women’s actual lived experiences
serves the important purpose of exploring the historical truth about views of women’s
sexual practices in the nineteenth century. Nancy Cott, who coined the term
“passionlessness” to describe the lack of sexual desire or passion advocated for these
women, describes the term as representing the shift from “a traditionally dominant
Anglo-American definition of women as especially sexual which was reversed and
transformed between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries into the view that
women (although still primarily identified by their female gender) were less carnal and
lustful than men” (57).
Carl Degler provides counter-evidence of physicians and advice writers who did
not conform to the view that women were essentially lacking in sexual desire. He asserts
that these texts “suggest, at the very least, that there was a sharp difference of medical
opinion, rather than a consensus, on the nature of women’s sexual feelings and needs”
(1467). In fact, he points out, “There is some reason to believe, as we shall see, that the
so-called Victorian conception of women’s sexuality was more of an ideology seeking to
be established than the prevalent view of practices of even middle-class women,
especially as there is a substantial amount of nineteenth-century writing about women
that assumes the existence of strong sexual feelings in women” (1473). His claim that
passionlessness represents more of an ideology about sexuality than the historical
practices of real women, however, helps to underscore my argument about the rhetorical,
rather than descriptive, role that this idea played in the culture. Although preachers and
physicians alike used the idea of women’s lack of sexual desire descriptively, in reality
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the dictate seems to have functioned more prescriptively. But unlike Degler, I do not
view the prescriptive nature as in any way lessening Cott’s argument about the
importance of passionlessness in the culture. Instead, the very prescriptiveness of the
dictate means that the idea of passionlessness carried a great deal of ideological weight.
As such, it could be used as a weapon of moralization, as other historians have pointed
out, but it could also be put to other, more subversive purposes.
One such purpose arises from the fact that passionlessness creates a contradiction
for a culture that also fetishized motherhood and viewed women’s proper and primary
roles as mothers. The medical discovery of ovulation in 1843, and the related discovery
that female “heat” or passion was not needed for reproduction, perhaps indicates that
women increasingly in the nineteenth century could be seen as fecund and not sexual. As
Jill Matus points out, though, even after the discovery of ovulation, medical texts
continued to argue that ovulation and fecundation resulted from female sexual
excitement. The biomedical discovery of ovulation “laid the framework for a doctrine of
female passionlessness and passivity” but “that doctrine was by no means orthodox or
representative during the Victorian period” (Matus 43). To indicate just how contentious
and ideologically fraught the relationship between passion and fecundity was, Dr.
Thomas Kay writes in the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1891, almost
fifty years after the discovery of ovulation, that prostitutes could avoid pregnancy by not
becoming sexually aroused during intercourse. He gave an example of a married woman
who controlled her body’s reaction to disease by not “allowing her passions to be
aroused” (Thompson 131).15 Women who were fecund, then, risked being seen as

15

Jill Matus argues for a view of Victorian sexuality as a “vexed” category. She asserts that
“according to the Foucauldian view that sexuality is constituted through representation, biomedical
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succumbing to “female heat” and “allowing her passions to be aroused,” associating them
with common prostitutes, and those able to control their bodies did so by controlling their
passions. Clearly, within the medical community, the debate over whether or not
reproduction resulted from sexual passion continued well into the twentieth century.16
In fact, the debate preceded the nineteenth century as well. The female orgasm,
writes Donald Symons, “inspires interest, debate, polemics, ideology, technical manuals,
and scientific and popular literature solely because it is so often absent.” Perhaps one of
the most enduring of these debates, at least within the medical community prior to the
twentieth century, was the question of whether female orgasm was instrumental for
reproduction. In fact, ancient physicians’ primary concern, if they happened to discuss
the female orgasm at all, was with whether it was necessary for conception.17 The history

literature is an important participant in constructing what we have come to understand by Victorian
sexuality. To pursue Foucault’s terms we would say that sexuality is never logically prior to its written
representations; however much it is represented as natural—a matter of biological fact—sexuality belongs
to culture, and its history is thus the history of its discourses. Recent explorations of the narratives of
reproductive biology have shown how scientific representations of sex are deployed ideologically and how
the grounding of sexual difference in ostensibly natural facts both reflects and serves ideologies of
gender”(22). As a result, “conflicting and sometimes contradictory formulations make up the discursive
history of reproductive biology”(23). Contrary to the notion of reproduction and pregnancy in the
nineteenth century as fixed and stable (because of the primacy we give passionlessness as a cultural dictate
for women) scientific depictions of reproduction were ideologically caught up in debates over women’s
sexuality.
16
In fact, the debate over whether or not menstruation was connected to ovulation continued
throughout the nineteenth century. As late at the 1890s, the medical community was still debating whether
the exact purpose of the menstrual cycle, whether it was related to ovulation, or whether the uterus was an
independent organ that performed the menstrual function without external aid, generally thought to be the
effect of the moon on the female body. Some doctors, influenced by Victorian disgust at the sexual and
reproductive processes, still believed menstruation to be pathological. As these make clear, little concrete
knowledge existed about the exact nature of the female reproductive processes, and much remained open
for ideological debate. See Vern Bullough and Martha Voght, “Women, Menstruation, and NineteenthCentury Medicine," Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 47 (1973): 66-82, for a thorough discussion of
nineteenth-century medical views of menstruation and reproductive processes.
17
Greek philosopher Aetius believed that a “certain tremor” was necessary for conception while
Soranus viewed female sexual desire, rather than orgasm, as the prerequisite condition for conception.
Medieval physicians held that nothing was necessary beyond male ejaculation, and in Tudor and Stuart
England, thought that not only was female orgasm necessary for conception to occur, but that sexual
arousal in women without the accompanying release of orgasm was unhealthful, as it caused an imbalance
in the humors since the blood rushed to the sexual orgasms during arousal and would remain there without
orgasm. It was thought that female orgasm caused contractions that released the blood back into the
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of scientific views of female orgasm also shows a continued concern with the relationship
between female sexual desire and health. Prior to the nineteenth century, physicians
advanced the idea that women’s physical health was connected to her sexual desire,
arguing for either a positive or negative relationship. Some doctors, such as Ambroise
Pate, expressed the view in 1634 that women with strong sexual desires and healthy
appetites were less likely to experience imbalance of the systems since their humors
flowed more freely. Other doctors held that an excess of sexual desire was detrimental to
the woman’s overall health and reproductive potential. As Abraham Zacuto argued in
1637, excessive sexual desire “is a dreadful and odious ailment, for it interferes with
intercourse and conception” (qtd. in Maines 53). As Rachel Maines notes, “Relief from
unhealthful congestion was … a standard refrain in medical discussions of the importance
of orgasm to both men and women” (53). While physicians of the Renaissance and later
may have had moral and ideological reservations about the female orgasm, particularly
those produced through clitoral stimulation, they nonetheless felt that unreleased sexual
desire was unhealthful for both men and women.
This view changed, though, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the
medical community embraced the view of women as innately lacking in sexual desire.
This medical view of female sexual desire emerged because of a belief that women either
“enjoyed intercourse sufficiently with or without the resolution now medically defined as
orgasm, or that normal women experienced no sexual feelings at all” (Maines 59). The
famous nineteenth century physician Richard von Krafft-Ebing, in a stunningly revealing

circulation of the body, restoring balance to the body’s humors. For a discussion of the medical history of
orgasm and its relationship to reproduction, see Thompson’s Wandering Womb and Maine’s Technology of
Orgasm.
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expression of this view, wrote, “Woman, however, when physically and mentally normal
and properly educated, has but little sensual desire. If it were otherwise, marriage and
family life would be empty words” (qtd. in Maines 55). The belief in women’s sexual
frigidity and complete lack of sexual interest was popular both medically and culturally
in the nineteenth century and was not limited to single, unmarried women. As Rachel
Maines puts it, “Physicians, popular culture, and even some feminists attempted in the
nineteenth century to establish decorous anorgasmia as a normal, even desirable,
feminine trait” (66). Many critics have rightly argued that this view held certain benefits
for women, particularly with the dangers of pregnancy and all its potential complications
and risks. Nancy Cott, as well as John D’Emilio, Estelle Freedman, and others, have
argued that the view of women’s passionlessness offered women moral authority and
granted them some power within sexual relationships to refuse sexual advances on moral
grounds. Beyond the sexual realm, this added moral authority gave women access to
greater social and political influence. Even further, historians have noted how the dictate
of passionlessness could aid women in limiting family size by giving them this moral
authority to refuse sexual relations with their husbands, a practice that nineteenth century
feminists embraced as “voluntary motherhood.”

Pregnancy as “Unnatural”
Passionlessness alone does not fully explain women’s newfound ability to control
her reproductive practices. Women needed to combine their supposed passionlessness
with a medical reason for managing their reproduction. They found this reason in the
way that the medical community approached their reproductive health. Doctors used the
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language of disease and degeneration when talking about the dangers of contraception. 18
Generally, the emerging, male-dominated medical community of the nineteenth century
was opposed to birth control for a variety of professionally, socially, and politically
motivated reasons, and these denouncements largely took the forms of medical expertise
and knowledge. As late as the end of the nineteenth century, doctors continued to
advocate the view that birth control was medically ineffective, despite the demographic
evidence to the contrary. H.S. Pomeroy, a doctor writing in 1888 of these issues,
represents the typical medical view:
It is surprising to what an extent the laity believe that medical science
knows how to control the birth-rate. Just here let me say that I know of
but one prescription which is both safe and sure—namely, that the sexes
shall remain apart. So thoroughly do I believe this to be a secret which
Nature has kept to herself, that I should be inclined to question the ability
or the honesty of any one professing to understand it so as to be able
safely and surely to regulate the matter of reproduction. (qtd. in Gordon
106)
This view, though, was more the result of moral and political views than the result of
“science” and was certainly connected to the dispute between the growing
professionalized medical community and midwives and popular health movements over
who would have dominion over women’s bodies. In fact, despite the fact that for
centuries, women’s reproductive health was seen as the purview of female midwives,
increasingly, the professional medical establishment began to lay claim to doctor’s right
to minister to the female body. Birth control, in this scenario, represented both the threat
of the non-professional medical community, which professional doctors increasingly
18

See James Reed “Doctors, Birth Control, and Social Values, 1830-1870,” The Therapeutic
Revolution: Essays in the Social History of Human Medicine, ed. Morris Vogel and Charles Rosenberg,
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), Brodie’s Contraception and Abortion, and Mohr’s
Abortion in America for a discussion of the medical community’s complex views of contraceptives and
abortion.
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represented as charlatans and quacks who often sold the birth control products and
instructed on the use of such items, and the threat of women’s own control over their
bodies and reproductive processes. Neither of which were seen as advantageous for the
growing professional medical community.
Many doctors thought that the use of contraception led to permanent sterility and
referred to birth control as “onanism,” or fruitless intercourse resulting “wasting seed”
(Gordon 106). Women who engaged in reproductive control practices were called
“legitimate prostitutes” or were considered to engage in “marital masturbation.” In a
particularly condemning 1893 anti-abortion tract, Abbot Kinney wrote, “Sexual
intercourse, unhallowed by the creation of the child, is lust…wife without children is a
mere sewer to pass off the unfruitful and degraded passions and lust of one man”
(Gordon 11).
Adding to this sense of the medical community’s conflation of sexual excesses
with the physical health of the body was the medical view of women’s health as
fundamentally connected to her reproductive health. Victorian medical texts viewed the
ovaries as “the workshop of generation” and held that “it is on account of the ovaries that
women is what she is” (Matus 32). As Smith-Rosenberg puts it, for doctors, “those
aspects of woman’s physiology that were uniquely female—menstruation, pregnancy,
childbirth, lactation, and menopause, as well as a host of gynecological diseases—
determined all of a woman’s other physical and social experiences” and caused male
physicians to view women as “dominated by their reproductive processes” (23). One
mid-century physician asserted that “Woman’s reproductive organs are pre-eminent”
because “they exercise a controlling influence upon her entire system, and entail upon her
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many painful and dangerous diseases. They are the source of her peculiarities, the centre
of her sympathies, and the seat of her diseases. Everything that is peculiar to her, springs
from her sexual organization” (qtd. in Smith-Rosenberg 184). Women’s reproductive
health and all of its “peculiarities” were seen as the source of her overall physical heath.
Even her sexual “health” had grave implications for her physical well being.
“Excessive” sexuality in women was considered a disease.19 John Harvey Kellogg, best
known as the inventor of Kellogg’s Corn Flakes, ran a nineteenth century sanitarium in
Michigan where he attempted to “cure” men and women of unhealthy excessive sexual
desire. In writing on the dangers of masturbation for both sexes, he asserted that “the
dangers [of masturbation] were terrible to behold, since genital excitement produced
intense congestion and led to urethral irritation, enlarged prostate in males, bladder and
kidney infection, priapism, piles and prolapse of the rectum, atrophy of the testes,
varicocele, nocturnal emissions, and general exhaustion” (qtd. in Thompson 136). While
the nineteenth century medical community was convinced of the dangers of masturbation
for either sex, for women, whose overall health was thought to be dependent on their
reproductive health, the consequences of sexual excesses were cause for even graver
concern. For example, Dr. Baker Brown’s book Surgical Diseases of Women advocated
the idea that masturbation was the main cause of female insanity. Similarly, Dr. Hollick
thought that an enlarged clitoris could “degenerate into gangrene, fungus, or cancer”
(Hollick 604). Any sexual violation of a women’s body, which usually referred to
masturbation, particularly at the outset of puberty, had grave repercussions for her later
physical health. One physician noted of female puberty,
19

Excessive sexual passion was medically considered unhealthful for both sexes, but I have chosen
to focus on the particular way that the medical community viewed excessive sexuality in women as a
degeneration and disease.
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It is now that every hidden germ of disease is ready to spring up; and there
is scarcely a disorder to which the young and growing female is subjected,
which is not at this occasionally to be seen, and very often in fatal form…
Coughs become consumptive and scrofula exerts its utmost influence in
the constitution and deforms the figure of the body…The dimensions of
that bony outlet of the female frame is also altered and diminished on
which so much of the safety and comparative ease depends in childbirth.
This, indeed, is the cause of almost every distressing and fatal labor that
occurs and it is at this period of life [puberty] …that such an unspeakable
misfortune may be prevented. (Smith-Rosenberg 187)
Here, the “hidden germ of disease” that threatens to “spring up” shows how sexuality
itself was seen as the manifestation of some hidden disease in the female body, which
affected both her physical health (coughs and consumption, physical deformations of the
body, etc.), as well as her reproductive health (the threat of “distressing and fatal labor”).
Clearly, the moral dictate for decorous anorgasmia was literally for a woman’s own good.
This medical view of the female body and the connection between reproductive
and physical health shows the extent to which mid-nineteenth century rhetoric about the
body, particularly as it related to sexuality, imagined it as an organism that represented a
self-regulating system, i.e. a system that must maintain equilibrium within itself to
preserve health and order, a notion based in the belief of the dangers of the “excess” on
health. This was particularly important in matters of health and sexual relations. Writers
of advice literature advocated strongly for self-regulation of the body’s systems and
“inundated America with the message that bodily well-being required that individuals
practice sexual self-control” (D’Emilio and Freedman 72). These writers based their view
of sexual activity on the prevalent notion in the scientific community that the body
represented a “closed energy system” and, as such, its resources were depleted by each
use. Excessive sexuality, they argued, posed a physical danger to the health of the system
and, therefore, the overall health and well-being of the individual. If, as Smith31

Rosenberg asserts, doctors viewed women’s bodies as containing “only a limited amount
of energy—energy needed for the full development of her uterus and ovaries,” any
activities that depleted the resources of the female system were seen as harmful (187).
This argument was most commonly put forth to men, whose depletion of
resources was physically manifested after each sex act in a way that a woman’s was not
and was typified by the conception of “spermatic control.” Historians point out that men
were encouraged to control their baser sexual natures, not only to properly conserve their
own sexual system, but also to control over-indulgence of sexual activity on their wives.
As one advice writer put it,
Many a man who would have been a good husband if he had only known
how, and who would not for his life, much less a momentary pleasure if
afforded, have endangered the health, or hazarded the happiness of a wellbeloved wife, has destroyed her health, happiness and life (some men
several wives successively) by excessive sexual indulgence. (qtd. in
Walters 82)
Women, however, were in some ways at even greater risk of physical harm from the
dangers of sexual health, given the fact that the overall health of their bodies was seen as
so dependent upon their reproductive and sexual health. As a result, writers advocated for
the exercising of male sexual self-control to prevent the negative results of overindulgence in sexual practices for women.
Even further, the medical uncertainty about the line between abortion and
miscarriage raised further questions about exactly how to regulate the female system.
During the early nineteenth century, little distinction was made between abortion and
contraception, and the exact status of abortion in the nineteenth century currently
continues to be a subject of critical debate. Generally, at least in the early part of the
century, abortion itself, as long as it was prior to quickening, was not considered a legal
32

issue.20 In fact, when it occurred before quickening, abortion was often medically seen
as miscarriage, or the body’s “natural expulsion of the fetus” (Burns, Observations on
Abortion). As Simone Caron explains, “Physicians and the public alike generally did not
believe pregnancy could be confirmed during the first trimester. Many women and their
doctors assumed the abeyance of the menstrual cycle could result from a blockage as
much as from pregnancy” (16). That the source of the “blockage” could result from
either pregnancy or from some other physical disruption of the women’s reproductive
systems meant that doctors, and society, could not adequately distinguish between a
medically-necessary inducement of menses and an abortion. As a result, doctors felt that
“the health of the woman depended on the secretion of the womb, and it is consequently
of great importance that this should be corrected whenever any derangement as to
quantity or quality may occur” (Gaston 459-60). The “secretion of the womb” referred to
here is of course menstruation, but the logic of the sentiment indicates that any absence in
“quality” or “quantity” of menses is a “derangement” of the system necessitating
“correction.” In alluding to the continued debate over the nature of public sentiment
about abortion, historian Cornelia Hughes Dayton points out that “abortion attempts were
far from rare” but “outrage over the destruction of the fetus or denunciations of those
James Mohr’s foundational work Abortion in America sets the terms for the current
debate over the history of abortion in America. Mohr puts forth the view that the nineteenthcentury anti-abortion campaign was a historical aberration that resulted from the American
Medical Association’s crusade to criminalize abortion to serve its own professional
advancement. Since Mohr, scholars have discussed the history of abortion often within Mohr’s
term, either to support or refute them. Marvin Olasky’s Abortion Rites: A Social History of
Abortion in America refutes several of Mohr’s central premises, predominantly the idea that prior
to the nineteenth century there was no criminalizing of abortion, the argument in the nineteenth
century abortion was mainstream and common, and the view of AMA as a “politically conscious
organization.” See also Leslie Regan’s When Abortion Was a Crime and Simon Caron’s Who
Chooses? for a discussion on the popular morality of abortion in the nineteenth century and for
the role quickening played in determining pregnancy.
20
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who would arrest ‘nature’s proper course’” were “strikingly absent.”21 Perhaps the reason
that these denunciations were “strikingly absent” was the very confusion over whether
early abortion was abortion or whether it was a “natural,” or even medically-induced but
necessary return to menses. In other words, given the lack of concrete medical
knowledge of the fetus in early pregnancy in the nineteenth century, doctors could hardly
be faulted for ministering to their female patients who complained of “interrupted” or
“blocked” menses and who perhaps were in some physical and/or emotional distress. It
is not surprising, given this indistinguishable line between a lack of orderly functioning
of the menstrual cycle because of pregnancy or some other unknown “blockage,” that
restoring the “order of the system,” if that is what the patient so desired, would be seen in
medical, and not moral, terms.
Given this medical confusion over pregnancy and harmful obstructions of the
female system, it is not surprising that purveyors of contraceptive and abortifacient
products capitalized on the ironic medical construction of pregnancy as an “unnatural”
state for women to advertise their wares. If pregnancy was seen as a possibly “unnatural”
state for women, then women could control pregnancy under the guise of “regulating”
their systems while remaining virtuous, “true” women. This allowed birth control
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Henry C. Wright put forth the first feminist argument for abortion in The Unwelcome Child
(1858). He argued that abortion was an unfortunate, but necessary, result of the excessive sexual demands
that husbands made on their wives. His view mirrored those of the woman’s right movements. Elizabeth
Cady Stanton argued that the growing number of abortions was a result of the “degradation of women” at
the hands of their male partners. While feminists of the nineteenth century could understand what drove
women to abort, they did not condone it and hoped that marriage reform would erase the need for
abortion. They even opposed contraception on the grounds that it allowed men access to sex both inside
and outside of marriage without any of the repercussions of their sexual demands. They did, however,
advocate for “Voluntary Motherhood,” the feminist slogan for women’s control of their reproduction that
involved only engaging in sexual activity when the intended consequence was reproduction. It is not
difficult to see why their mode of reproductive control was not as popular as some others. See Andrea
Tone’s Controlling Reproduction, (Wilmington: SR Books, 1997).
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products to hide behind the medicalization of pregnancy and the male biomedical view of
women’s reproductive processes—menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth, and
menopause—as possible sources of diseases and derangements of women’s biological
systems in order to permit women to control their reproductive practices without entering
into the contentious world of feminist socio-political ideology.

Pregnancy as Obstruction
Advertisers of birth control products, then, could capitalize on the fears of
“derangement” of the female system, as well as the medical discourse surrounding the
female body that viewed any disruption of the reproductive processes or threats to
reproductive health as threats to women’s overall physical health, by depicting their
products as merely offering a “cure” for the obstructions that plagued women’s
reproductive systems, whatever the cause of such obstructions. Despite the view that the
“medical vision of women’s physiology and sexuality served to reinforce a conservative
view of women’s social and domestic roles,” (Smith-Rosenberg 23) a rhetorical analysis
of advertisements of contraceptives reveals how a particular discourse, even if its intent is
restrictive or repressive in nature, can be subversively repurposed to serve the agenda of
other, competing interests. The medicalizing of the Cult of True Womanhood aided in
the construction of this alternate agenda. Purveyors of birth control products manipulated
medical language of disease and the female body in order to serve their own agendas—to
sell their products. That they offered women a moral screen for regulating reproduction
was a byproduct of the rhetorical logic that they used to do so.
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In fact, the print advertisements for these products relied on a complex, codified
set of language practices to both incorporate the biomedical view of menses into their
pitch for their products and to shield themselves from public outcry about the exact
nature of their services they offered. An ad for a product that is not aimed specifically at
curing reproductive illness helps to show how the pervasive language and rhetoric of
disease is an integral part of these practices (see figure 1).

Figure 1: The Cause of Disease. Weekly Messenger. Sept. 7, 1842. APS.

This 1842 ad from the Weekly Messenger highlights the rhetorical logic of general
advertisements for medical products prevalent at the time—that the body is subject to
obstructions that prevent the orderly operations of the system and that the cure is the
removal of said obstruction. The ad reveals a significant part of the rhetorical logic of
medicinal products in the mid-nineteenth century—that disease itself was simply an
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obstruction or blockage that could be cured by removal. In other words, these
advertisements essentially depicted the body as an orderly system that became blocked by
the obstruction of disease.
An analysis of the language of birth control advertisements reveals that these
advertisements operated under the same logic. Although some historians have noted that
these ads employed a sort of rhetorical code to describe the processes of pregnancy and
menstruation in order to mask the true nature of their products, none has analyzed the
rhetoric of the ads themselves.22 By the 1860’s, advertisements for over twenty-five
different chemical abortifacients could be found in newspapers, periodicals, and
pharmacies (D’Emilio and Freedman 63). These products were often advertised as
“cures” for “obstructed menses” or “interrupted menstruation,” and they operated
rhetorically within the space between abnormal functioning of the female system due to
disease, which necessitated medical intervention, usually in the form of a medicallyinduced miscarriage or abortion, and the normal absence of menstruation due to
pregnancy. Indeed the popular periodicals of the time featured ads that offered to cure
“suppressed menses,” (New York Daily Times, Oct. 16, 1851) “suppression, irregularity,
or retention of the menses,” (Philanthropist, Aug. 13, 1839) and the “the irregularities,
suppressions and obstructions of Nature” (New York Times, Nov. 25, 1862).
These products, then, clearly aim to control reproduction predominantly by acting
as abortifacients and inducing miscarriage while posing these actions as simply a
reestablishing of the healthful order of the system by stopping the “unnatural” and
unhealthful cessation of menses. By positing the pregnancy as an “obstruction,” they
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See D’Emilio and Freedman for a discussion of the prevalence of these types of advertisements
and their use of code language to describe their product’s purpose.
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associate it with the obstruction that the earlier ad claimed was the cause of disease and
that must be purged in order to restore to the system to health.
Other ads make this connection even more clearly. An analysis of ads
specifically marketed as cures for reproductive health reveals both how similar these
particular advertisements are to the earlier one promising only to cure “disease” and how
closely these ads rely on the medical rhetoric of reproduction, as well as the biomedical
view of women’s overall health as at the mercy of their reproductive health.
Dr. Geissner’s Menstrual Pills (see figure 2 on next page) claim to be “most
astonishing in their effects in reaching and removing the various irregularities,
suppressions, and obstructions of Nature.” Many of these types of advertisements of
contraceptives, while still using the terminology of disease of the other ads, replace the
term “menses” with the term “Nature,” thereby further highlighting the extent to which
women’s physiological system, their “natural” internal order, was equated with their
sexual reproductive organs and the way that this equation firmly connected the physical
reality of pregnancy with the diseased body that must be cured. In addition, the ad
indicates the blurred line between products that act as traditional forms of birth control
and those that act as abortifacients, as it, in addition to its claim to “reach” and “remove”
the “suppression” or “obstruction” of Nature, also promises to “act like a charm…never
failing to afford relief, and always successful as a preventative.” In effect, the product
claims to both remove and prevent menstrual obstructions, or to either induce
miscarriage, to act as an abortifacient, or prevent pregnancy in the first place.
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Figure 2: Dr. Geissner’s Menstrual Pills. New York Daily Times. Aug. 18, 1855. APS.

Other ads go even further in associating women’s physical health with the
maintenance of regulatory systems. The Compound Vegetable Systematic Pills (see
figure 3 on next page) are advertised as “strong cathartic or purgative pills” that act as a
“deobstruent” agent for the female reproductive system. These pills “are recommended
in almost all complaints which Females are subject to, such an [sic] obstructions of
customary evacuations.” By referring to the “obstructions of customary evacuations,” it
of course references the evacuation that occurs during a woman’s menstrual cycle, an
evacuation that of course does not occur when obstructed by pregnancy. Consequently,
while men’s evacuations during sexual intercourse are considered hazardous to the
physical health of their system, the menstrual evacuation of women here is put in conflict
with the obstruction that is pregnancy, which is figured as posing the greater physical
39

harm. For women, then, it is the lack of the evacuation of their system that poses the
physical threat to their overall health. Pregnancy, then, by definition could be seen as an
unhealthful lack of evacuation of the female reproductive body, thereby posing the threat
of physical harm to women. The rhetorical logic of these ads, then, can be seen as
participating in a construction of pregnancy as unnatural.

Figure 3: Compound Vegetable Systematic Pills. Boston Masonic Mirror, Jan. 18, 1834. APS

Even while participating in the biomedical discourse of women’s reproductive
physical health, these ads also acknowledge the effect of this suppression of menses on
women’s emotional health. Some ads, while perhaps more obtuse in their meaning, are
move evocative of the emotional dangers involved for women when suffering from
“peculiar functional interruptions” (see figure 4 on the next page). Radway’s Ready
Relief, although not specifically marketing a contraceptive product, assures that “ladies
find it a present help for the debility occasioned by miscarriage and for the tortures they
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suffer from peculiar functional interruptions.” While this ad seems aimed at women
suffering from the “debility” of miscarriage, among other assorted ailments, the language
used in reference to the “tortures” that they endure from “peculiar functional
interruptions” indicates an awareness of the advertising rhetoric of birth control products.
It evokes the language of obstruction and blockage so prevalent in the birth control
product ads, and the reference to the “tortures” seems to clearly indicate both the physical
maladies and the emotional distress induced by unwanted pregnancy.

Figure 4: Radway’s Ready Relief. New York Times, Oct. 22, 1860. APS
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In fact, beginning in the 1860s, the ads for birth control products began to evince
simultaneously both more reticence and more openness in advertising their products, a
move most probably brought on by the growing campaign against birth control
products.23
For example, Lyon’s Periodical Drops (see figure 5 on next page) assures that
they “cure all complaints incident to the sex, and remove all obstructions of nature, from
whatever cause, producing health, vigor and strength.” Further, “they cure all those ills to
which the female system is subjected, with dispatch and a degree of certainty which
nothing but a scientifically compounded fluid preparation could reach.” In fact, they
“guarantee…to cure Suppression of the Menses, from whatever cause.” Like the
previous ads, this example claims that it can “remove obstructions of nature” and is able
“to cure Suppression of the Menses.” It even references the rhetoric of restoring the
order to the female system by asserting it can “cure all those ills to which the female
system is subjected” and will restore “health, vigor and strength.” Even more, it too blurs
the line between preventing and ending pregnancy by claiming that the pills “are
particularly adapted [to married women], as they bring the monthly period with such
perfect regularity.” Unlike the earlier ads, though, this example ends with a much more
explicit statement of the pills’ effect on the reproductive system of women by cautioning
that “care should be taken to ascertain if pregnancy be the cause, as these DROPS [sic]
would be sure to produce miscarriage, if taken whilst in that situation, and all are
23

See Kristen Luker’s Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood, (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1984) and Reagan’s When Abortion Was a Crime for a discussion of the criminalization of abortion,
and Nicole Beisel’s Imperiled innocents : Anthony Comstock and family reproduction in Victorian
America, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) for a discussion of the Comstock Act and its affect
on the dissemination of birth control products and literature.
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cautioned against them, as I wish it distinctly understood that I do not hold myself
responsible when used under such circumstances.” The addition of this last disclaimer,
given the shared rhetoric of this type of ad with earlier ones, none of which give a similar
warning, indicates that it is more a precaution against the growing legal complications
resulting from selling birth control and abortifacient products than a genuine statement of
the intended use of this product. In other words, the examination of the rhetoric of birth
control ads reveals that this is in fact exactly the intended use of these products, a fact
that women were well aware of, and that this caution is more a result of political and
legal machinations than indicative of the true intent of the product’s user.

Figure 5: Lyon’s Periodical Drops. New York Times, Oct. 7, 1864. APS
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In appealing to the female consumer in terms of the biomedical view of the
female body, these birth control ads serve to illuminate a cultural view of the female body
that imagined pregnancy as somehow outside of the natural state of a woman’s biological
system. The unnaturalness of pregnancy for women, while seemingly running counter to
the long-held critical and cultural belief in the supremacy of women’s roles as mothers in
the nineteenth century, actually ties in with the more messy, nuanced problem that
dictates of motherhood created for women in a culture whose perhaps only other greater
cultural dictate was passionlessness. Because of the emphasis on passionlessness, in
some respects, women could more easily adhere to the societal dictates about women’s
sexuality by not having children than by having them. The marketing of birth control
products to women as cures for the unnatural state of pregnancy reveals how decorous
anorgasmia actually served women’s interest to an even greater extent than has been
previously argued by showing how passionlessness served as a moral screen for the use
of contraceptives. Advertisers of these products could wisely capitalize on this cultural
conflict by using rhetoric that focused on the medically gray area between harmful
obstructions of the female system and pregnancy, and in the process, advocated a view
that made pregnancy “unnatural” for women, calling into question the very notion of
“natural” motherhood.
This rhetoric surrounding the female body and women’s sexuality in the midnineteenth century created an environment of confusing and conflicting societal dictates
for women, which opened the door for advertisers of birth control products to exploit the
medical view of women’s health as dependent on their reproductive health in order to
market their products as a solution to the “unnatural” problem of blocked menses, even
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when the term “blocked menses” stood for pregnancy. Passionlessness, then, served as a
moral shield for the use of contraceptives. In other words, these advertisements opened
up a cultural space that made it possible for women to buy into the rhetoric of the birth
control ads—meaning women weren’t ending or preventing pregnancy, they were simply
availing themselves of medical treatments for their “blocked” systems—and then if
nineteenth century women failed to have children with the same frequency as their
mothers did, there was the confusion of medical views between women’s sexual arousal
and pregnancy to blame. Women could therefore use contraceptives to limit or avoid
pregnancy and yet appear simply to be the chaste and virtuous women society told them
they should be, women who simply did not enjoy sex. It was no wonder they did not get
pregnant.
The logic of the contraceptive ads allowed women to separate the regulating of
their “system” from the regulating of reproduction. The former was a medical necessity,
operating outside of the realm of issues of morality or threats to the patriarchal order.
The latter was a dangerous, immoral, and potentially physically harmful practice that
only libidinous women such as prostitutes engaged in, which threatened the very fabric of
the social order and proved that such women were interested in sex for its own sake.
These women clearly did not adhere to the standards of femininity of the culture. It is not
surprising, then, that purveyors of birth control products relied on the former, not the
latter, in constructing the rhetorical logic of their ads. And it is also not surprising that
women seemed to believe them—if potentially only in pretense.
Copyright © Virginia Bucurel Engholm 2014
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Chapter 3: Dysgenic Problems, Eugenic Solutions: Antoinette Brown Blackwell’s The
Island Neighbors, Sexual Containment, and the Culture of Eugenic Thought in
Nineteenth-Century America

As discussed in Chapter 1, the nineteenth century witnessed the birth of modern
birth control. During that century, biomedical knowledge of the female reproductive
system and advances in the science of contraceptives contributed to a general population
of women who were increasingly better able to manage their reproductive processes, as
evidenced by the drastic decline in the birth rate among white middle- and upper-class
women. Controlling birth was no longer the unstable and uncertain process it had been
historically. By the early twentieth century, through knowledgeable consumption
choices, about which the mass media was all too happy to guide women, women could
with a high degree of accuracy ensure their desired reproductive outcomes.24
However, this reproductive freedom came at a perceived cost to the nation. Prior
to the emergence of this ability to reliably control birth on population levels, society was
not faced with questions of who could, or should, reproduce, and perhaps even more
importantly, who should not reproduce. With the rise of modern birth control, though,
reproduction became another societal tool with which to shape the face of a nation.
Eugenics, then, can largely be seen as one of the first fully-fledged ideologies devoted to
harnessing this new power of reproductive control. This chapter examines how an early
fictive version of eugenics ideology in the nineteenth century reveals the emergence of
the threat of dysgenic reproduction, and how one writer, eugenicist, and amateur scientist
used the logic and rhetoric of contagion and containment to deal with this problem.
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For a discussion of the consumer choices and consumptive practices of birth control in the
twentieth century, see Andrea Tone’s Devices and Desires (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001).
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Antoinette Brown Blackwell, a prominent women’s rights activist as well as the
first female ordained minister in the United States,25 serves as a particularly helpful figure
with which to explore these narratives of sexuality, reproductive control, and eugenics.
An avid amateur scientist, she was in fact the first female member of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science and she read widely from scientific texts,
particularly Darwin and Herbert Spencer, publishing her own Studies in General Science
in 1869 prior to writing The Island Neighbors (Cazden). Embracing the notion of the
evolutionary nature of mankind, she nonetheless rejected Spencer’s everyman-forhimself theory of human evolution in favor of a collaborative vision of societal
advancement and progression through cooperation based on her religious and social
justice values garnered from her work as a minister and advocate for women’s rights and
the poor. Through her overt interest in the science of eugenics in the late nineteenth
century and her fictionalizing of a eugenic narrative in 1871 in writing her only novel The
Island Neighbors, she helps us not only to relocate the origins of the eugenic movement
in America several decades earlier than the beginning of the twentieth century when it is
most commonly dated, but she also helps us to examine the differences between the early
incarnation of eugenic thought and the later twentieth century eugenic movement.
While The Island Neighbors is a little known novel, it sits at the interesting
intersection of the social justice and reform and feminism movements of the 1870s by
25
Biographer Elizabeth Cazden and theological historian Beverly Zink-Sawyer have pointed out the
difficulty in making this claim because of the inconsistent application with which titles and designations
were applied to ministers in the nineteenth century, particularly in sects such as the Quakers or in the case
of itinerant preacher Sojouner Truth, making the first female ordained minister somewhat difficult to
pinpoint. However, according to Zink-Sawyer, full-clerical ordination for a woman was unprecedented
until Blackwell earned that distinction, given by the Congregational Church, in 1853. See Elizabeth
Cazden, Antoinette Brown Blackwell, a Biography, (Old Westbury, NY: The Feminist Press, 1983) and
Beverly Zink-Sawyer, From Preachers to Suffragists: Woman's Rights and Religious Conviction in the
Lives of Three Nineteenth-century American Clergywomen, (Louisville: John Knox Press, 2003).
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virtue of its author’s social role as a late nineteenth century feminist reformer, combined
with the emerging eugenics-based rhetoric of scientific and social-science communities.
Perhaps what is most interesting—and significant—about the novel, though, is the way
that the author’s reform agenda seems to run counter to what actually occurs in the novel.
In other words, while Blackwell seems to have written a populist novel that appeals to
working class themes and issues based on her class sympathies as a reformer, the novel
can easily be read as an early eugenic narrative that offers one imaginative solution to the
problem of undesirable reproduction through the plot device of voluntary, self-imposed
sexual and reproductive quarantine of the working class, and potentially dysgenic, couple
on the titular island.26
Blackwell’s text serves the important purpose of offering an early narrative
exploring the possibility of eugenic ideas in society.27 Dominick La Capra argues that
literary texts contain “variable uses of language that come to terms with—or ‘inscribe’—
contexts in various ways…in an exchange with the past through a reading of texts” (127).
I am interested in the particular way that the context of Blackwell’s eugenic ideology is
inscribed in her novel and, conversely, what this inscription can reveal about the
emerging eugenic movement. Even further, Blackwell’s novel, rather than depicting any
actual, historical reality or ‘’lived experience,” reveals how the dysgenic threat was
imagined, an important distinction given the imagined nature of the threat in the first
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William Leach, one of the few critics to provide a reading of the novel, also comments on this
apparent conflict between her apparent desire to expose the class pretensions of the wealth Boston family
and her clear sympathies with them: “The island represents freedom, independence, health and sensuous
fulfillment; Boston is sickness, class stratification, and repression. But, if we had to choose which of the
two worlds meant more to [Blackwell], Boston would probably be the choice” (110).
27
I am indebted here to Dominick La Capra’s views on literature’s “symbolic systems and
signifying practices” in its role in the study of history (History and Criticism, (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1985), 118.
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place. As Priscilla Wald writes about the contagion narrative, fictive accounts of the
threats of contagion served as a powerful myth, “especially prevalent during times of
rapid social transformation,” that sought to present social narratives as “established truth”
(10). The Island Neighbors, then, serves as a fictive “laboratory” where Blackwell could
imagine both a dysgenic problem and a social-containment solution.28
Blackwell’s novel revolves around the potential, and eugenically undesirable,
union of an island sailor and Margaret, the maid of a wealthy Bostonian family, who is
visiting the summer retreat. Her smallpox scars, a visible reminder of the disease that
once ravaged her body, also serve as a marker of her social unfitness. In this case, her
social unfitness is evidenced by her wealthy employers’ obvious anxiety over her highly
sexualized relationship with the island sailor. Margaret’s dysgenic status results from her
diseased body, both in terms of its physical and its sexual shortcomings. On the surface,
this may seem to demonstrate an essentialist element, but in truth, her marked face
merely masks the class and racial concerns of the novel. According to the standards set
by the Warners, her wealthy employers, and the larger society, in her body, status, and
soul, Margaret was a wholly dysgenic figure.
The novel’s solution to the eugenic problems posed by Margaret’s partnering with
the island sailor presents a rather surprising departure from the traditional eugenic
narrative. Twentieth century eugenic thought focused on institutionalizing and sterilizing
the “unfit.” But the novel displays a much different solution for nineteenth century
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I borrow this idea of literature as “laboratory” from Ann Rigney’s essay “Being an Improper
Historian.” She describes the role of literature in historical study by stating, “The fascinating thing about
imaginative literature is that it provides a laboratory where historically variable ways of seeing the world
are expressed through the prism of poetical forms” (151). See Manifestos for History, ed. Sue
Morgan, Keith Jenkins, Alan Munslow (New York: Rutledge, 2007).
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eugenicists. Unlike Henry Goddard’s—the early twentieth century psychologist and
eugenicist—claim that we should “hunt [the unfit] out in every possible place and take
care of them, and see to it that they do not propagate,” the late nineteenth century’s
solution to the threat of the dysgenic as revealed by Blackwell’s narrative was to isolate
the problem, not expunge it, from society (271).29
Blackwell’s solution to the threat of dysgenic reproduction clearly draws on other
prevalent scientific and social scientific ideologies of her time, particularly the twin
notions of contagion and containment. Priscilla Wald writes of the ghettoization of urban
immigrant communities in New York at the turn of the century that quarantine served as
the model for dealing with the threat of contagion. Abraham Cahan’s 1896 novel Yekl: A
Tale of the New York Ghetto and the 1928 landmark study The Ghetto by Louis Wirth
indicate the influence of the quarantine model in the literature of contagion and
“explained the appeal of the ghetto as a space for sociologists’ inquiry: not only for what
they could observe but also for what they could contain” (149). It offered “a reassuring
tale of Americanization that features integration through containment: the preservation of
social control through self-imposed quarantine” (150). We see these echoes of contagion
fears and rhetoric in her treatment of the dysgenic reproductive threat in the text, as well
as the solution of social containment through the “self-imposed” sexual and reproductive
quarantine of the dysgenic couple.
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Priscilla Wald’s work on contagion theory in the twentieth century speaks to the issues involved
here as well. Her assertion that “disease emergence dramatizes the dilemma that inspires the most basic of
human narratives: the necessity and danger of human contact” seems relevant to the novel’s treatment of
the intermingling of the contagion of disease with the social contagion of the islanders for the Warner’s
family circle (Wald 2). See Contagious: Cultures, Carriers, and the Outbreak Narrative, (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2008).
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As a result, the novel ends with the couple remaining on the island, free to
reproduce but unable to infect society with their dysgenic reproduction. The link between
the nineteenth century ideology and the twentieth century movement can be found in
Blackwell’s version of social evolution. Margaret’s choice of an “unworthy lover” and
capitulation to feelings of passion and love over “duty” indicate that not only is she
dysgenically unfit for reproduction, but that she also chooses to procreate unfitly anyway.
Margaret and Alfred thus represent Blackwell’s dysgenic nightmare: the unfit couple who
refuse to engage in sexual self-control for the good of all and threaten Blackwell’s belief
in the ability of “all movements which combine the cooperative energies of many
persons, and thus closely bind together the interests of the community” to “point to a new
era of progress” (Studies in General Science, 333-334). Like the sexologists of the late
nineteenth century, Blackwell hoped for “the modification of lust by love, of egotism by
altruism, as a slow ‘evolutionary’ process” whereby “the instincts of individual selfpreservation were eventually modified by the social instincts” (qtd. in Birkin 61). In other
words, Blackwell hoped that individual self-preservation would lead to self-imposed
sexual and reproductive quarantine for the good of the social body, and the narrative she
creates is a sort of wish fulfillment that narratively isolates the dysgenic couple in order
to offer a model for how to deal with the dysgenic threat.
The Island Neighbors, then, allows us to locate the roots of the eugenic movement
in the nineteenth century, enabling us not only to better understand the origins of the
movement, but also to connect nineteenth century concerns with reproducing “rightly”
with the racism of the eugenic and xenophobic movements of the twentieth century. But
if it is “warfare of the cradle,” as eugenics advocate Theodore Roosevelt termed it,
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Blackwell’s novel offers an early Darwinian battle between individual self-preservation
and social good (qtd. in Dryer 124). It is no wonder, then, having lost the battle against
self-preservation, twentieth-century society took action against women who refused to
reproduce “rightly.”

The Emerging Culture of Eugenic Thought
Historians have generally located the beginning of the eugenics movement at the
turn of the twentieth century. However, eugenic concern with the reproduction of the
“best stock” can be traced back well into the nineteenth century. From Elizabeth Cady
Stanton to Charlotte Perkins Gilman to John Noyes, the late nineteenth century is teeming
with social and political figures who advocated eugenic ideologies in various forms,
sharing the common concern of the over-reproduction of the undesirable other and the
declining reproduction of the “best stock.” If women were the (re)productive agents of
society, if women were needed to produce citizens, this precipitous drop in reproductive
rates among the “better class” of women threatened the very fabric of the country and
opened the door to the threat of the “race suicide” of the old Puritan stock and the overreproduction of the undesirable other. The eugenic narrative of America as engaged in a
demographic war, exemplified by Roosevelt’s reproductive battle cry of the “warfare of
the cradle,” had begun.
Several revisionary historians trace the origins of the eugenics movement, as a
movement that influenced thought and social policy in the early twentieth century, to the
nineteenth century’s concern with the physical perfection of the body, the connection
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between moral and physiological fitness, and the relating of these things to
reproduction.30 The term “eugenic,” which comes from the Greek words for well and
born, was actually coined by Sir Francis Galton in 1883, well before the turn of the
century and the rise of the Progressive Era with which the eugenic movement is so
closely associated.31 As Nicole Rafter lays out in her work Creating Born Criminals,
although the term eugenics was not generally used in the United States until the twentieth
century, eugenic theory very much influenced and shaped late nineteenth-century cultural
ideas and politics, as well as social and political practices. In fact, she asserts that the
origins of American eugenics can be dated from around 1870,32 well before the turn-ofthe-century start of the movement that is usually attributed to it.33 Ronald Walters has
also argued for tracing the eugenic timeline back into the nineteenth century and claims
that although John Humphrey Noyes and the Oneida community preceded the heyday of
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Dating the origins of eugenic ideology, however, continues to be a source of disagreement among
historians. Even works such as Edwin Black’s War Against the Weak, (which traces eugenic thought well
back into the mid-nineteenth century with the publishing of Herbert Spencer’s Social Statistics, which
proposed that society followed natural and scientific laws, not God’s laws, and first used the term “survival
of the fittest;” Darwin’s publishing of The Origin of Species in 1859; and Sir Frances Galton’s publishing
of Hereditary Genius in 1869, in which he studied the genealogies of prominent and artistic families to
argue that heredity transmitted, not only physical characteristics, but also emotional, intellectual, and
creative ones as well, still locates the origin of the eugenic movement at the outset of the twentieth century.
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Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into Its Laws and Consequences, (London,
Macmillan & Co, 1869).
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This dating seems tied to the rise of Social Darwinism, the collection of scientific and
philosophical works that came out in the decade or two prior which coalesced into the theory of Social
Darwinism, the idea that Darwin’s scientific principles of evolution and competition in the natural world
can and should be applied to human society.
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Lois Cuddy and Claire Roche, in their introduction to the collection Evolution and Eugenics in
American Literature and Culture, 1880-1940 (Lewisville PA: Bucknell University Press, 2003), argue that
the large scale social, political, and cultural changes that occurred after the Civil War created an ideal
environment for the emerging eugenics movement: “The pattern of social and cultural changes taking place
after the Civil War created the opportunity for eugenicists to go public with their ideas and agenda.
Specifically, the combination of urbanization, industrialization, and increasing secularization taking place
between the Civil War and the Great Depression created the circumstances under which eugenics could
prosper”(14).
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the eugenics movement, they shared with it the central premise that the “best stock”
should reproduce and “perfect the race” (151).
Writers and thinkers of the nineteenth century, concerned with the declining birth
rate of white middle-class women and with the moral “fitness” of the women who were
reproducing, created what I term a “culture of eugenic thought” that set the stage for the
later twentieth century eugenic movement. This culture of eugenic thought differs from
the later organized, eugenic movement, and Linda Gordon describes this difference by
arguing that the “hereditarian thought” that emerged after the 1870s, which “had not yet
distinguished accurately between heredity and nonhereditary characteristics,” was
“associated with a social and political pessimism used to justify the miseries and
inequalities of the status quo” and would later become the “self-conscious eugenics
movement dedicated to maintaining the supremacy of the northern European-Americans”
(76). It is this movement from thought to self-conscious movement that this chapter
seeks to outline in order to examine both how eugenic movement was rooted in the
culture of eugenic thought and to examine the differences in the way that this culture and
this movement addressed the problem of dysgenic reproduction.
The culture of eugenic thought can be defined by three main tenets: first, a belief
in the inseparable relationship between moral and physical fitness; second, a linking of
physiological deficiencies with social and racial status founded on ethnocentric views of
white supremacy; and third, a belief in both the deterioration of the race and the faith in
the powers of “right” reproduction to address this problem. These tenets, expressed in
nineteenth century cultural terms, would become the foundation for the ideology
underpinning the twentieth century eugenic movement and lead to the assertion that
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“‘indiscriminate survival’ gives way before that ‘rational selection and birth of the fit’
which is a fundamental condition of social well-being—the master spring to a rapid
evolution of general happiness.”34
One of the keystones of determining whose indiscriminate survival was
undesirable for the larger social body can be found in the belief of the inseparableness of
body and mind. An 1853 letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Susan B. Anthony on
marriage displays the connection between fitness of “mind and body” and the
advancement of the white race:
Let them [the law makers] fine a woman fifty dollars for every child she
conceives by a Drunkard. Women have no right to saddle the state with
idiots to be supported by the public. Only look at the statistics of the idiot
asylums, nearly all of the offspring of Drunkards. Women must be made
to feel that the transmitting of immortal life is a most solemn responsible
act and never should be allowed, except when the parents are in the
highest condition of mind and body. Man in his lust has regulated this
whole question of sexual intercourse long enough. Let the mother of
mankind whose prerogative it is to set bound to his indulgence rouse up
and give this whole question a thorough fearless examination….My
letter… will call attention to that subject, and if by martyrdom I can
advance my race one step I am ready for it. (Davis 212)
Her claim that “women have no right to saddle the state with idiots to be supported by the
public” will become a central claim of the twentieth century eugenic movement, which
focused less on positive eugenics, the attempt to increase the reproduction of the
eugenically desirable, and more on negative eugenics, the prevention of the reproduction
of the undesirable or unfit. In fact, that these women have “no right” to reproduce is
exactly what the Supreme Court decrees in the 1927 decision allowing the forced
sterilization of women on eugenically-motivated grounds.35 In another letter (1866),
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Jane Hume Clapperton, Vision of the Future, Based on the Application of Ethical Principles, 1904,
as cited in Richardson, Love and Eugenics in the Late Nineteenth Century, xv.
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See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, Supreme Court of the United States, 1927.
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Stanton makes a perhaps even stronger eugenic statement when she unequivocally
connects physical and moral deficiencies: “Hence, discord, despair, violence, crime, the
blind, the deaf, the dumb, the idiot, the lunatic, the drunkard, all that was ‘inverted’ and
must be so, until the mother of the race be made dictator in the social realm” (146).
Linking mental and physical ailments, Cady Stanton demonstrates the culture of eugenic
thought with her revilement of the physiologically unfit, while confidently relying on the
ability of the “the mother of the race” and social control to solve the problem.
This linking of moral and physical deficiencies proved especially useful for
implicating undesirable others on the basis of anti-eugenic claims. As such, nineteenth
century eugenic thought associated physiological deficiencies with social and racial
status. Theodore Roosevelt, perhaps one of the most well known eugenic proponents of
the twentieth century, began espousing eugenic views long before the turn of the century.
According to historian Thomas Dryer, throughout the late nineteenth century, Roosevelt
promoted the notion that immigration problems could be solved and nativism minimized
if the breeding powers of the old-stock Americans remained strong enough to enable
them to absorb the great masses of new people. As early as his 1880’s days as a
representative in the New York Assembly, he espoused anti-Irish views and believed that
Chinese immigration should be curtailed. Even more explicitly, according to a private
letter written in 1887, Roosevelt had been distressed on a European voyage by some
“noisy German Jews and diseased looking South Americans” (qtd. in Dryer 124).36
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Alan Kraut terms this notion “medicalized nativism,” the idea that stigmatizing immigrant groups
based on their perceived spreading of communicable diseases is justifiable. See Silent Travelers: Germs,
Genes, and the “Immigrant Menace,” (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1994).
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Again, we see the linking of anti-immigrant and ethnocentric views with physiological
deficiencies, a hallmark of eugenic thought.
The eugenic beliefs in both the deterioration of the race and the faith in the
powers of right reproduction to address this problem were often put in terms of the
problem of the “best stock” reproducing. This concern with the reproduction of the “best
stock” led to the race suicide fear of the late nineteenth century. Connecting the fear of
race suicide to abortion, in 1868 a Michigan doctor wrote, “The destruction of fetuses
[has become so] truly appalling [among native-born white American women that] the
Puritanic blood of ’76 will be sparingly represented in the approaching century” (qtd. in
Solinger 69). Theodore Roosevelt called this thinning of the “Puritanic blood” an “evil
force” (qtd. in Dryer 127). As Rickie Solinger puts it, “In other words, abortion was
dangerous because it thinned the population of Anglo-Saxon white people. Abortion
risked the social future of the United States” (69). As a result, eugenic practices sought
reproduction strategies that would increase the reproduction of the “fit,” or positive
eugenics, and decrease the reproduction of the “unfit,” negative eugenics.
Theodore Roosevelt was one of the strongest and most influential proponents of
the theory of race suicide, the idea that the “higher races” faced extinction if they failed
to increase their reproduction. This theory masked the fear that the “higher races” would
be overrun by the increasing numbers, both through immigration and reproduction, by the
“inferior races,” and as a result, would run the risk of having their social power and
control threatened. Roosevelt, like other proponents of the theory, saw “good breeders”
as the solution to the problem. However, as Dryer asserts, Roosevelt’s view that
“extreme fecundity” was not the solution, that only the increased reproduction of the
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better classes would remedy the problem of race suicide, actually fits in better with
nineteenth century eugenic thought, with its emphasis on positive eugenics and the
increasing of the reproduction of the “right sort” of people, than with the twentieth
century eugenic policies which emphasized negative eugenics and prevention of the
reproduction of the undesirables. As Ronald Walters points out, even earlier than this,
Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell argued that the reproduction by the physiologically and morally
fit should become a “form of worship” and a “prop for national pride” (156). The linking
of the physiologically and morally fit shows the extent to which “fitness” for
reproduction involved not just the bodily and spiritual fitness of a person but also how
those two categories were actually seen as virtually inseparable. In other words, to be
physiologically fit was to be morally fit and vice versa. As William Leach puts it, “The
physicality of the world was seen to mirror the moral law: one had only to study the
physical universe or, more important, one’s own physiology, to discover the basis for true
health, and therefore for true virtue” (20).

The Problem of Dysgenic Reproduction
These dynamics of nineteenth-century eugenic thought play out in Blackwell’s
novel. Because in The Island Neighbors Margaret is physiologically unfit, as evinced by
her face marred by the pox scars of disease, under the terms of nineteenth century
eugenic thought, she is necessarily morally unfit, and this eugenic belief is validated in
the novel by her “choosing” passion and romance over “duty.” She chooses to be, in
Dale Bauer’s term, an “ugly girl,” a bad girl, fit for sex and not reproduction, and comes
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to be equated with the “unfit.”37 The term “unfit” came to describe those whose
reproduction was considered culturally and socially undesirable. I apply the term to the
character of Margaret because she carries the mark of disease in the form of her smallpox scarred face and because of the obvious societal concern, displayed most evidently
by the Warners, her wealthy employers, over her highly sexualized relationship with the
island sailor. Her pockmarked face, marking her as “unfit” and incapable of reproducing
“rightly”, indicates Margaret’s dysgenic reproductive status, or a reproduction that results
from the sexual partnering of the “unfit.” The novel expands this term to examine how
disease itself could be seen as a sign of unfitness, how disease could manifest itself as the
sign of both physiological and mental unfitness, an idea that would come be to expressed
in the early twentieth century as “moral contagion.”38
Blackwell, however, was personally conflicted when it came to issues of poverty
and suffering, at least prior to the time that the novel was written. In the 1850’s, she
spent some time chronicling her experiences visiting tenement districts and prisons
crowded with Irish and German immigrants for the New York Tribune. Her experiences
led her to write a series of articles entitled “Shadows of Our Social System,” in which she
lamented the hopelessness and desperation of the women of these tenements, calling it a
“black shadow” on our “polished, enlightened, civilized Christianized society” (Zink-
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infectious behaviors of the tenements’ populations to society (Wald, Contagious, 115).
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Sawyer 162). In a letter to Abby Hopper Gibbons, who accompanied her on her work in
these districts, she wrote,
The work among the poor and degraded in New York was so pitiful that it
was almost too much for healthy sympathy, at least to one whose life had
hitherto been so sheltered as mine; and coming not long after the serious
religious overturning of my mind at South Butler39 and before the
reconstruction of my positive beliefs, it made the whole world a place of
shadows and sorrows. (qtd. in Cazden 188)
Blackwell, like other religious reformers, saw human misery and pain as distinctly the
result of human activity and rejected the view that such pain came into the world as the
result of the sin and death caused by the fall of Adam and Eve. Failing to see the
institutional and social causes of poverty, Blackwell, faced with the overwhelming
misery witnessed in the tenements and prisons of New York, needed to find another
solution to the cause of poverty and suffering.
Blackwell found this solution in the emerging fields of hereditary science and the
works of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer. In truth, Blackwell’s background and
knowledge in science was scanty, a result of the fact that like others who went to college
before 1870, she studied “natural philosophy,” rather than science, and her knowledge of
scientific principles such as the empirical method was practically nonexistent.
Nevertheless, Blackwell read the works of prominent philosophers and scientists, taking
years to read and digest the difficult concepts and eventually distilling them into her own
scientific writings, beginning with Studies in General Science, published just before The
Island Neighbors, in 1869. She was particularly interested in Darwin and Spencer’s
works and developed her own progressive view of human development as a result of
39

Blackwell is alluding here to her experiences during her year as an ordained minister in a small,
rural New England community, which caused her to have somewhat a crisis of faith because her perceived
inability to adequately lead her flock and help them deal spiritually with loss and suffering. See Cazden,
ABB: A Biography.
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reading their works. Building on Darwin’s theory of evolution, Spencer applied it to
human beings, arguing in the absence of proof otherwise, that all the characteristics that
an organism possessed, including moral, intellectual, and physical, would be passed on to
its offspring. In addition, he saw the natural and human worlds as fundamentally
connected and integrated in their parts, and naturally progressing forward.40 Blackwell
accepted Spencer’s idea of a fundamentally integrated world and the natural progression
of man, but rejected his fierce individualistic view of this process—Spencer thought that
those unemployed and unable to support themselves should be allowed to starve to
death—in favor of a view of society as socially integrated for the benefit of all: “The
struggle for existence, then, regarded in its whole scope, is but a perfected system of
cooperations in which all sentient and insentient forces mutually co-work in securing the
highest ultimate good” (Studies in General Science 52). In other words, in her view of
human evolution, society was progressing cooperatively towards the good of all. In fact,
her faith in man’s ability to rationally progress was manifest:
Man alone possesses discriminations broad enough to enable him to
distinguish between the intrinsically right and wrong, the true and the
false, the beautiful and the ugly; and his volitions and sensations are
commensurate with his perceptions, he only can intelligently make his
own and other lives more and more desirable, by a closer conformity with
all established coordinations. He alone can enter upon a course of
unlimited improvement—of unending progress. (Studies in General
Science 231)
Blackwell, then, takes Spencer’s belief in a fundamentally integrated world and remakes
that belief into a metaphysical notion of man’s “unending progress” away from the ugly
and towards the beautiful. In eugenics terms, Blackwell saw the natural progression of
man as moving away from the dysgenic and towards the eugenic. The ideal solution to
the problem of dysgenic reproduction for Blackwell, then, is a sort of negative voluntary
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reproduction, whereby the dysgenic recognize their inherent deficiencies and abstain
from reproducing for the good of all.

Disease As the Dysgenic Signifier
As demonstrated in The Island Neighbors, for Blackwell, disease seems to
function as the sign of dysgenic status. The novel is obsessed with disease and illness,
and it is not surprising, given this obsession, that it seems to engage with the nineteenth
century notion of the social body as akin to a biological organism, subject to the same
threats of contamination and infection as the physical body. As John Chadwick,
nineteenth century physician and positivist figure puts it, “The sickness of our times
afflicts the social organism” (qtd. in Leach 21). This eugenic plot device of the selfimposed isolation of the dysgenic threat, which thereby prevents the threat of their
reproduction from infecting the society, imagines solving the eugenic problem, not as the
twentieth century did by institutionalizing eugenic policies and eradicating the
reproductive potential of the unfit, but by working only to protect the social body from
the negative affects of the dysgenic reproduction. Instead of hunting the unfit out and
expelling the threat to society by preventing the possibility of their reproduction, in the
novel the threat of the dysgenic is neutralized by isolating them on the island where they
may reproduce but their dysgenic reproduction would not taint the overall society. It was
a policy of isolating, not expunging, the dysgenic threat. The novel’s concern over the
naturalizing of reproduction, the many references to the connection between familial
lines, breeding, and the natural world, serve to strengthen the connection between
Margaret’s unfit body and the probable outcome of her relationship. Their isolation on
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the island at the end of the novel offers Blackwell’s mythic societal solution to dysgenic
reproduction—rather than focusing on preventing the dysgenic from reproducing, she
seems to argue, society should try to isolate the reproductive consequences of such
unions and prevent those undesirable outcomes from infecting the rest of the social body.
Even though the novel is obsessed with illness, the only character who actually
suffers (or has suffered) from disease is Margaret. Margaret’s body is, in fact, the only
diseased body in the novel. Many of the characters are described as “infirmed,” but
Blackwell creates a distinction between infirmity and disease that separates
neurasthenia,41 the disorder of nervous exhaustion that predominantly affected the middle
and upper classes, from the diseased bodies of the working class. From the beginning of
the novel, Mr. Warner is described as having a neurasthenic-like ailment: “Mr. Warner
was a man hardly past middle life; but years of suffering and infirmity, while they had
left one sunny side to his character, had added a shady one—like an apple which has
ripened unequally: smooth and delicious looking, from one point of view, but gnarled and
a little worm-eaten, from the other” (11). This opening description of him sets up an
important trope in the novel: the way that human physiology is linked to the natural
41

Neurologist George Beard coined the term “neurasthenia” in 1869, from neuro for nerve and
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world. In this description, his body, because of the infirmity, is likened to an apple, not
quite rotten, but allowed by circumstances to become physically stunted, “gnarled”, a
“little worm-eaten.” This analogy speaks volumes about his “infirmity,” which, as we
find out in the novel, seems to be, in the classic symptoms of neurasthenia, the result of
too much leisure and a weak temperament and not the result of physical “disease.”
Blackwell uses the character of Captain Giles, the sage old sea captain of the
island who is in the “habit of curing people,” to comment on the nature of Mr. Warner’s
ailment and to reveal the “falseness” of his health problems, more the result of his class
than any physical deficiency. In fact, Captain Giles feels sure that he could “cure” Mr.
Warner of his ailments if given the chance and that all Mr. Warner needs is some hearty
sea air, good food, and good exercise, which also happened to be the classic nineteenth
century cure for neurasthenia. As he points out, “that Mr. Warner, when he feels like it,
is as merry as a sleigh-bell on smooth roads; but he sinks down all in a minute—like a
baby that’s lost its mother, and nobody to comfort it” (17). His position is validated
when, just after arriving on the island, Mr. Warner, who had been complaining of feeling
poorly, is immediately restored: “Afterwards, when the storm waxed wilder, the invalid’s
depressed spirits rose to a sudden exaltation. He forgot himself, and, standing erect,
drinking in long breaths of the purified air, he seemed to have grown strong and healthful
within five minutes. ‘This is really grand,’ he said, as the ocean and the thunder roared
together. It was hard to keep him from stepping out into the tempest, in his enthusiasm”
(14). While Mr. Warner represents the neurasthenic infirmity of the leisure class, Captain
Giles’s ailments are the natural result that comes with age and a life of hard physical
labor. His “back’s a little stiff ”(15) and he’s described as “standing half erect, with one
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hand pressed hard against his rheumatic back, and the other resting on his knee” (16).
His infirmary is no mystery, though. As Mrs. Giles puts it, “It ain’t every one that can be
as much a man as ever at nearly eighty. […] Twice a child, comes from sickness as well
as age” (17).
Margaret’s disease, though, unlike Mr. Warner or Captain Giles, is not the result
of the natural breakdown of the body over time or the excess of leisure and absence of
physical activity. Mr. Warner and Captain Giles represent two forms of “ailments” but
the key to understanding Blackwell’s fascination with disease is Margaret. Blackwell
clearly wants to constantly remind the reader of Margaret’s diseased past, of her less than
perfect physical health, and her dysgenic possibilities. Without fail, every time Margaret
is described physically in the novel, the narrator references her pockmarked face.
Particularly, when Alfred Brand, the young sailor on the island and Margaret’s romantic
interest, describes her, it is always in terms of her physical scars. In their first meeting,
he notices her “smiling face, only a little pockmarked, with clear, shining eyes”(15). The
reference to her smiling, pretty face is always accompanied by the phrase, “only a little
pock-marked.” Other times she is described as having “clear, frank eyes” but also “ugly
pock-marks” (32). In an even more telling moment, Alfred muses on her physical
appearance: “She had a pleasant, honest face, which almost any one would have called
rather pretty, if the envious small-pox had not sot its signet there; but as Alfred’s thoughts
rested on this defect, he felt that he could love her all the better for it” (38). Small pox’s
“signet” has been left on her face, the mark of the disease from which she cannot hide or
escape. The “signet” of the disease marks her as dysgenic, as physically imperfect,
incapable of the sort of ideal reproduction advocated by the eugenic proponents and
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Blackwell herself. And because physiological fitness was so closely related to moral
fitness, her physical defect cast doubt on her moral state. ‘Sickness is a crime,’ observed
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, ‘since it is an evidence of a violation of some physical law” (qtd.
in Leach 20). Sickness itself was seen as a sign of moral failing.
The nineteenth century perception of the connection between moral and physical
fitness, which I argue is foundational for the eugenic movement, is made explicit in the
novel as well. In order to reinforce the reproductive threat of the couple, Blackwell
imagines the disease as affecting Margaret both physically and emotionally. Blackwell,
in fact, claimed, “The solution to the problem of women’s sphere must be obtained in
physiology” (qtd. in Leach 19). In establishing this link between the body and mind,
Blackwell plays into nineteenth century fears about “unfitness,” casting her maid heroine
as sexually, reproductively, and eugenically unfit. Even further, Alfred muses on “the
suffering which doubtless accompanied the repulsive disease, and his heart softened with
a manly wish to add joy and love as an offset, not only to the pain of body, but also to the
necessary mental distress, which perhaps she sometimes felt keenly even now” (38).
Alfred imagines the pockmarks as a sign of her past physical distress and ongoing mental
pain, as well as evidence of her femininity. Alfred’s willingness to look past the sign of
her disease seems to result from his natural “sympathies” to her plight, an indication that
their romantic and sexual attraction is class-based. In other words, the threat of the
dysgenic does not seem to be that Margaret will infect the upper class. In the logic of the
text, her dysgenic “sign” draws those appropriate her for and repels those more
eugenically desirable potential mates, such as the Warner’s son. The contagion threat is
not from the sexual contamination of the upper class by the dysgenic—it’s the threat of
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reproductive contagion resulting from the sexual unions of the reproductively
undesirables.
Despite the fact that her physical body is marked by disease, several characters
remark on the fact that Margaret is “never sick.” The apparent contradiction of her being
marked by disease and yet physically healthy can be reconciled, though, by
understanding that the mark of disease for her functions not as an actual indicator of her
physical health but as a disqualifying marker of her reproductive status. In other words,
being healthy does not help her case—her dysgenic status is part of her being, not
something that can be escaped from or that she can remedy. She is fundamentally and
manifestly unfit for reproduction.
In a perhaps even more damning narrative trope, the novel makes several
connections between human physiology and the natural world of the island that
ultimately serve to strengthen even more the eugenic argument of the novel. Even
further, Blackwell’s use of “natural” analogies in describing the genealogy of the
islanders serves to naturalize the pro-eugenic thread in the narrative. In one of several
direct references to the inbreeding of the island families, Captain Giles asserts, “The
whole stock of the island—this end of it especially—is linked in and out like one of those
brain-corals” (27). This reference to the isolation of the genetic pool of the island
imagines a sort of voluntary and “natural” genetic containment of the islanders that
serves as Blackwell’s ideal solution to the problem of dysgenic reproduction. Of course,
in the novel, the result of the genetic isolation for the islanders is degenerative. As
Captain Giles explains, “One family’s deaf and dumb, except for one child: That is a
rather common infirmity in our neighborhood—at least it crops out in a dozen families or
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so; but all springing from the same root. Even potatoes won’t grow forever in the one
soil” (29). That “potatoes won’t grow forever in the one soil” indicates that the
genealogy of the families on the island is like a pasture that has been allowed to
stagnate—in other words, the geographic isolation of the islanders has led to a lack of
new “blood” being brought into their genetic pool, resulting in a stagnation of their lines
not unlike the sort of stagnation that occurs when a farmer fails to rotate the crops grown
in a particular field. The “natural” result is the potatoes eventually fail to thrive, just as
these island families eventually fail to thrive genetically, causing the “infirmity” of the
neighbors on the island.
This connection advocates a sort of natural selection view of human reproduction
that exposes essentialist, xenophobic undertones of the novel, as evidenced by a
conversation between Frank, the wealthy son of the Warners, and Mr. Dennis, another
island local who, like Captain Giles, offers sage advice and local color for the tourists.
When Frank asks Mr. Dennis if he is familiar with the theories of Darwin, Mr. Dennis
replies, “I have heard of that scheme for manufacturing man, and elephants, and
rattlesnakes all out of fishes—going off on different tacks to do it—the spokes growing
out of the same hub at the center, and other spokes running all round” (123). However,
he doesn’t believe in the theory: “I don’t think much of that scheme—not for any thing
that can be handed down intellectually” (123). While this may seem like a case of
provincialism versus intellectualism, he goes on to claim, “If life is any thing worth
having, I guess Providence mebbe took as much pains to make a musquito a musquito,
and an elephant an elephant—to say nothing of making a man a man—once for all—as
he did to make a chunk of gold, gold […] It appears to me that a fish is a fish—himself,
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and nobody else—and will stay so, likely, now and forever” (124). This take on
Darwin’s theory and the idea of natural selection dismisses it in favor of religious
essentialism, which in some ways runs counter to what Blackwell wrote in her scientific
writings. In the context of the novel, this speech serves to show that the islander’s genetic
deficiencies are part of their essence, divinely given, adding a religious bent to eugenic
thought that allows Blackwell to merge her eugenically-motivated views of human
society with a religious belief in divine province. The novel, then, seems to see no
remedy for their situation beyond a continuing of the current track—let the degenerates
degenerate. As the sage Mr. Dennis claims, it is “better not marry at all than mated crisscross” (128). In other words, there is no other solution to the problem of the genealogy
and reproduction on the island than to keep to your own kind. In this way, the novel
seems to be an early forerunner of naturalism, with the plot of decline applying to the
entire island. The island shares with Margaret the problem of their inherent deficiencies,
and so it is fitting that the problem of her dysgenic reproduction should be reconciled by
her remaining on the island. The island and Margaret share the same dysgenic fate.

“Contagious” Sexuality
Part of what makes Margaret and Alfred’s relationship so connected to issues of
reproduction, and eugenics, is its highly sexualized nature. From their first meeting,
when they “shook hands at parting,” the “operation” “left a new tingle in the young
sailor’s finger” (14). Clearly, the “new tingle” in his fingers left by their first touch
indicates their sexual chemistry, as well as the “contagious” nature of her sexuality. This
is furthered by the common romantic trope of the sensible, young man who is so
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overtaken, one could say “infected,” by his passion for a young lady, usually one he has
just met, that he begins to act differently, impetuously. Alfred, although described as a
“steady boy” (28), impulsively tells Margaret that he will propose marriage to her at their
second meeting. Even more, the novel makes clear that this is Margaret’s particular
affect, not a result of a generally romantic nature on Alfred’s part. Although he’s “quick
to feel,” he is described as not having had romantic feelings in the past: “It was strange
that he was so perversely cold-hearted. He reproached himself for it bitterly; but taking
himself to task didn’t in the least mend the matter. Finally, he gave up the idea of ever
getting into that state of very fervid fascination to which all his young friends were so
prone” (31). In fact, he had decided to first choose a wife and then “compel himself to
love her” (31). He evokes a rational view of marriage and love, not unlike that of free
love and rational marriage proponent John Noyes, a view that Blackwell herself seemed
to somewhat share.42 The heated debates within the women’s rights movement over
marriage affected Blackwell’s view of the institution and for a long time it seemed that
she would not marry at all. Yet she did eventually marry Sam Blackwell, a member of
the famous reformer Blackwell family. In choosing to marry, Blackwell herself took a
rationalist approach. As her biographer Elizabeth Cazden asserts, “Antoinette was
convinced that most, if not all, of the inequities of marriage as an institution could be
eliminated by careful planning” (107). In writing about her impending marriage, she dealt
strictly with the logistical concerns of integrating her work with her new status as wife
and wrote of their future,
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Of course we won’t mark out the future too rigidly, or take any strict vows
on the subject or make plans which must continue for two or five years.
We will be governed very much by circumstances and what seems best as
the years go by, but I think, Sam, we can be self sovereigns, we can bend
everything within and without to our wills, and our wills to our intellects.
(qtd. in Cazden)
Her faith in the idea of “self sovereignty” to cure the ills of marriage exposes her
rationalist view of the institution and her belief in self-control as the means of affecting
social change.
Alfred’s rationalist view of marriage changes, however, when he meets Margaret,
and “all the ice of his nature melted with a fervent heat” (32). In fact, as the novel goes
on, Alfred’s physical appearance comes to be described in terms of passion and sexual
desire: his “eyes were flashing now with fire and energy enough to hide the deformities
of red hair, freckled skin, and brusque manner” (117). Margaret’s social isolation
ironically leads her to be even more susceptible to their sexual chemistry, as “very
naturally, Margaret, from her isolation and her real warmth of nature, responded almost
unconsciously to the always respectful, earnest tenderness and good-will which expressed
itself in every look and gesture” (32). And indeed, Margaret is described as having “a
developed womanly nature—forbearing, sympathetic, and fertile in resources” (23), the
references to her “womanly nature” and her “fertile” resources, of course, connoting
sexuality and reproductive fecundity. The infectious effect of her body is something,
however, that her mind, well-trained to be respectable and feminine, is incapable of
containing. As a result, even as she is infecting him with her sexuality, she remains
appropriately passive and feminine.
Margaret, too, is affected by the sexual nature of their relationship. The sight of
his ship results in her “color” “coming and going in a fever of excitement” (89), the
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language here a not-so-thinly veiled reference to sexual acts. The affect of their sexual
passion, however, indicates her appropriately chaste response, which interestingly reveals
that even being a modest, respectable young girl does not negate her dysgenic status. In
other words, the “fever” of their passion indicts her whether or not she acts on it. It has,
in effect, already spread and contaminated Alfred, exposing the dangerous and
contagious nature of her dysgenic status. The “fever” between them, then, continues to
spread, even as they both at times try to resist it. Alfred feels a “fever of hope, selfreproach, and a terrible fear” at the thought of a reconciliation with her, and when he
found himself “upon the deck of little vessel” “every thing around him quickened
memory, raising with him a new fever of hope and unrest which kept heart and brain both
throbbing long after he lay wrapped up in his blanket” (91). One can only wonder what
else was “throbbing.” In fact, their relationship often seems consumed with flame:
“Alfred was perhaps a little conspicuous, from his unusually flaming red shirt; but if he
had been clad in a suit of literal flames, he could hardly have filled Margaret’s eye with
more glare and warmth than he now did. She absorbed so much of the influence that it
seemed to be burning into her very soul, and yet she could not turn away” (121). The
sexual nature of their relationship is quite evident; the expression “hot and heavy” seems
particularly apt here.
The highly sexualized nature of their relationship serves to reinforce the dysgenic
threat their reproduction poses. Free love thinkers and social purists believed that excess
sexual drive was a form of societal disease: “The Satyr (male or female) who cannot see
one of the opposite sex without the production of physical excitement,” Linda Gordon
explains, “is not strong, but irritable; the nature is diseased” (qtd. in Gordon 79). This
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understanding of excessive sexual excitement as a form of a diseased nature doubly
indicts both Alfred and Margaret. Margaret, already marked once with physical disease,
reinforces her dysgenic status with her sexualized nature. At the same time, Alfred’s
choice of an obviously dysgenic partner makes their sexual relationship symptomatic of
their diseased relationship, rather than an indicator of it, and further indicates how their
dysgenic attraction is a sign of their class status. Because social purist doctrine held that
sexual immorality was just as damaging within a marriage as it was outside of it,
marriage and the legitimizing of their sexual passion would do nothing to alleviate the
dysgenic threat. Any offspring their union might yield would be unavoidably and
irrefutably “unfit.” The eventual outcome of Margaret and Alfred’s relationship is
reflected in a letter published in 1902 by eugenics advocate Dr. Joseph Greer. Allegedly
sent to him by a patient, the letter reveals the “natural” result of one dysgenic couple’s
diseased relationship:
I was married when only sixteen…He was twenty-two; strong, healthy,
and with large sexual demands…I thought him exacting and selfish, and
he thought me unaccommodating and capricious…If I refused, his great,
strong fingers would sink into my flesh and force would compel
submission…As a result I would be bruised and beaten, and perhaps made
sick and have a doctor before I got over it. Two little babies were literally
killed before they were born, and the one that did live I have seen often in
convulsions from ‘sexual vice,’ either a transmitted tendency or a
birthmark due to the infernal nastiness I was forced to witness during
pregnancy. When at last I watched his little life go out, I knew that he was
spared a life of imbecility or idiocy, and I could not mourn.”43
While neither the relationship in the novel nor all dysgenic relationships in general were
imagined as physically violent, as this one clearly was, the letter illustrates the connection
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that social purists and eugenic thinkers of the time made between excessive sexual
passion and diseased, dysgenic reproduction.
Alfred’s movement from a rational, free love thinker to a romantic, sexualized
hero further exposes the dysgenic and class-based nature of their potential union. Rather
than treating love, sex, and reproduction rationally – as demonstrated by marrying
someone fit, physiologically and morally, for reproduction –Alfred instead irrationally
follows his heart and marries someone marked as dysgenically unfit. Here, Blackwell
uses Alfred to make a feminist critique of the dysgenic dangers of romantic love. William
Leach asserts,
Feminists turned away from romantic love as blind, passionate, seductive.
In an unequal society, romantic love threatened the interests of women.
So did sentimental love that portrayed women as idealized objects and the
passive recipients of masculine affections. In their place, feminist put a
rational, symmetrical, and egalitarian love based on a knowledge that
made no room for ideality, passion, or fantasy. (99-100)
Given these views, it is not surprising, then, that Blackwell would allow her characters to
engage in romantic love and simultaneously “punish” them for doing so. Furthermore,
Margaret’s choice of an “unworthy lover” and capitulation to feelings of passion and love
over “duty” indicate that not only is she dysgenically unfit for reproduction, but that she
also chooses to procreate unfitly anyway.
Blackwell imagines an idealized solution to the problem of Margaret and Alfred’s
dysgenic reproduction by ending the novel with an overt societal embrace of their
marriage and potential offspring (the Warners relent in their feelings toward Alfred and
go to the wedding). Yet, the novel concludes with the couple isolated on the island, along
with all of the local degenerates, so that their dysgenic reproduction will not be able to
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contaminate the greater society.44 The novel ends, then, with their return to the island,
newly wed: “Margaret had come back to the island that evening a bride. She and Alfred
Brand were to keep house together in the furnished cottage where she had spent the
summer, while their own home was building higher up on the hills” (138). Alfred “drew
Margaret to his heart with all the manly gratitude of a strong soul, satisfied with the
fullest fruition” (138).45 The word “fruition” here evokes the “fruition” of their union,
their future offspring. Their idyllic ending on the island masks the larger social
commentary of the novel. In the end, the novel seems to be suggesting that if you can’t
reproduce rightly and rationally and you insist on reproducing anyway, at least keep it to
yourself.

Dysgenic “Carriers,” Tainted Blood, and The New Demographic War
Elizabeth Yukins argues about eugenic policies and rhetoric in the twentieth
century that it increasingly focused on the “insidious threat of moral pathology and
biological degeneration” that went beyond visual appearance and racial categorization
(164). This “insidious threat” could be localized to the site of reproduction and the
women’s bodies that underwent the reproductive process. As a result, Yukins argues that
at the turn of the century “reproduction was a crucial site for gender, class, and race
44
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regulations, and national well-being depended upon careful genealogical surveillance”
(164). This new emphasis on genealogical surveillance, and the eugenics advocates
increasing willingness to turn to state intervention and regulation in the fight against the
“unfit,” shows how the turn of the century eugenicists ultimately rejected Blackwell’s
notion of voluntary self-containment as a model for dealing with the dysgenic threat.
Turn-of-the-century novelist and activist Mary Austin writes in her autobiography
of her daughter’s disability, which today might be termed autism: “Brought up as I was,
in possession of what passed for eugenic knowledge, it had never occurred to me that the
man I had married would be less frank about his own inheritance than I had been about
mine…I who had entered motherhood with the highest hopes and intentions had to learn
too late that I had borne a child with tainted blood” (qtd. in Richards 150). The “tainted
blood” rhetoric she uses could, in another context, refer to the “taint” of miscegenation,
but here it helps blur the boundary between eugenic rhetoric of “genealogical
surveillance” and the desire to imbue whiteness with a privileged reproductive status that
protects whiteness as category from eugenically motivated policies. This taint, this “bad
blood,” according to eugenic advocates such Goddard, results from “the defective
mentality and bad blood having been brought into the normal family of good blood, first
from the nameless feeble-minded girl and later by additional contaminations from other
sources” (qtd. in Yukins 178-179). Hence, unlike the “bad blood” that emerges from the
threat of racial contamination, this contamination occurs when “bad blood” is brought
into the family of “good” (read: white) blood. As Yukins explains,
In specifically demonizing ‘feeble-minded’ women and labeling them as
sexual contaminants, eugenicists thus developed a powerful and effective
means to identify an alien source of ‘bad blood’ and to reconstitute the
dominant inside/outside boundary. By displacing blame for sexual and
76

social transgression onto the reproductive bodies of impoverished women,
eugenicists sought to reify dominant class and race hierarchies, yet their
diagnostic agenda reveals the selectivity of scientific claims of white racial
superiority. While eugenicists strove to warn the American public against
undetected threats to white racial progress, the popularity of their theories
also made visible the ways in which white racialism can fracture at the
point of class integration. (181)
While it is clear that eugenicists threatened to fracture the very white racialism that they
sought to create in their demonizing of feeble-minded women, the notion of an “alien
source of ‘bad blood’’ allowed them to wield eugenic policy as a class-based weapon
while simultaneously reifying whiteness as a privileged biological marker that operated
outside of the threat of eugenic policies.
What changed, then, as the eugenic movement moved into the twentieth century?
How did eugenics become about not just the reproduction of the fit, but about the
reproduction of the whites? Partly, it seems a response to the failed attempts to stem the
tide of undesirable demographic trends of the nineteenth century. But even more
importantly, as fears of race suicide gained traction, race more than class or status
became the preeminent sign of “fitness.” It was no longer enough that the better classes
of whites were exhorted to reproduce—it was essential that all whites reproduce in order
to combat the perceived threat to white cultural supremacy of the New Negro, the
Japanese and the Chinese, the Cuban, and the Latin American. According to race suicide
proponents, white cultural supremacy in America was being attacked from all sides—
from within by the New Negro, from the west by the Japanese and the Chinese, from the
south by the Latin Americans, and from the east by southern and eastern Europeans,
Russians, and Jews. Reproduction became a weapon of this new “warfare of the
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cradle”—and white women of all classes were the foot soldiers, enlisted regardless of
class.
It is not surprising, then, that given this war over population statistics and census
data, the eugenics movement infiltrated the courts and social systems. Oliver Wendell
Holmes, in his 1927 Supreme Court decision on the legality of forced sterilization for
“imbeciles,” argues, “It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate off-spring for crimes, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who was manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.” In the minds of
twentieth century eugenicists, the nineteenth century solution of the self-imposed
isolation of dysgenic reproduction and relying on positivist notions of the individual as
working voluntarily for the good of all failed to deal adequately with problem of race
suicide and dysgenic reproduction. Twentieth century society took the drastically more
controlling step of eradicating the problem by eradicating the threat of dysgenic
reproduction altogether. Amos Bulter, Secretary to the Board of State Charities in
Indiana, gave an address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science in
1901, the very same organization to which Blackwell belonged, that sums up the change
in mood from Blackwell’s imagined solution of social integration tempered with
isolationism when necessary to the Supreme Court’s decision in favor of eradication:
Comparatively few persons yet realize the suffering, the moral degredation
[sic], and not least, the increasing expense entailed upon the public by the
progeny, often illegitimate, of feeble-minded women. Could our citizens
know the truth, the enormous expense, and the depth of degredation
caused by this group of degenerates, they would be amazed. Could they
look into the future and see what would be the accumulated cost piled up
before them in money, in immortality, in succeeding generations of
defectives, they would not rest until they had sought means to prevent all
this.” (Yukins 164)
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This “scientific” claim was met on the part of twentieth century eugenicists with the
determination to “prevent all this,” a determination that the earlier nineteenth century
eugenicists such as Blackwell had not yet reached.
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Chapter 4: The Birth of the Modern Abortion Debate: “Choice,” Shame, and the Prospect
of Reproductive Freedom in the Progressive Era
By the late nineteenth century, emerging biomedical knowledge of the female
reproductive system and advances in the technology of birth control offered women the
prospect of ensuring their desired reproductive outcomes through knowledgeable
consumer choices. As I lay out in chapter 2, however, these advances in reproductive
control, and the declining of the reproduction of white, middle class women, were viewed
as a significant threat to the overall health and well being of the country. A eugenics
movement formed to combat these demographic trends by encouraging the “better class”
of women, both through cultural narratives and institutional and government practices, to
embrace their reproductive duty and reproduce for the good of the nation. The emerging
eugenic ideology failed, however, to stem the tide of falling reproductive rates and
increasing insistence on women’s access to birth control and sexual agency. 46 The birth
rate continued to drop—from 3.56 in 1900 to 2.77 in 1920—and one study estimated that
83% of women were using birth control.47
Even worse, despite the successful efforts to illegalize abortion in the 1860s and
1870s, by all accounts women were still exerting pressure on family doctors to perform
them, often through the legal loophole of “therapeutic abortions,” or abortion deemed
medically necessary. Because there was no set legal definition of what constituted
“medically necessary,” however, doctors had broad discretion in determining whether an
abortion was indeed “therapeutic.” While the inherent difficulty in determining reliable
statistics on illegal medical procedures is apparent, some doctors in the late nineteenth-
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century estimated that two million abortions were performed annually.48 More important
than the actual number of abortions performed, though, was the perception of their
prevalence. A 1911 comment from a physician that “those who apply for abortions are
from every walk of life, from the factory girl to the millionaire’s daughter; from the
laborer’s wife to that of the banker, no class, no sect seems to be above…the destruction
of the fetus” indicates the problem that abortion posed for eugenicists (Reagan 23). The
fear that “the millionaire’s daughter” and the “banker’s wife” were not above terminating
their pregnancies, when their pregnancies were seen as so essential to the future of the
country, indicated that calls for these women to reproduce out of a sense of duty to their
country were falling on deaf ears.
If America was indeed engaged in a demographic war, it was one that the eugenic
proponents and supporters of the sexual status quo were losing. Clearly, rallying for
middle-and upper-class white women to reproduce in greater numbers was not turning the
reproductive tide—the country needed to reconstruct the terms of the ideological
narrative, to modernize anti-birth control rhetoric, if it wanted to have any hope of
reversing these demographic trends. In other words, simply chastising women for failing
to procreate was not going to win the ideological war for them. Putting the emphasis on
women’s “duty” to reproduce was clearly not increasing reproduction rates.
Part of the failure of this notion of reproductive duty was that it was at odds with
the emerging sense of reproductive freedom offered by nineteenth century advances in
reproductive control and turn-of-the-century changes in courtship rituals and sexual
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practices.49 If the rise of modern birth control and changes in sexual practices promised
greater sexual freedom as a result, the rhetoric of duty focused on limiting or negating
this perceived new freedom, an ultimately ineffective strategy. This prospect of sexual
freedom could be maintained, however, by focusing on the idea of “choice” rather than
duty. As a result, early twentieth century eugenicist and anti-birth control advocates
moved away from the narrative of “duty” to the narrative of “choice.” If women were
given the choice to make reproductive decisions, then their burgeoning sexual freedom
would remain intact.

By recasting reproduction as a “choice” rather than a “duty,”

proponents could allow women to feel that they retained their ability to manage their
reproductive choices freely. In other words, sexually active women, whether they were
married or single, could choose to prevent pregnancy altogether through the preventative
use of birth control or they could choose to either continue or terminate an existing
pregnancy.
Of course, because this reframing as choice rather than duty emerged from within
already established cultural narratives—namely, narratives of class, race, sexuality, and
gender—the actual ability to freely make reproductive choices is a construction that is
every bit as subject to prescription as the earlier narrative about duty was. The rhetoric of
choice functioned as an ideological weapon in the Progressive Era. As two early cultural
texts that explicitly depict abortion as a matter of choice reveal, this new rhetoric offered
49
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the illusion of freedom and personal agency while at the same time, by encoding those
reproductive choices with gendered, racialized, class-based tropes, the narratives
circumscribe the heroines’ “choices.” Choice, then, becomes a successful way for
eugenic advocates to press their reproductive agendas while maintaining the illusion of
reproductive freedom. Reproductive “choice” in abortion then came to be cast in what
modern readers will recognize as familiar, gendered tropes—that of the choice to be a
“selfish” or a “good” girl.
An analysis of the 1916 anti-abortion film Where Are My Children?, written and
directed by the successful Hollywood producer and eugenics proponent Lois Weber, and
Edith Wharton’s 1917 novel Summer reveal the birth of this modern abortion narrative.
Wharton, too, has ties to the eugenics movement, although her exact views on the issue
are the source of continued critical debate.50 I argue in this chapter that these narratives
taken together provide early examples of the depiction of abortion as “choice” and help
us to understand the birth of the modern abortion debate in terms of the emerging sexual
freedoms of the Progressive Era and their implications for reproductive choices. These
texts not only directly dramatize the choice to continue or terminate a pregnancy, but also
place the two central female characters and their respective reproductive decisions in the
now familiar abortion-debate terms of "selfish" choices versus "good" girls. Weber’s
film is straightforward is its assessment of this: only selfish women have abortions.
Wharton’s novel, on the other hand, more clearly dramatizes the way that these choices
were circumscribed by gendered, racialized and class-based tropes and shows how these
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reproductive choices were filtered through the narrative lens of shame. In doing so, she
exposes the complexity with which this new narrative functioned in the Progressive Era
by depicting the lack of real choices for the novel’s protagonist, Charity. Driven by the
shame of her dysgenic origins, Charity ultimately chooses to be a good girl, if an
unhappy one.

Reproduction as “Choice”
The modern abortion debate revolves around the familiar term “choice.” From
the abortion rights supporters self-labeled “pro-choice” claim to the anti-abortion
proponents slogan, “It’s not a choice, it’s a child,” contemporary discourse over abortion
imagines first and foremost that reproduction is a decision, an action with possible, and
competing, options and outcomes. This contemporary view of reproduction emerged
from the previous historical view of it as a singularly determined biological event, one
that did not involve choices. For women of the past, pregnancy happened to women and
women were left to face the consequences.
As Linda Gordon argues, after Roe v. Wade, the dominant abortion rights
activists, using the legacy of the legal assertion of the right to privacy, focused on
“choice” as its rallying cry, as “this language evoked the emotional and political power of
the idea of freedom—as in freedom of choice—in American political discourse.”51
Gordon argues that the reproductive rights’ movement of the sixties and seventies was

51

See Linda Gordon’s The Moral Property of Women for a discussion of the movements within
America’s history of birth control and abortion, and see Leslie Reagan’s When Abortion Was a Crime for a
detailed account of the legal movement and arguments that resulted in the decriminalization of abortion in
the 1970s.

84

marked by a “reliance on a right to privacy and ‘choice’ and by the slogan for ‘abortion
on demand.’” And while she rightly points out that the activists in the decades after this
era, in response to conservative attacks and the weakening of the feminist movement,
moved away from this rhetoric of privacy and choice to argue for abortion rights as a
“social good, part of a larger group of reproductive rights that helped to create equality
for women and social responsibility for children,” this legacy of putting abortion in terms
of reproductive “choice” remains (297).
Gordon presents this shift as a choice on the part of the abortion rights proponents
based on the emerging legal decisions regarding abortion. No doubt it was. It is certainly
true that it has only been in the past couple of generations that women who supported
abortion rights have identified themselves as “pro-choice,” rather than as supporters of
birth control or “humane abortion.”52 It is also true that, as Gordon points out, this shift
moves the debate away from a focus on abortion, and its contentious politics, and onto
the rights of women, an important one in this current political climate of the thriving
right-to-life movement.53 The question this chapter addresses, though, is where we can
locate the origin of this shift. It is my argument that, contrary to the general critical
assumption that this change occurred only in the post-Roe v. Wade era and only as a
result of the legal legacy of that decision, this conception of reproduction as a matter of
“choice” emerged in the Progressive Era as a response to the promise of reproductive
freedoms offered by the rise of modern birth control in the nineteenth century. This new
52
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narrative of choice, however, masked the eugenically-driven, socially conservative
rhetoric of duty in a seemingly more progressive, more freeing language of “choice.”
The emergence of this view of reproduction as involving “choices” plays a key
role in Progressive Era reproductive politics. Margaret Sanger, perhaps the most well
known advocate in the history of the birth control movement, did not, like many of her
contemporaries, support abortion.54 Sanger, who coined the term “birth control” in 1915,
in fact did not see abortion as part of the forms of reproductive control that she imagined
birth control covered. In a1923 pamphlet, she writes, “there is no commoner
misapprehension concerning Birth Control than that which identifies it with abortion.”
She asserts in the pamphlet that women are “practically forced into abortion” because of
their lack of access to birth control: “Can it be imagined that any woman would resort to
these painful and dangerous means of checking the increase of her family if she had
access to scientific medical information that would enable her, without the slightest
danger to herself, to prevent conception?” What is interesting about this pamphlet is the
language of choice that Sanger uses. She argues, “without Birth Control the mother is
given the choice of two crimes—to injure herself and to destroy her unborn child by
abortion, or to bring into the word children for whom she cannot care, and who are
doomed from birth to misery, ill health, deficiency or physical defect” (emphasis added)
(qtd. in Tone 157). This is a markedly different argument about the nature of
reproduction. In Sanger’s articulation, birth control offers a third option for women,
who, without it, are faced with the choice of either having an abortion or continuing an
54
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advocacy for eugenics.
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unwanted pregnancy. The fact that she articulates reproduction, not as a singularly
determined biological event, but as involving competing options, indicates the significant
change to the way reproduction was imagined in the Progressive Era. Societal issues of
birth control and abortion were not, as they had been previously, seen as purely medical
issues best left to physicians or as demographic issues that politicians and ideologues
need address. Sanger places women, and their choices, at the center of the reproductive
rights debate. This is not a call to abstain from sexual activity to avoid reproduction, no
real choice at all and one that negates the value of women’s sexual lives, or a call to use
reproduction as a tool for the social good, one that places societal good at the center of
women’s reproductive lives. This is a direct articulation of reproduction as a personal
choice that women face, a choice that comes with options, however limited or flawed.
This is a radical moment in the history of women’s reproductive rights.
In fact, the term “reproductive rights” has very little meaning without choice. For
the feminist of the nineteenth century, the term “reproductive rights” meant “voluntary
motherhood,” the idea that women’s sexual and reproductive rights were limited to the
right of married women to decline sex with their husbands in order to avoid pregnancy.55
Women simply were not imagined as having “choices” when it came to reproduction.
This is not to say that all pregnancies were carried to term or that women did not use birth
control methods, including abortions. Women certainly did have various reproductive
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options, as the precipitous drop in birth rates shows, and they did have abortions, both
self-induced and those performed by doctors.56
What it does mean is that women were not imagined as having reproductive
choices. The nineteenth century viewed abortion largely in medical, rather than moral,
terms. As Chapter 1 shows, this view largely grew out of the nineteenth-century medical
knowledge of pregnancy and the female body. Because doctors could not determine
pregnancy through examination until later in the pregnancy, they relied on women’s
physiological experience of “quickening,” the moment when the fetus can first be felt by
the pregnant woman, as the determining factor for pregnancy. Quickening, though, does
not occur until the fourth or fifth month, which meant during that time period, as I argue
in Chapter 1, a lack of menstruation could result from a harmful obstruction of the female
reproductive system or from pregnancy. The successful effort to illegalize abortion in the
nineteenth century resulted largely from arguments that abortion should be an entirely
medical matter and that the only legal abortion should be the “therapeutic” ones
performed by licensed and qualified doctors.57
As Leslie Reagan points out, despite campaigns to educate women about the
emerging reproductive sciences and discourage this quickening-based view of pregnancy,
women in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century continued to view pregnancy
and abortion in much the same terms that generations of women before them had. In
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recounting the vernacular women used to describe their illegal abortions in the period
between 1880 and 1930, women consistently used language such as “bring my courses
on,” “fixed up,” and “to be put straight,” all of which follow the nineteenth century
rhetorical model of viewing abortions as medical procedures intended to remedy physical
ailments of the reproductive system (qtd. in Reagan 24). This is not a rhetorical
argument based on the idea of choice. In their self-depictions, these women have no
choice. What they have is a medical condition that needs medical attention.
As we can see from Sanger’s pamphlet and the now ubiquitous notions of women
as having reproductive choices, at some point a paradigm shift occurred that moved
women away from thinking of reproduction in purely medical terms to thinking of it in
terms of choice and agency. The complexities of this shift are too vast for a complete
discussion of them in this chapter; tied up in changing notions of selfhood, women’s
relationship’s to sexuality and their body, and their places in the home and society, this
shift is part of a larger historical narrative about the women’s rights movement and
changing gender dynamics in the twentieth century. What this chapter will discuss is the
way that fictive depictions of reproduction and pregnancy as involving conscious and
deliberate choices in the Progressive Era reveal the socially-conservative purpose this
new rhetoric of choice was put to and the way that already existing gendered, racialized,
and class-based tropes of sexual norms and expectations circumscribed women’s choices
to such a degree that the very of idea of choice seemed to preclude, rather than allow,
greater reproductive agency. In other words, choice became a reproductive trap for
women, holding over them the shame of making the wrong choice. Women weren’t
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making reproductive choices so much as they were making the choice to be good girls or
selfish women.

Sex and the “Selfish” Girl
Where Are My Children? presents the earliest existing depiction of the theme of
abortion in American film. Lois Weber, the film’s writer, director, and producer, holds a
unique place in film history. She was one of America’s earliest and most successful
filmmakers. As Anthony Slide puts it, “Along with D.W. Griffith, Lois Weber was
American cinema’s first genuine auteur, a filmmaker involved in all aspects of
production and one who utilized the motion picture to put across her own ideas and
philosophies” (29). By 1916 she was the highest paid director at Universal Studios and
the highest paid female director. Although she has largely been forgotten in film history,
during the teens, she was as famous as D.W. Griffin and Cecil B. de Mille.58
As recent scholars such as Ann Kaplan, Anthony Slide, Linda Seger, and Janet
Staiger have engaged in recovery projects of early twentieth-century female directors and
their place in film history, Weber’s personal politics and their affect on her films have
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been the subject of increasing critical scrutiny.59 Her films gained notoriety for their
illicit and sexually-explicit materials. Her 1914 film Hypocrites featured the first nude
love scene in American film (Seger 199).

Where Are My Children?, while

commercially successful, was enormously controversial and even featured a disclaimer
prior to screening about the “illicit” nature of its subject matter.
Ann Kaplan has argued that the film “contains contradictory discourses arising
from the context of the film’s production, cultural preoccupations of the period, and
Weber’s idiosyncratic concerns” (132). Kaplan attributes the dual nature of the film—
one thread of the plot deals with the trial of a lawyer prosecuted for disseminating birth
control to the poor occupants of a tenement and the other with the upper-class lawyer and
his wife, who we learn is secretly having illegal abortions to avoid the responsibility of
being a mother—to Weber’s “own puritanical Christian values,” which “account for her
strong identification with a familiar construction—that of the virtuous working classes,
and a wasteful, idle upper class” (132). Her argument that “the film is split between a
conservative, male-identified address in the upper-class story that is the main plot, and
female-identified and more radical address in the sub-plot concerning a working class
mother and child” (132), along with Anthony Slide’s reference to Weber as a “gentle
propagandist” and his highlighting of her opposition to capital punishment and support of
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birth control for women, serves as evidence not only of the recovery of Weber but also of
the critical rehabilitation of her image and reshaping of her into a feminist film icon.60
The trouble with that rehabilitation is the troubling sexual and reproductive
politics of her film Where Are My Children? Despite readings of the film’s politics as
either confused or as more the result of the studio system machinations than a reflection
of Weber’s own political leanings, the film is unrelenting is its clear, eugenicallymotivated and classist themes, none of which are unique or novel for their times. The
advocacy of birth control in the film, like the popular movement for birth control at the
time, is limited to poor women, and the villainess abortion-seeking women of the film are
of the leisure class, motivated by selfishness and the unnatural desire to avoid the
responsibilities of being a mother.
The historical evidence does indicate that, contrary to the image of the seduced
and abandoned single young girl forced to the crime of abortion by desperation that was
so popular with the press, most of the women who had abortions in the early twentieth
century were indeed married women and this trend continued until after World War II
(Reagan). Demographic evidence based on class is even more difficult to determine in
the case of illegal abortions, as women of the middle- and upper-classes had greater
access to qualified doctors and therefore potentially had fewer complications and a lower
rate of mortality, a primary means by which statistics about illegal abortions were
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obtained. However, one study done of ten thousand working-class clients of Margaret
Sanger’s birth control clinic found that twenty percent had had an abortion, whereas a
1920s survey of educated middle-class women indicates that around ten to twenty percent
had had an abortion performed.61 While these numbers certainly are not definitive, they
do indicate that middle- and upper-class women were certainly no more likely than
working class women to have abortions, and in fact, were potentially less likely to do so.
This is supported by the historical argument that suggests that upper- and middleclass women were probably more successful than their working-class counterparts in
getting physicians to prescribe birth control for them. Because of their greater ability to
influence their doctors, upper- and middle-class women were most likely better able to
gain access to birth control and therefore less likely to need to use abortion as a method
of reproductive control. In addition, while married women were more likely to have an
abortion than single women, for the vast majority of them, abortion was used as a method
of birth control only after the desired family size had been reached.62
The historical reality of who was actually having abortions and for what reasons,
though, is not the concern of the film. The film, instead, is committed to advocating for
birth control for the poor on eugenics grounds, while simultaneously vilifying women of
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the upper class for being “social butterflies” and refusing to procreate. Echoing Theodore
Roosevelt’s claims that America’s “rapid decline of the birth-rate…inevitably signalizes
race decay, and …racial death,” the film attributes this decline, as Roosevelt puts it, as
“due to coldness, to selfishness, to love of ease, to shrinking from risk, to an utter and
pitiful failure in sense of perspective and in power of weighting what really makes the
highest joy, and to a rooting out of the sense of duty or a twisting of that sense into
improper channels” (qtd. in Tone 160). These traits—coldness, selfishness, love of
ease—define the affluent and privileged women of the film.
The opening of the film sets up the eugenic terms of both its pro-birth-control and
anti-abortion narratives. The film opens with the subtitle, “Behind the great portals of
eternity, the souls, another of little children waited to be born.” As we learn, these souls
in heaven are divided: “Within the first space was the great army of ‘chance children’”
who “went forth to earth in vast numbers.” However, “then came those sad ‘unwanted’
souls that were constantly sent back. They were marked morally or physically defective
and bore the sign of the serpent.” Lastly, there were the wanted ones: “And then in the
secret place of the most high were those souls, fine and strong, that were only sent forth
on prayer. They were marked with the approval of the almighty.” This conception of
souls as divided into “physically and morally defective” or “fine and strong” sets up the
eugenic argument of the film that access to birth control should be determined by the
genetic quality of the potential offspring. The film, though, sentimentalizes this
argument by relying on the narrative trope, carried throughout the film, of these
reproductive choices as representing “souls” depicted as angels.
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The pro-birth control part of the dual narrative of the film is carried out in the
courtroom. Richard Walton, a district attorney described as a “great believer in
eugenics,” defends a doctor, also a proponent of eugenics, who is accused of
disseminating immoral materials by distributing birth control information to the
community’s poor. The doctor on trial asserts, “I am accused of distributing indecent
literature because I advocate birth regulation. The law should help instead of hinder me.”
A close up of a page from his book reveals his clearly stated eugenic argument for birth
control: “When only those children who are wanted are born the race will conquer the
evils that weigh it down.”
The trial scene upholds this eugenic argument by including flashbacks of the
horrors the doctor witnessed in the city tenements, narratively attributed to the lack of
adequate family planning. A montage of domestic scenes of violence, poverty, and
despair, husbands and wives abusing each other, and children as dirty, neglected, and
abused provide “evidence” for the doctor’s views of these people’s unfitness to
reproduce. The doctor asserts that he was often witness to these scenes, as “[his] work
among the poor often took [him] to the slums.” It is “these conditions” that proved to the
doctor “the necessity of world wide enlightenment on the subject of birth control.”
Another cut to a close-up of his book reveals the cause of this suffering: “Because men
and women are ignorant and undisciplined does it follow that unwanted children should
be born to suffer blindness, disease or insanity?” The occupants of the tenements are
clearly dysgenic, and the viewer is encouraged to reach the same conclusions about the
need for their access to birth control that the doctor has put forth.

95

To underscore the connection between this world of dysgenic reproduction and its
anti-abortion message, the film moves from this courtroom scene to the revelation that “it
was a great disappointment to the district attorney that his wife was childless.” However,
unlike the pro-birth control side of the narrative, the anti-abortion narrative is played out
predominantly in the home. When Mrs. Walton is introduced, she is shown lying on the
family home’s terrace, lounging on a chaise sofa, feeding candy to a pair of small dogs.
In her indolent and idle lounging, she is the picture of leisure and class privilege. The
sumptuous nature of the leisure activities and the reposed nature of her lounging mark her
as sensual and even sexually suspect, while the devotion to and pampering of her pets
indicate the displacement of her appropriate maternal energies onto inappropriate objects.
Even further, her morally suspect life of leisure is revealed as a matter of “fault”
in the film. The film narrates that “never dreaming that it was her fault, her husband
concealed his disappointment” about their lack of children. The language of “fault” here
sets up the other side of this dual narrative—that of the “selfish” woman who, while
eugenically and financially able to have children, chooses not to. Mr. Walton’s sister
provides yet another counterpoint to Mrs. Walton, which further underscores the
selfishness of her choice. When his sister and her husband arrive for a visit with their
new baby, the film narrates, “Walton’s sister had contracted an eugenic marriage and her
first child was a source of great interest.” Mr. Walton comes over to the infant and, as
Weber describes in the script, “looks lovingly at the child.”63 Mrs. Walton, on the other
hand, appears in the scene carrying her dog in her arms as if it were an infant. The
message here is clear: Mrs. Walton has perverted her natural maternal desires and
channeled them into inappropriate objects—her pets—all in a selfish effort to avoid the
63
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demands of motherhood, and in the process, denies her husband the eugenically desirable
children he so desires and deserves.
This scene also provides an important contrast between the eugenically-conceived
baby, with its full, pink cheeks and cherubic face, and the baby featured in the earlier
tenement scene, with its sallow, wan, thin cheeks and unhealthy physical appearance, and
depicts how allowing access to birth control for the masses will prevent the birth of these
less desirable babies, these “physically and morally defective souls,” leaving
reproduction in the hands of those women eugenically fit for it.
As Mrs. Warner’s unnatural leisure indicates, however, there is another problem
preventing this utopic reproductive ideal—the selfishness of this “better class” of women.
The next scene in the movie begins at the home of Mrs. William Brandt, Mrs. Walton’s
“bosom friend.” Mrs. Brandt, like Mrs. Walton, is introduced lying reposed on a settee.
The film fades up on clouds and an angel appears at the portals of the opening of the film.
The film cuts to a close up of Mrs. Brandt, to whom a vision of the angel’s face appears
over her shoulder and whispers in her ear. This is the film’s narrative trope to describe a
woman’s learning that she is “with child.” Mrs. Brandt, as is described in the script, is
“angry” and “impatient” at this revelation, and clearly unhappy at the thought of being
pregnant. When another lady invites the women to a house party, Mrs. Brandt is
“peevish” and “discontented.” The film narrates these events to show that her desire to
avoid children results from her desire for social amusements. Like Roosevelt, the film
depicts these women as avoiding motherhood purely out of a selfish and frivolous love of
enjoyment.64
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The film’s argument for how these women avoid motherhood centers solely on
the issue of abortion. It is Mrs. Walton, of course, who offers the solution to her friend’s
troubles—a visit to Dr. Malfit, a name that implies how he has “malfitted” his medical
training to serve immoral purposes. The visit to his office reveals that, while some
women look uneasy or uncomfortable, Mrs. Walton is all too familiar with his practice,
as she yawns while flipping through a magazine in the waiting area.
Weber further vilifies her by contrasting her casual and cavalier attitude towards
terminating pregnancies with Mr. Walton’s evident paternal longing and desire for
offspring. Several scenes in the film involve shots of small children playing in the
neighbor’s yard and close-ups of Mr. Walton gazing at them longingly. One such scene
depicting his desire for children is interspersed with the “result” from Mrs. Brandt’s
abortion. The film cuts to an angel rising alone through the clouds. The portals appear
and close as the angel disappears. The subtitle, “one of the ‘Unwanted Ones’ returns and
a social butterfly is again ready for house parties,” appears on the scene. The message is
clear—these “social butterflies” choose their social lives and the gaiety and frivolity of
them over their duty to be mothers, the husbands’ desires, and the lives of these “angels.”
In a heavy-handed use of dramatic irony, the film cuts back to Mr. Walton again
longingly watching the children play, and he says to the neighbor, “We plan to have a
dozen of these little angels in time.” Although he is unaware of her visits to Dr. Malfit,
the audience is all too aware that her nonchalant visit to the doctor’s office, and her
knowledge of the illegal services he offers, indicate the true reason for their current lack

(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) and Nan Enstad’s Ladies of Labors, Girls of Adventure
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) for a couple of provocative works on the topic.

98

of children. Clearly, if his wife has any say in it, and because of Dr. Malfit and her
reproductive choices she does, they will not “have half a dozen of these little angels.”
The climax of the movie occurs when Mrs. Walton’s brother, a rake who is
visiting, seduces Lillian, the young daughter of their housekeeper. As the subtitle notes,
“It was the old, old tragedy and one of the ‘unwanted ones’ was called to earth.” When
he goes to his sister with his troubles, Mrs. Walton once again offers Dr. Malfit’s services
as a solution. This time, however, “the obliging Dr. Malfit bungled,” and “Lillian lived
long enough to tell her broken-hearted mother the truth.” Although Mr. Walton does not
immediately learn of his wife’s involvement in this affair, he does learn of the doctor who
performed the botched abortion, and “through Walton’s efforts Dr. Malfit was quickly
brought to trial.”
It is through this legal action that Mr. Walton learns of his wife’s deceit. When
Dr. Malfit is sentenced to fifteen years, in a last act of vengeance, he says to Mr. Walton,
“Before sitting in judgment of others, you should see to your own household.”65 The film
cuts to a close up of Mr. Walton who glances at the ledger Malfit put before him,
revealing the name “Mrs. Richard Walton” and the entries of “To Professional
Services…………$50.00” listed twice. He also sees a listing for Mrs. Brandt before
throwing the ledger down in disgust.
The final scene in the film ends with Mr. Walton confronting Mrs. Walton.
Returning home, he find his wife entertaining her friends, and says to them all, “I have
just learned why so many of you are childless! I should bring you to trial, but I shall
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content myself with asking you to leave my house!” After the women leave, he turns to
his wife and delivers the title line of the film: “Where are my children?” Her reaction
shows her remorse and shame at her actions. Mr. Walton, though, is greatly angry and
exclaims, “I—an officer of the law—must shield a murderess!” She pleads at his feet,
but he simply turns his back, walks out of the room, and shuts the door. She faints and
sinks to the floor and the picture fades out. The scene ends on the subtitle, “All night
long Richard Walton grieved for his lost children and his lost faith in the woman who
should have been their mother.”
Ultimately, “seeing how much a family means to him and really loving her
husband, Mrs. Walton decides to conquer her selfishness and prepare for motherhood.”
And of course, even when Mrs. Walton becomes contrite and remorseful of her actions
and, “prayerfully now…sought the blessing she had refused,” “the portals remained
closed to her forever.” She is doomed in the film to be forever punished for her
reproductive choices. I have described the melodramatic finale of the film in some detail
to fully show the punitive, shaming, and castigating nature of the ending. The film serves
as a cautionary tale for married women of the middle- and upper classes. The message is
clear: if you make selfish reproductive choices, you risk losing the ability to reproduce
forever. If you deny your husband his rightful offspring, you will face the shame that
comes from his recrimination: “Throughout the years, she must face the silent question,
“Where are my children?”
Weber’s film perverts the historical facts about who actually had abortions and
their motivations for doing so in order to politicize women’s reproductive choices. In
doing so, she reveals how this new fictive treatment of reproductive “choices” was rooted
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in a socially conservative framing of these choices within already established gendered,
racialized, and class-based tropes. Women who choose to have abortions are selfish
women, doing what they wanted instead of what is in the best interest of their society,
their unborn children, and their husbands. Weber’s film performs two significant actions
in the early treatment of the notion of reproductive choices—it both depicts reproduction
as something about which women have choices and it creates a gendered and
eugenically-driven ideology about those choices. Under this new reproductive paradigm,
some choices are inherently “good” and some choices are “selfish.”

“You’re a Good Girl, Charity”
Edith Wharton’s 1917 novel Summer, although it caused a sensation when it was
published because of its frank depiction of sexuality, has since fallen out of favor in
Wharton criticism.66 However, the novel provides one of the frankest and earliest
depictions of a heroine’s struggle with an unplanned pregnancy and one of the few early
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resulting in the “sick” union of Charity and Mr. Royall. Dale Bauer sees Edith Wharton’s work as engaged
in an “argument with new America,” one in which Wharton saw the eugenics craze as both “symptom” and
“symbol” of America’s attempt to “localize and totalize its new social problems”(28). Jennie Kassanoff’s
work Edith Wharton and the Politics of Race takes issue with the way that these reading conceal Wharton’s
radical conservatism. Arguing that “Summer answers the chaotic multiplicity of war with a conservation
paean to the racial uniformity of the old home,” Kassanoff sees Wharton’s “commitment to generational
continuity triumphing over her feminist individualism”(119, 148). See Elizabeth Ammons’s Edith
Wharton’s Argument with America (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980); Dale Bauer’s Edith
Wharton’s Brave New Politics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994); Jennie Kassanoff’s Edith
Wharton and the Politics of Race (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Jennifer Haytock’s
Edith Wharton and the Conversations of Literary Modernism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008);
Rhonda Skillern’s “Becoming a “Good Girl”: Law, Language, and Ritual in Edith Wharton’s Summer,”
The Cambridge Companion to Edith Wharton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and
Kathleen Pfeiffer’s “Summer and Its Critics Discomfort,” Women’s Studies 20 (1991):141-52, for critical
discussions of Wharton’s Summer.
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twentieth century works that deals with a heroine expressly contemplating whether or not
to terminate a pregnancy.
The novel centers on the story of Charity Royall, a young woman living in the
remote mountain town of North Dormer.67 Charity, we learn, was born “up the
mountain,” a place depicted in the novel as backwards, almost subhuman. She is rescued
from her terrible fate and brought “down the mountain” to North Dormer by the town
lawyer, Mr. Royall and his wife, described as a mousy, down-trodden woman. After
Mrs. Royall’s death, Mr. Royall, a brutal and difficult man, raises Charity alone, although
their relationship is depicted as intensely strained and contentious. Charity meets
Harney, a young architect from the city, who sweeps her off her feet, and they have a
passionate, and ultimately failed, relationship. Facing the fact of her unplanned
pregnancy and determined to keep her baby, she marries Mr. Royal to preserve her
reputation and provide for her child. In many ways, it is the classic seduction narrative.
However, Wharton’s take on the seduction story reveals the importance of this
novel and how it contributes to an understanding of the politics of reproductive choice in
the Progressive Era. Unlike earlier seduction narratives, Charity has choices.
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Kathy Peiss describes the culture of “treating” that emerged in the early twentieth century. The
origin of modern dating traditions, this practice involved young men “treating” girls to leisure activities as a
way of indicating romantic and social interest. Treating created confusing sexual norms for young,
working class girls who were entreated to remain sexually pure but who saw the benefit of being the
recipient of “treating,” as well as the sexual obligation that accompanied it. The term “charity girl” came to
be used to for girls who “bought fully into the culture of treating” and traded amusement and trinkets for
sexual favors. Such women were distinct socially from women who engaged in “occasional” prostitution
as a means of supplementing their incomes but existed in a socially suspect space. While it’s unclear if the
choice of “Charity” for the main character of the novel is a deliberate reverence to these “charity girls” or
not, there does seem to be similarities between the character of Charity in the novel and the perception of
these girls. Particularly suggestive of this association is Charity and Harney’s trip to Nettleton, where
Harney “treats” Charity to a fancy lunch complete with wine and buys her an “expensive” trinket, a ring.
This trip also marks the beginning of their sexual relationship, a connection that further implicates her as a
“charity girl.” Peiss’s assertion of “the intricacies this negotiation—of the balancing act between social
respectability, female desire, and male pressures” certainly seems to refer to Charity’s position as she
navigates, largely without guidance, the social and sexual terrain of young womanhood (112).
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Specifically, she has the choice to continue the pregnancy to term or to terminate the
fetus. The fact that Wharton offers abortion as an option for Charity’s age-old plight
indicates the “progressive” nature of this novel.
From the start, though, Charity is not depicted as the prototypical heroine of the
seduction tale. She is described as having a “small, swarthy face” (2) and “rough dark
hair” (88) and her first line in the novel is, “How I hate everything!” (2). In fact, Charity
is rather unpleasant. She clearly has a “chip on her shoulder” that manifests itself as a
certain unpleasantness and pettiness. She resents everything, including North Dormer for
being such a miserable town:
There it lay, a weather-beaten sunburnt village of the hills, abandoned of
men, left apart by railway, trolley, telegraph, and all the forces that link
life to modern communities. It had no shops, no theatres, no lectures, no
‘business block’; only a church that was opened every other Sunday if the
state of the roads permitted, and a library for which no new books had
been bought for twenty years, and where the old ones mouldered
undisturbed on the damp shelves. (3-4)
But she also resents being indebted to Mr. Royall and the town for saving her from her
fate on the mountain. As the narrator explains, “Charity Royall had always been told that
she ought to consider it a privilege that her lot had been cast in North Dormer. She knew
that, compared to the place she had come from, North Dormer represented all the
blessings of the most refined civilization”(4). She even resents her job working in the
town library, although she enjoys the small amount of personal and financial freedom
having employment offers her. Charity, then, is full of anger and resentment, a
misanthrope, an unlikeable character. She is not the prototypical heroine of the seduction
novel.
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In the novel, however, her harsh nature is tied to her suspect background. As the
narrator asserts, “Charity was not very clear about the Mountain; but she knew it was a
bad place, and a shame to have come from it” (4-5). Like Margaret in Chapter 2,
dysgenically marked by disease, Charity is marked by her “bad” past and the “shame” of
her clearly dysgenic origins, and also like Margaret, her sexual and reproductive choices
are read through the lens of her dysgenic background. Mr. Royall describes the people of
the mountain by saying that they “ain’t half human up there” (50-51) and that they were
lacking in any sort of natural human emotion or attachment, as evidenced by his claim
that her mother “was glad enough to have her go. She’d have given her to anybody”(50).
Charity, then, was “the child of a drunken convict and of a mother who wasn’t ‘halfhuman’”(51).
Given her suspect origins, Charity is particularly concerned in the novel with how
others in the town perceive her. As other critics such as Dale Bauer and Rhonda Skillern
have noted, Charity’s relationship with Harney is highly sexualized but for her, this
sexual relationship is fraught with her dysgenic-coded background. In one particular
moment, she contemplates joining him in his bedroom but realizes the consequences of
such an action:
One motion of her hand, one tap on the pane, and she could picture the
sudden change in his face. In every pulse of her rigid body she was aware
of the welcome his eyes and lips would give her; but something kept her
from moving. It was not the fear of any sanction, human or heavenly; she
had never in her life been afraid. It was simply that she had suddenly
understood what would happen if she went in. It was the thing that did
happen between young men and girls, and that North Dormer ignored in
public and snickered over on the sly. It was what Miss Hatchard was still
ignorant of, but every girl of Charity’s class knew about before she left
school. It was what had happened to Ally Hawes’s sister Julia, and had
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ended in her going to Nettleton, and in people’s never mentioning her
name. (72)68
It, of course, was sex. And while Charity asserts that is was not “fear of any sanction”
that prevented her from going inside, she knows that the potential result of this action is
procreation.
The courting couples of North Dormer are clearly sexually active, if only “on the
sly.”69 This sexual activity carried the risk of getting caught, the risk of getting pregnant.
Julia Hawes and Rose Coles, two unmarried North Dormer girls who get pregnant, offer
Charity two possible outcomes for girls who get “caught:” abortion and disgrace or a
loveless marriage. Julia Hawes chooses to have an abortion and becomes a prostitute.
Rose Coles’ forced marriage, on the other hand, is just as miserable and without dignity
as Julia’s fate:
Distinctly and pitilessly there rose before her the fate of the girl who
married ‘to make things right.’ She had seen too many village love-stories
end in that way. Poor Rose Coles’s miserable marriage was of the
number; and what good had come of it for her or for Halston Skeff? They
had hated each other from the day the minister married them; and
whenever old Mrs. Skeff had a fancy to humiliate her daughter-in-law she
had only to say, ‘Who’d ever think the baby’s only two? And for a seven
months’ child—ain't it a wonder what a size he is? (72)
Rose’s case fails in every way. Destroying her “village love-story” and causing them to
“hate each other,” it does not even preserve her dignity or shield her from idle village
gossip. After all, her mother-in-law knows that her past sexual indiscretions serve nicely
68

Bauer discusses the role of mothers in the novel and argues that lack of “good mothers” in the
novel “leads to Wharton’s drama of cultural scapegoating of ‘bad mothers,’ whose laxity and degenerate
behavior were all considered signs of greater dysgenic decline” (30). The lack of available mother figures,
and their guidance, in the novel heightens Charity’s precarious social and sexual positions. The available
mother figures fail in every way to help prevent Charity’s fall—Miss Hatchard, through her lack of sexual
knowledge and inability to protect Charity from Mr. Royall’s advances, Rose Coles’ mother-in-law, though
her use of sexual history as a social weapon, and both her biological and adoptive mothers, through their
abandonment through desertion and death.
69
See Kathy Peiss’s Cheap Amusements for a more complete discussion of changing dating and
sexual practices of the Progressive Era.
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as a social weapon. It is no wonder then that Charity finds it difficult to determine whose
case is more miserable and “had always suspected that the shunned Julia’s fate might
have its compensations”(49).
Wharton is clear about “what had happened to Ally Hawes’s sister Julia” and
what “had ended in her going to Nettleton,” a carefully grammatically constructed
sentence that suggests, not just what action (sex) had ended in going to Nettleton but
what “had ended” in Nettleton—the pregnancy. As we later learn, and is also referenced
by Ally, who says she will “always remember that awful time I went down with Julia—to
that doctor’s” (88), “that” doctor is an abortionist. Charity’s early feelings about Julia’s
plight—“’Poor Julia!’ Charity sighed from the height of her purity and her security”
(88)—indicate Charity’s pre-sexual and socially secure position. Her feeling that “the
pity of it was that girls like Julia did not know how to choose, and to keep bad fellows at
a distance,” (88) invokes the classic societal response to the “girl in trouble” scenario.
She simply didn’t know “how to choose.” Charity, though, knows that she has chosen a
young man who “wore city clothes” and was from a good family. She feels immune to
the dangers of Julia’s situation.
It is significant, then, that the first time that Charity sees the abortionist’s office is
on an illicit trip taken with Harney to visit Nettleton for the Forth of July fireworks. The
building is described as a “brick house with a conspicuous black and gold sign across its
front, ‘Dr. Merkle; Private Consultations at all hours. Lady Attendants’” (98). Seeing
the house, she remembers, “Ally Hawkes’s words: ‘The house was at the corner of Wing
Street and Lake Avenue…there’s a big black sign across the front…’” and the sight of
the house causes “through all the heat and the rapture a shiver of cold ran over her” (98).
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It is hardly coincidental, then, that it is in this context, this town, that the sexual
nature of their relationship begins to escalate. Although “in most of the village
friendships between youths and maidens lack of conversation was made up for by
tentative fondling,” “Harney … had never put his arm about her, or sought to betray her
into any sudden caress”(91). This lack of physical contact changes, however, during the
train ride to the town: “Now and then a lurch of the train flung her against Harney, and
through her thin muslin she felt the touch of his sleeve. She steadied herself, their eyes
met, and the flaming breath of the day seemed to enclose them” (92).
It is during the firework finale, though, that the sexual nature of their relationship
really begins to escalate. The fireworks serve as an extended metaphor for their
developing sexual relationship, and the description of the fireworks is filled with sexual
language—the references to “throbbed,” “pressed,” and “rapture” serve as examples. The
metaphor of the fireworks’ finale as a sexual release is also apparent. The fact that it
ended in Harney and Charity’s first kiss, a kiss described as a passionate one that
“revealed” a new, “dominant” Harney to her, as well as a “new mysterious power”
clearly indicates her dawning awareness of their sexual relationship.
What makes this passage even more significant than Wharton’s frank depiction of
a young women’s burgeoning sexuality is the context in which this moment occurs and
the narrative results of the awakening of this sexuality. Directly after this moment,
Charity and Harney come face to face with the “seedy” side of sexuality in the form of
the infamous Julia Hawes and a drunken Mr. Royall. Charity’s sees Julia, noting that her
face has “lost her freshness” and whose “paint under her eyes made her face seem
thinner”(102), after the fireworks, with “her white feather askew, and the face under
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flushed with coarse laughter”(105). Julia is part of a gang of rowdy youths with whom
her guardian is drunkenly associating, and the scene devolves into his shouting furiously
at Charity, “You whore—you damn—bare-headed whore, you!”(106).
Charity suddenly had a vision of herself, hatless, disheveled, with a man’s
arm about her, confronting that drunken crew, headed by her guardian’s
pitiable figure. The picture filled her with shame. She had known since
childhood about Mr. Royall’s “habits”: had seen him, as she went up to
bed, sitting morosely in his office, a bottle at his elbow; or coming home,
heavy and quarrelsome, from his business expeditions to Hepburn or
Springfield; but the idea of his associating himself publicly with a band of
disreputable girls and bar-room loafers was new and dreadful to her. (106)
The shame that Charity feels in this moment significantly gestures toward the shame that
she feels about her dysgenic origins. The novel reveals how the sexual and reproductive
choices for Charity are circumscribed by her these origins.
The truth is, however, that Charity has more in common with the “disreputable
girls” than she might like to believe, a fact underscored by her concern with what people
would say about her when word of this incident reached North Dormer. Charity’s
“tainted” origins mean that her sexual choices will be read by the people of the town
within that existing essentialized context. Whereas Julia is a good girl gone bad, a fact
supported by her sister’s continued position as a “good girl” in the town, Charity’s sexual
behavior will only serve to reinforce her already suspect background. The “shame” that
she feels from Mr. Royall’s consorting with this “band of disreputable girls” results from
the shame that she feels from having been “caught” “hatless, disheveled, with a man’s
arm about her.” Her sexual shame is magnified by the shame of her origins.
However, despite the warning that this scene might occasion for her, she
continues on her path of sexual awakening, meeting with Harney in a primitive house in
the woods for their sexual rendezvouses. To make even clearer the sexual and romantic
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nature of these meetings in the woods, the room was “furnished in primitive camping
fashion. In the window was a table, also made of boards, with an earthenware jar holding
a big bunch of wild asters, two canvas chairs stood near by, and in one corner was a
mattress with a Mexican blanket over it” (127). Even further, her sexual awakening
continued in the house in the woods: “He had his arms about her, and his kisses were in
her hair and lips. Under his touch things deep in her struggled to the light and sprang up
like flowers in sunshine” (130). Wharton, however, does not allow this sexual awakening
without a price.
Finding herself in the classic seduction plot, Charity realizes not only that she is
pregnant but that, like Julia, she in fact does not know “how to choose.” Harney, she
learns, is engaged to another, and to make matters even worse, to a girl of his own social
standing. Charity resolves not to trap Harney into marriage with the pregnancy, which as
she realizes solves very little—she knew the “sorry fate” of the girl “who was married ‘to
make things right’” and “had seen too many village love-stories end in that way” after all
to see that as a viable option.
The question for Charity is what to do now. Faced with the classic fate of the girl
in the seduction tale—abandoned with an unwanted pregnancy—Charity, unlike earlier
heroines, is faced with reproductive choices. Her subsequent visit to the abortionist
seems to indicate a willingness to consider ending the pregnancy as an option. However,
the scene in the doctor’s office suggest otherwise:
This woman with the false hair, the false teeth, the false murderous
smile—what was she offering her but immunity from some unthinkable
crime? Charity, till then, had been conscious only of a vague self-disgust
and a frightening physical distress; now, of a sudden, there came to her the
grave surprise of motherhood. She had come to this dreadful place
because she knew of no other way of making sure that she was not
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mistaken about her state; and the woman had taken her for a miserable
creature like Julia…The thought was so horrible that she sprang up, white
and shaking, one of her great rushes of anger sweeping over her. (160)
Charity’s fear that the doctor mistakes her for a “miserable creature,” seeking
“immunity” from a “crime” indicates the extent to which Charity’s choices are
constrained by the shame she feels because of her dysgenic background. Her sexuality
and reproductive choices are not hers to make freely—her fear that they will be read
through the lens of her suspect status as “undesirable other” precludes her from choosing
the option that perhaps would be “best” for her personally.
Charity refuses to terminate her pregnancy, deciding instead to marry Mr. Royall,
a man whom she had described as a “horrible old man” who fills her with “disgust.”
Perhaps the primary question that occupies critics of the novel is why Charity makes the
choice she does.70 Her “choice,” though, is constrained by the racially-motivated
narrative of dysgenic reproduction that surrounds her mountain past. Indeed, any
interaction with the “mountain people” in the novel underscores their less than fully
human status and reifies the “tainted” nature of her “origin.” When Charity takes
Harney, an aspiring architect, to visit local places of interest, some of which are in the
mountains, these trips expose the “inhuman” nature of the mountaineers. In one such
trip, the narrator describes the following scene: “The place was bare and miserable and
the air heavy with the smell of dirt and stale tobacco. Charity’s heart sank. Old derided
tales of the Mountain people came back to her, and the woman’s stare was so
70

Several critics have commented on Wharton’s use of the nineteenth century trope of the incest plot
in sentimental novels. See Elizabeth Barnes’ Incest and the Literary Imagination (Gainesville: University
of Florida Press, 2002) and Cindy Weinstein’s Family, Kinship, and Sympathy in Nineteenth-century
American Literature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) for a discussion of this narrative trope
in the nineteenth century. See Elizabeth Ammons, Jennie Kassonoff, Kathleen Pfeiffer, and Rhonda
Skillern for a discussion of the incest plot in Summer and the degree to which Charity’s choice to marry
Mr. Royall can be seen as “resisting” or as a “willing abdication of Charity’s independence and autonomy”
(Kassonoff 147).
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disconcerting, and the face of the sleeping man so sodden and bestial, that her disgust
was tinged with a vague dread” (57). Further, “The sight of the weak-minded old
woman, of the cowed children, and the ragged man sleeping off his liquor, made the
setting of her own life seem a vision of peace, and plenty” (58). And even though she
repeated to herself, “This is where I belong—this is where I belong,” “every instinct and
habit made her a stranger among these poor swamp people living like vermin in their
lair”(59). Charity has so internalized the shame of her origins that even as she attempts to
connect herself to them by repeating that she “belongs” there, she vilifies and
dehumanizes the mountain people as “vermin.”
In facing her choices, though, she attempts to embrace her dysgenic past in order
to embrace her dysgenic reproduction. After she learns of her pregnancy and of Harney’s
engagement to the woman from his own “circle,” Charity determines to go back to the
mountain to her own people. Again depicting the biological nature of her connection to
the mountain people, it was “something in her blood” that made the Mountain the “only
answer to her questioning”(167). She felt that as “she herself had been born as her own
baby was going to be born; and whatever her mother’s subsequent life had been, she
could hardly help remembering the past, and receiving a daughter who was facing the
trouble she had known”(171). However, in keeping with the “inhumanity” of the people
of the Mountain, Charity finds no comfort or solace in her mother’s arms. Instead, she
finds that her mother has died, and even in her death, there is precious little humanity:
A woman lay on [the bed], but she did not look like a dead woman; she
seemed to have fallen across her squalid bed in a drunken sleep, and to
have been left lying where she fell, in her ragged disordered clothes. One
arm was flung above her head, one leg drawn under a torn skirt that left
the other leg bare to the knee: a swollen glistening leg with a ragged rolled
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down about the ankle. The woman lay on her back, her eyes staring up
unblinkingly at the candle that trembled in Mr. Miles’s hand. (177)
To make even more clear the inhuman nature of the woman’s body in death, Wharton
notes that “there was no sign in it of anything human: she lay there like a dead dog in a
ditch” (178). Charity’s inability to recognize the humanity of these people indicates the
extent to which she has internalized the dysgenic narratives about them, and as a result, is
unable to accept this return as a legitimate option. Charity’s plan of returning to her
“folks,” then, is short-circuited, not only by her mother’s death, but by the very lack of
identifiable, human bonds between the people in the house: “But she could not make out
what relationship these people bore to each other, or to her dead mother; they seemed to
be herded together in a passive promiscuity in which their common misery was the
strongest link” (184). Despite the fact that nothing but a life of “misery” awaits Charity
at the bottom of the mountain, Charity rejects this misery in favor of a more socially
acceptable one—one of continuing an unwanted pregnancy and entering into an unhappy,
façade of a marriage with a man she despises.
Charity’s choice is less about the choice to continue or to terminate her pregnancy
and more about her choice between her “nature,” represented by her mountain origin, and
her “upbringing,” represented by returning to the town and to Mr. Royall. Charity’s deep
shame of her dysgenic origins results in her fear that terminating her pregnancy would
make her exactly the sort of “miserable creature” that she witnessed on the mountain.
The choice to continue the pregnancy and to marry Mr. Royall would align her with the
“good” people of the town. It is no wonder that Mr. Royall tells her at the end of the
novel, “You’re a good girl, Charity.” (205). Charity has made a choice—a choice to be a
good girl.
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“Tainted” Choices
Ultimately, as Jennifer Haytock notes, “Despite the freedoms of the New Woman
and the flapper, Wharton suggests that women have few good choices” (73). Caught
between the immoralities of the Julias and the Mrs. Warners of the world, the “good
girls” like Charity were forced to choose middle-class respectability, marriage, and
security, even if it meant giving up their hard-won sexual, personal, and domestic
freedoms. Despite recognizing the liberating potential of birth control and abortion,
women risked being seen as prostitutes or “selfish” social butterflies if they chose those
options. The sexual freedom of the early twentieth century caused women to shed the
mask of passionlessness but with it went, conversely, the screen that masked their use of
birth control. Birth control and abortion became what it was—a way for sexual women
to avoid or delay motherhood.
In both the film and the novel, reproduction is presented to the audience and
reader, not as a perhaps unfortunate biological and medical certainty, but as a something
about which women—married women, single girls—have choices. These choices,
though, are not freely made. They are constrained by, and read through the lens of, the
gendered, racialized, and class-based ideologies of the time. As a result, while the
movement to view reproduction as involving choices is a significant one in the history of
reproductive rights, these early fictive examples reveal that while the rhetoric of choice
would appear to allow greater personal agency and reproductive autonomy, in practice,
the socially-conservative ideologies of race, class, and gender in the Progressive Era
inscribed reproductive choices with meanings that circumvented reproductive freedom.
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The film and the novel make the new message of reproductive choice clear—the choice
to continue or terminate a pregnancy is not without negative, societal consequences.
Women who choose wrongly risked being judged as selfish or worse.
In the novel, Charity herself is able to identify reproduction as a choice for others
but is unable to apply this logic to herself. Too constrained by the social construction of
herself as biologically “tainted,” her only option is to continue her pregnancy or else risk
being a “bad girl.” As she asserts about Julia Hawes, her problem is that she doesn’t
know how to choose. All the options that she tries leads her back to the traditional
patriarchal order, represented by Mr. Royall. This ultimate labeling of her as a “good
girl” by him indicates the patriarchal approval of her reproductive choice.
The fact that Charity chooses to be a “good girl” and continue her pregnancy,
despite her dysgenic background, exposes the fissures of this new rhetoric, however.
After all, according to someone like Weber, Charity makes the wrong choice. Charity’s
choice, then, reveals the inherent problem with masking reproductive duty in the guise of
reproductive choice. You run the risk that women will choose wrongly.
In the end the eugenic messages of the film and the novel serve less as ways to
make claims about race and class and more as ways to control women’s reproductive
choices. Ultimately, whether you are a good girl or a selfish woman seems to come down
to whether you choose to reproduce.
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Chapter 5: Reproductive Control Gets Personal: The Paternal Longing, “New”
Fatherhood, and Women’s Reproductive Choices
Running alongside the narratives about changes in women’s sexuality,
reproductive control, and the family is a narrative about the emergence of a “new” father
in the twentieth century. Affected by many of the same factors—changing family
demographic patterns, wide scale reshaping of familial dynamics and relationships, and
external shifts in economic and political opportunities for both men and women—
fatherhood in nineteenth and twentieth century America has emerged as a source of
perhaps as much critical scrutiny as motherhood and reproduction. Critics such as David
Blankenhorn, Mary P. Ryan, and Mark Carnes have argued that the nineteenth century
witnessed a “defathering” of men, a slow but steady erosion of the male’s place in family
life. 71 Other historians, such as Ralph LaRossa, Steven Franks, and Steven Mintz dispute
this historical view of the declining role of the father and offer their own accounts of how
a “new fatherhood” emerged. 72 While the exact nature of the father’s role in the family
and in child rearing remains a subject of critical debate, an examination of the rhetoric of
fatherhood in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century reveals surprising, and
significant, implications for understanding the relationship between cultural changes in
the role of the father and the reproductive decisions and choices of women.
As I argue in Chapter 3, the Progressive Era began a process of masking
reproductive duty as a reproductive choice. This chapter builds on that argument by
71
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examining how the rhetoric of fatherhood began to change at the same time that these
constructions of reproduction as a choice began to emerge. I argue that, contrary to the
view that the nineteenth century witnessed a “defathering,” it instead witnessed merely a
“different fathering,” the emergence of a new ideal of fatherhood that would come to be
termed by its supporters as “new fatherhood” and by its detractors as “maternal
fatherhood.” 73 This figure of the “new father,” though, had important connections
culturally to the changing views of women’s reproductive choices. In constructing a “new
father” founded on notion of fathers’ longing for, and immersion in the lives of, their
children, society complicated these narratives of women’s reproductive choices by
refocusing the cultural longing for offspring on fathers. My argument is that this paternal
longing, combined with the increase in the father’s direct role and responsibility for the
daily care of his children, emerge out of a culture very much concerned with women’s
lack of maternal desire and motivation to reproduce.
Movies, magazines, and books again and again framed this new “maternal father”
as a reaction to “the woman who refuses to accept maternity.” Paternal longing and the
growing commitment to idea of the father’s responsibility for childcare served as a form
of reproductive control for women. The former consisted of an emotional appeal to
women to engage in reproduction—i.e. Mr. Walton’s longing for children in Where Are
My Children?—whereas the latter served as a practical appeal. If fathers are willing to
actively engage in the care-taking of infants and children, to be co-parents and not to
simply leave the child-rearing to women, then how can the “selfish women” of the film
who are avoiding motherhood out of fear of the burdens that that position will place on
them continue to deny their husbands children? After all, as the writer of a 1932 column
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“Confessions of New Father” for the “For Father’s Only” series in Parents’ Magazine
asserts, “the first year of baby’s life is the hardest for Mother and Father and Baby, but it
can be one of the happiest if you get into the game” (6). If fathers are going to “get into
the game” when it comes time to actually take care of the baby, then shouldn’t women
give them the chance to play?
In making this argument that paternal longing and a new, more active ideal of
fatherhood functioned as a form of societal reproductive control, I am not denying the
very real effect that this shift in fatherhood had for men, children, and families. New
fatherhood allowed men to develop personally, and culturally, significant relationships
with their children, relationships that helped provide the foundation for the new
compassionate family of the twentieth century, and later the second-wave feminist
movement’s seismic shift in the structure of marriage and family life, a shift that
benefited women, men, and children in a myriad of ways. In other words, this new model
of fatherhood was instrumental in achieving much of the social change of the twentieth
century. I am not denying the reality of these fathers' commitment to this new model,
their children, and their emerging sense of self as predicated significantly on being a
loving, involved father.
I do argue, however, that an analysis of this new model of fatherhood within the
narratives of reproduction and reproductive control in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century reveals that this shift emerged from within the gendered politics of
reproductive control. In other words, given that the popular culture depicted, usually
negatively, this new father as the result of women’s lack of maternal desire and
investment in reproduction, it clearly seems to have been imagined as a way to address
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perceived problems in the fall in the reproduction rates of women and the decline of the
American family. If society wanted their (reluctant) women to reproduce, then creating a
new father who experienced the kind of maternal longing for offspring that had
historically been limited to women and who was willing to be an active partner and
helpmate in raising children, it would seem, would help mitigate the reasons women
could voice for limiting, postponing, or opting out completely from having children.
This shift indicates yet another important cultural shift in the reproductive
pressures on women. The failure of the rhetoric of civic duty to control women’s
reproductive rates resulted in a continual reexamination and revising of the rhetoric
surrounding reproduction, motherhood, and ultimately fatherhood. New fatherhood
emerged as a cultural ideal designed to focus on the reproductive choices of women as
individual, personal, and familial decisions rather than agents of societal change or good.
No longer were women encouraged to reproduce for the good of the country. Instead,
women were encouraged to reproduce for the good of their husbands and families. The
reproductive practices of women, once centered around notions of societal, national, and
civic good, had become personal.

The Critical Debate over Fatherhood
In order to understand how the changing rhetoric of fatherhood affected women’s
reproductive choices, it is important to examine the history of the father’s role in the
family, and particularly, his role in child rearing. The current historical debate about the
nature of fatherhood in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries revolves around disputes
over the level of a father’s investment in their children and their level of involvement in
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childcare. Cultural commentators, such as David Blankenhorn, and family historians such
as Mary P. Ryan and Mark Carnes, taking their cue from the separate sphere ideology
and the cultural fanfare for motherhood in the nineteenth century, argue that nineteenthcentury America witnessed a “de-fathering” of men. 74 As Mary Ryan puts it, this
resulted in a fatherhood that “almost” “wither(ed) away” because of the familial
restructuring that allowed the mother/child bond to “assume central place in the
constellation of the family” (4). They argue that, as men increasingly went off to work in
jobs no longer centered around the home and family sphere and as women increasingly
were viewed as spiritually and morally superior, mothers came to be the sole custodians
of children, and fathers played distant, patriarchal roles. Men were thought to exhibit
little affection for their children or interest in their children’s lives; women were the sole
caretakers, educators, and disciplinarians.
Other historians, such as Ralph LaRossa and Steven Franks, have questioned this
view of fatherhood in the nineteenth century. 75 Steven Franks in particular argues that
the nineteenth century witnessed, not a de-fathering, but a different fathering, and that
letters, diaries, and writings of fathers of the time show fathers playing a sustained and
engaged paternal role in the lives of their children. While men did work outside of the
home, men as well as women embraced the sentimental notion that the family offered
sanctuary and solace from the corrupting demands of the public sphere. As a result, men
took their roles as husbands and fathers seriously, and not only was affection a central
component of this fathering, but they also developed new ways of interacting with their
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children, such as father play, and became increasingly concerned about issues such as
their child’s future standing in society, career options, and potential romantic unions. In
short, the nineteenth-century father in Franks’ assessment, while perhaps not the
“modern” father of the late twentieth century, was an active, affectionate, and worried
paternal figure.76
Other critics support this view by addressing the emotional investment nineteenth
century fathers had in their children. Steven Mintz describes the wartime emotional
turmoil fathers experienced during the Civil War in being separated from their children
and the doubts and anxieties they expressed in their letters about their losing their
children’s affection and love because of their absence. 77 Karen Sanchez-Eppler writes
about the effect of infant and child death on fathers and argues that not only did they
experience a great deal of grief when their children died but that public displays of grief
by fathers were socially acceptable. 78
Blankenhorn argues of examples such as Mintz and Sanchez-Eppler that while the
shift from father to mother as the primary caregiver in the nineteenth century should not
be exaggerated and that “despite its steady contraction, nineteenth-century fatherhood
was almost certainly stronger than its twentieth-century successor,” the overall historical
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trend of fatherhood remains one of a broad cultural “shrinking” (14). This prevalent view
of the history of fatherhood is at odds though with the historians who try to make sense of
the increasing rhetoric of fatherhood in the nineteenth and twentieth century that
encouraged men to take active roles in the daily care of their children, to be help-mates,
play-mates, and role-models.
It seems clear that this prevalent historical narrative of fatherhood’s long decline
creates far too neat a linear trajectory for fatherhood. Fatherhood, like motherhood, has
always been, and continues to be, a highly fraught, and hotly contested, cultural category.
As Stephen Franks argues, “Scholarly fascination with the social and cultural
construction of difference between the sexes has obscured the extent to which nineteenthcentury Americans thought of parenting as a shared commitment and mutual endeavor”
(1). Franks has attributed this to scholars’ “overly literal understanding of the so-called
separate spheres” and an inclination to see Victorian society as physically divided into
two realms, public and private, with little overlap in duties or activities (2).79 However,
contrary to this view, he argues that even as society venerated motherhood and economic
and labor conditions pushed men out of the home and into the marketplace, social critics,
reformers, and advice writers encouraged fathers to be even more actively involved in the
daily care and lives of their children.
For Franks, despite the claim that “fatherhood ‘lost its meaning’ in [the]
feminized middle-class households” of the separate spheres nineteenth century, fathers
remained willing, involved, and active parental partners. What this critical disagreement
over the father’s role in the nineteenth century shows is that, rather than being evacuated
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of cultural meaning, or “decultured” as Blankenhorn terms it, fatherhood is constantly
being reimagined, reshaped, and reevaluated. This chapter traces those conflicts in the
cultural construction of fatherhood in the late nineteenth-century and early twentiethcentury in terms of how society reimagined the father’s role in the lives of his children
and what implications this reshaping had for narratives of reproductive choice and
control.
This reshaping of a new paternal figure was not without cultural anxiety,
however. As this new father became more and more the cultural norm in the early
twentieth century, the “feminized” father figure became a source of public ridicule and
mockery. Henry James’s first novel Watch and Ward (1868) features an early literary
example of the maternal father and perhaps the earliest literary example of the stay-athome father. The novel’s plot features a single, middle-age man without marriage
prospects who adopts a young girl in order to take up the “vocation” of fatherhood. James
holds his protagonist up both as a perhaps unfortunate product of his time and as a source
of mirth and figure of fun. Watch and Ward reflects both the changing role of fathers of
the time and the societal ambivalence, even scorn, directed at these changes. This cultural
anxiety over the “new” maternal father indicated how this changing notion of fatherhood
was viewed as a threat to masculinity, and in some ways, the mockery directed towards
this maternal father figure intensifies in the early twentieth century. As late as the 1940’s,
magazine and journals published outraged articles about the “maternal father.”80
However, as the new fatherhood begins to more firmly take root in the twentieth
century, and despite the fact that it continued to be fiercely debated in the public realm,
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the view of the father as naturally longing for children and participating actively in their
general care gained cultural ground. The scenes of Mr. Walton’s longing for children
from the film Where Are My Children? evince the increasing ideological weight that
paternal longing had on the public’s imagination. An abundance of seminars, books, and
articles directed at fathers began to emerge which advocated for fathers taking an active
role in the daily care of children from birth.81

Paternal Longing in the Nineteenth Century
In January 1871, Anthony Comstock married Margaret Hamilton, a woman ten
years his senior.82 Maggie’s father had suffered a financial catastrophe, leaving his
daughters to support the family. Described as “worn out” and “never strong,” Maggie
was a woman from whom the bloom of youth had faded from the burden of hard work
and constant financial worry. Comstock nonetheless “found it easy to love this faded,
sweet and self-effacing woman whom he had chosen as his bride” (Broun and Leech
157). Indeed, he often referred to her as his “precious little wife” and a “blessed gift.” On
December 4, 1871 the happy couple was blessed with a daughter. As he wrote in his
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diary, “a little daughter born this morning about 8:15 A.M. Weighs 9 Lbs” (Broun and
Leech 159).
But their happiness would not last long. The child, Lillie, died soon after birth,
and Comstock wrote that night, “The Lord’s will be done. Oh for grace to say it and live
it!” Soon after this tragic event, in the course of his official duties as postmaster general,
he visited a tenement building in Chinatown where he encountered a newly born infant
girl whose mother was dying. Perhaps fearing that Maggie was beyond child-bearing
age, Comstock took the infant and brought her home, eventually adopting her through the
Brooklyn court system. Adele, as the child was named, was raised as his own daughter,
and Comstock was by all accounts a devoted and involved father. In fact, Adele would
often accompany her father to work. Adele suffered from developmental delays, but it
was only after Comstock’s death that a judge ruled it necessary that she be
institutionalized, where she remained for the rest of her life.
This personal anecdote from a well-known historical figure often vilified for his
role in suppressing the dissemination of knowledge about birth control and contraceptives
opens up a discussion about the nature of fatherhood, paternal longing, and a father’s
involvement in the caretaking of children in the nineteenth century, as well as the way the
changing rhetoric of fatherhood connected to issues of reproductive control. Anthony
Comstock famously used his position as postmaster general as a perch from which to
launch an anti-vice crusade aimed at eradicating immoral materials. This crusade
resulted in the passing of the Comstock Act of 1873, which made it illegal to disseminate
immoral materials through the postal service, including literature on birth control and
abortifacients. It is this legacy of preventing women from accessing information about

124

controlling their own reproductive processes that has garnered him the position as the
proverbial boogey-man of reproductive control.83
As a result, Comstock became a historical and political figure that represented
men’s desire to control women’s reproductive options. Scholars such as Janet Brodie,
Leigh Ann Wheeler, and Nicole Beisel have constructed narratives of men’s engagement
in reproductive issues that have generally viewed men as agents controlling women’s
reproductive possibilities, either as fathers and husbands, or, as with Comstock, through
legal and political means. 84 This anecdote, though, reveals a very different, personal side
to the historical figure and helps to complicate the critical view of men’s role in
reproductive control. Whatever his public views of women, reproduction, and
immorality were, personally, his longing for a child is evident from his story. Further, the
references in Haywood Broun and Margaret Leech’s biography to Comstock’s propensity
for taking of his daughter to work with him, as well as the mention that after his death,
she was institutionalized, while cursory, indicate that Comstock, and not his wife, most
probably functioned as Maggie’s primary caretaker.

83

This historical view of him is further heightened by the contemporary reactions to his crusade.
His anti-vice crusades of the 1870s and 1880s often butted heads with growing women’s rights movements
that were conversely calling for greater and greater access to these very same products he deemed immoral.
As Nicola Beisel points out, the efforts to criminalize methods of reproductive control such as abortion and
contraception were led largely by men, and groups such the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice
did not admit women to its meetings until 1891, a full two decades after the group was created. Indeed, as
Beisel asserts, the anti-vice societies and the campaign against obscenity was the “province of men”(71).
Although the call for the suppression of obscenity was framed in terms of concern over safeguarding
children’s sexual purity, Comstock and his allies largely targeted material aimed almost exclusively at
women.83 They relied on the language of paternalism as their justification for shielding both women and
children from these obscene materials. See Beisel’s Imperiled Innocents: Anthony Comstock and Family
Reproduction in Victorian America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
84
See Janet Brodie’s work Abortion and Contraceptives for a history of birth control in this country,
see Leigh Ann Wheeler’s work Against Obscenity: Reform and the Politics of Womanhood in America,
1873-1935 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004) for a history of the anti-vice movement in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in this country, and see Nicola Beisel’s Imperiled Innocents for
a history of Comstock’s law and the role of children in the anti-crusade.

125

Comstock’s personal narrative of deep fatherly longing and the active role he took
in his daughter’s caretaking speaks to the changing role of fathers in the lives of their
children in the nineteenth century, one that is largely at odds with Blankenhorn’s view
that the nineteenth century witnessed a dramatic reversal in men and women’s parental
roles. According to Blankenhorn, prior to the nineteenth century, men were seen as the
primary parents, while women held an auxiliary role. For Blankenhorn, the historical
trajectory for American fatherhood has been a clear and linear downward slope: “Today’s
fragmentation of fatherhood represents the end point of a long historical process: the
steady diminishment of fatherhood as a social role for men” (12).
Several critics and historians support this view of the role of fathers in the
colonial era, arguing that while colonial fathers generally were not the primary caretakers
of infants, beyond infancy, fathers were seen as the “child socializers,” which in colonial
terms meant being responsible for the education, moral instruction, and discipline of
children, and as the “ultimate authority in family matters” (Frank 24 and Carnes 108).
Legal, institutional, and cultural forces reinforced this view of fathers as the primary
parent; courts routinely awarded custody to fathers in divorce cases, advice manuals on
child-rearing were written for and addressed to fathers, and children who were serving as
apprentices often wrote letters to home addressed to their fathers, not their mothers
(Blankenhorn 13-14, Franks 24, and Demos 429).85 Historians Steven Mintz and Susan
Kellogg argue that this view of childhood and child-rearing emerged out of a Lockian
view of the child as “tabula rasa,” or blank slate. As a result, “novelists and child-rearing
experts told their readers that the primary object of child rearing was not to instill
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submission to authority but to develop a child’s conscience and self-government” (Mintz
and Kellogg 47). Michael Grossberg argues,
Traditionally in Anglo-American law fathers had an almost unlimited right
to the custody of their minor, legitimate children. The law assumed that
the interests of children were best protected by making the father the
natural guardian and by using a property-based standard of parental
fitness. Custody law considered children to be dependent, subordinate
beings. Their services, earnings, and so on became the property of their
paternal masters in exchange for life and maintenance. This quid pro quo
developed directly out of the settled conviction that fathers were best
equipped to care for their offspring. (Grossberg 238)
Mark Carnes points out that fathers were legally seen as so essential to the family that
upon his death, “the family as a legal entity was dissolved” (108).
Beginning in the 1800s, though, in many ways these positions reversed. Critics
such as Blankenhorn, Ryan, Demos, and Carnes attribute this shift to industrialization
and the development of a modern economy and labor system, which led to the “physical
separation of men from the home,” essentially removing fathers from the daily life of
their families and the related feminization of the domestic sphere (Carnes 110).86 Carnes
attributes this change as resulting from the growing demographic trends of the rising
prices of real estate and business congestion in city and town centers that led to the
“displacement of middle-class residential housing” (110). Carnes goes on to attribute the
“outpouring of advice books on family government and child rearing” to a “response to
the withdrawal of men from the domestic sphere” (110). In his view, works such as
Theodore Dwight’s The Father’s Book (1834) decried what they saw as the diminishing
of the father’s role in the family and aimed to reverse the trend towards the primacy of
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the mother as caretaker by persuading men to reassume their responsibilities within the
home. As Rev. John S. C. Abbott lamented in 1842, “Paternal neglect at the present time
is one of the most abundant sources of domestic sorrow,” as “the father … eager in the
pursuit of business, toils early and late, and finds no time to fulfill…duties to his
children” (qtd. in Carnes 111). John Demos describes this trend as one toward “limited
fatherhood” (438). The development of the special legal status of the “tender years,” the
belief in the special capacity of women to nurture and provide moral and spiritual
guidance especially for young children, and the decline in the patriarchal model of
marriage and movement towards a companionate ideal of marriage all contributed to this
“contraction” of the role of father. This critical narrative of the “contraction” of
fatherhood, then, shares certain key beliefs: that the nineteenth century serves as the
turning point for fatherhood in America; that this change occurred because of
industrialization and the shift from a producer-driven economy to a consumer-driven one;
and that this change was universal and uncontested. In other words, the dominant critical
belief is that fathers in the nineteenth became “unfathered.” However, what this critical
narrative fails to imagine is that the nineteenth century witnessed, not the de-fathering of
America, but a change in the role of the father. Exploring the letters, diaries, and writings
of men in the nineteenth century about their role as fathers reveals how our notion of the
“modern” father, thought to have emerged at the earliest in the latter part of the first half
of the twentieth century, was actually culturally visible in the nineteenth century.

128

The “Modern” Father in the Nineteenth Century
In 1854, the New York State Legislature declared, “There is no human love so
generous, strong, and steadfast as that of the mother for her child.” This statement is
significant more for its ubiquity than for its uniqueness. Motherhood in the nineteenth
century came to be more culturally revered than it perhaps had ever been before. As
Steven Frank puts it, “In important ways, fathers and fatherhood have become a lost
chord in the antebellum fanfare for mothers and the power of mothers’ love” (23). It is
partly this reverence of motherhood that helped lead to the erosion of paternal custody
rights in the nineteenth century and the emergence of a judicial patriarchy. As has been
widely documented by historians, such as Steven Mintz and Michael Grossberg, the
nineteenth century witnessed an institutionalization of the primacy of the mother’s role in
a child’s life, particularly through the changes in custody laws. As Carnes puts it, as
“women acquired new status as moral guardians of the young … courts increasingly
acknowledged the supremacy of mothers in child rearing” (111). According to family law
historians, the courts became so invested in the idea that women were the best and natural
caregivers for children that the legal notion of the “tender years” doctrine, the idea that
infants and children in their “tender years” were almost universally better off with their
mothers than their fathers, developed. Mintz attributes this shift partly to the traumatic
effect of the war on the nation’s psyche, which led to a greater investment in the notion of
a prolonged and protected childhood and the emergence of “child protection.”
However, as historians Peter Bardaglio and Michael Grossberg have argued, the
emergence of a “judicial patriarchy,” intended to provide children with legal protection,

129

only further eroded men’s custodial rights.87 Throughout the early nineteenth century,
three legal premises greatly increased the court’s role in determining custody: the tender
years doctrine; the “best interest of the child” premise, which held that child welfare
should be the chief concern of the courts in determining custody disputes; and the parens
patriae, which gave courts the authority to override parent’s custody rights.

The use of

the Latin phrase parens patriae, meaning “parent to the country,” has telling implications
for understanding what is at stake for the father’s role in the family in understanding this
shift to a greater role of the court in child protection and custody. Prior to this
foundational change in the understanding of parental custody, custody law relied on
English common law, which viewed offspring as part of the estate “owned” by the family
patriarch, creating a legal view of a father’s rights to his offspring as economic concerns.
With the shift to the parens patriae model of child protection, the court usurped the
father’s position as the patriarch of the custodial family. As Grossberg argues,
“Influenced by the society’s growing glorification of motherhood and female
domesticity, judges granted women new legal powers in family affairs,” but as women
increasingly and successfully used domestic ideology to argue for custody rights, parental
custody became “untenable,” and consequently, rather than simply transfer custodial
rights to women, which would in effect creating a matriarchal custodial system to replace
the patriarchal one, the courts instead usurped this role for itself, transferring the “power
from the male parent to the male jurist, making judges a new kind of patriarch” (241).
This new role of the courts, however, met resistance in legal and political arenas by those
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outraged by the loss of the father’s absolute position in the family. As one lawyer
claimed in an 1840’s custody battle, this shift represented “nothing less than an
assumption of power by a court…to determine the domestic arrangement of a man’s
family” (qtd. in Grossberg 242). These changes, which began in the antebellum period,
dominated custody disputes of the 1860’s and 1870’s, and such disputes were the center
of the debate over the court’s appropriate role in the family and fathers’ relationship to
child-rearing and care-taking. As Grossberg asserts, by the 1860’s, “parental fitness and
not parental rights would be the focus of custody disputes,” and it was clear “that judges
would assume the mantle of patriarchs” (242). The shift from parental rights to parental
fitness meant that a father’s right to his children was not absolute, a real blow to men’s
position as patriarchal head of the family.
In one particularly bitter 1840 Pennsylvania custody case, the court’s decision
relied primarily on the notion that a father’s care was at best a “substitute” for a mother’s
true maternal ability, which it describes with almost spiritual reverence: “Not doubting
that parental anxiety would seek for and obtain the best substitute which could be
procured, every instinct of humanity unerringly proclaims that no substitute can supply
the place of her, whose watchfulness over the sleeping cradle or waking moments of her
offspring is prompted by deeper and holier feelings that the most liberal allowance of a
nurse’s wages could possibly stimulate.”88 The mother’s lawyer in the case summed up
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the court’s position by saying, “Everyone knows that a father is unfit to take care of an
infant; physically unfit and unfit by reason of his avocations” (qtd. in Grossberg 242).
However, at the turn of the twentieth century, sociologist L. T. Hobhouse writes
that while “very few men have any natural aptitude with babies,” “it is almost a physical
difficulty to refrain from picking up a small child who holds out its arms to one, and
when he has caught it up, a man is inclined to sway with it and handle it, as women used
to do before they had theories.”89 This view of the physical desire that men have to care
for infants that is every bit as “natural” as that of women calls into question the notion
that men had unambiguous and uncontested feelings about society’s rejection of their
willingness and ability to care for their children. Clearly, everyone did not know that a
father is unfit to take care of an infant.
These two anecdotes, one from a personal reflection on paternal feelings and one
from a public court case, expose the growing conflict between the personal feelings of the
paternal and the public face of paternity. Hobhouse’s naturalizing of parental feeling and
the yearning he evinces runs counter to the legal and societal ideas of paternity. Even the
lawyer’s reference to men’s physical inability to care for infants conflicts with
Hobhouse’s assertion of the “physical difficulty” men experienced in refraining from
meeting infants’ needs. Even further, the lawyer’s denial of men’s fitness to care for
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infants in terms of their “avocation” completely precludes the idea of fatherhood as a
calling, much as motherhood was understood to be.
In a particularly revealing statement, legal historian Lawrence Friedman asserts,
“Courts gave more and more recognition to the mother—the actual caregiver. Mothers
were going to raise the children anyway; there were few fathers who could and would do
so. It is not surprising, then, that the cases referred more and more frequently to mother
love—how important it was, how precious; and that the doctrines of custody shifted in
the direction of the mother. Children needed mothers more than they needed fathers”
(Private Lives 131). Friedman goes on to assert that, even in cases where fathers did get
custody, “nobody really expected fathers to take care of small children—to feed the
babies or wipe their noses” because “men who were awarded custody of children had
servants, or at the very least women relatives—a mother, a sister, or perhaps a new
wife—to take over the job of actually raising the children” (131).
Friedman’s comments mix historical fact (the increasing prevalence of mother’s
receiving custody) with historical suppositions (that no one expected fathers to actually
take care of small children or that few fathers could or would raise their children). In
doing so, he shows how these assumptions about nineteenth century father’s aptitude and
desire to care for children are part of a larger historical narrative that men, prior to the
emergence of “modern” fatherhood in the late twentieth century, had little interest in the
care-taking of children for its own sake and little ambivalence about their lack of roles in
their children’s life.
However, as examples like Hobhouse’s show, an examination of the historical
and cultural evidence suggests that even as the rhetoric of fatherhood more consistently
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focused on the father’s “natural” inability to take care of their children, nineteenth
century fathers were in fact invested and involved in their children’s care. Indeed, even
fathers who survived the war felt the effects of their time away from their family as a loss
of their standing and place in the family. Steven Mintz, in his historical account of
American childhood, details wartime fathers’ attempts to stay connected to their families
and their pleas to their wives to ensure that their children would not forget them during
their long absence. Mintz notes one such example in the appeals of James Garfield, the
future president, to his wife to remind his daughter of her “papa, papa” so that when he
came back from the war, “she may know to call me” (129). Garfield’s desire for his
daughter to remember him as “papa” evokes the depth of the returning fathers’ fears over
their loss of place in the family—even their very linguistic signifier of “father” was
subject to loss. Further, the mere fact that their families were able to function without
them serving in their role as fathers, and their wives’ ability to raise the children and
manage the family in their absence, made the very nature of their role as father suspect.
Hamlin Garland recalled his father returning from the war as “only a strange man with
big eyes and [a] care-worn face” (qtd. in Mintz 132). As Mintz asserts, the Civil War
“altered—and diminished—the father’s role in the family” (132). While historical
incidences of fathers’ absences from their children certainly could be seen as contributing
to the “diminishing” of the father’s role and contributing to the rhetoric of “defathering,”
equally as significant is the desire and longing to be remembered and valued that the
fathers expressed in their letters.
What Hobhouse’s assertion also makes explicit is the connection between this
new fatherhood and concerns over women’s (un)willingness to take up their proper roles
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as mothers. Hobhouse’s claim that women “used to” be “inclined to sway with [and]
dandle” infants “before they had theories” references the cultural fear that changes in
women’s rights and status in society had resulted in their abandoning of their maternal
duties and even in their resistance to their sacred duty of procreating. For Hobhouse, the
emergence of men’s paternal instincts has directly resulted from women’s abandoning of
their own maternal ones.
Like Comstock’s willingness to adopt an infant most likely out of fears over his
frail wife’s reproductive capabilities and Where Are My Children’s Mr. Walton’s evident
longing for children while his wife blithely aborts their unborn fetuses, these anecdotal
accounts of men embracing fatherhood in the face of women’s perceived abandoning of
their reproductive duties indicates how paternal longing and the shifts in the rhetoric
surrounding fatherhood function as a form of reproductive control. After all, if men so
desire children that it is “almost a physical difficulty to refrain,” and if they are so
desperate to be fathers that they spend their time gazing longingly at the neighbor
children, and if they are willing to go so far as to adopt, and care for, infants themselves
in order to be fathers, who are women to deny them the children they so desire? Paternal
longing, then, served to highlight men’s stake in the reproduction of women. After all, if
women failed to reproduce, men failed to be fathers.

The “New” Father
Henry James’s first novel Watch and Ward, published in 1868, provides an early
fictive example of paternal longing, as well as the “maternal father.” The novel, which
centers around the main character’s desire for marriage and children, has received little
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critical attention, largely because of its perceived immature and awkward style,
particularly in comparison to James’s later, more mature works.90 Nonetheless, Watch
and Ward provides a particularly clear literary example of the sort of “new” father
significant for understanding fatherhood in the nineteenth century, one which depicts in
fictional terms the same paternal longing and changing rhetoric of the father’s role at
work in the larger culture.
Roger, we learn from the opening of the novel, desires nothing more than to be
married and have children. The novel opens by asserting that “From an early age his
curiosity had chiefly taken the form of a timid but strenuous desire to fathom the depths
of matrimony. He had dreamed of this gentle bondage as other men dream of the ‘free
unhoused condition’ of celibacy. He had been born a marrying man, with a conscious
desire for progeny” (8). What is telling about this quote is that his desire for marriage
stems from his desire for progeny. While this theme of men’s desire for heirs is certainly
not new, what is new is that in Roger’s case, “the world in this respect had not done him
justice” (8). Despite the fact that he was “serving a devout apprenticeship to the
profession of husband and father” (8), a phrasing that mirrors the dismissive claim that
men do not possess the “avocation” of fatherhood, he had been unable to find a woman to
help him accomplish his goals. Indeed, Roger’s desire to enter into that profession is so
90

Henry James’s novel Watch and Ward is generally seen by readers and critics alike as such a
“strange first novel,” so riddled by “technical deficiencies” that it warrants little serious critical attention.
The few critics who have discussed it often do so dismissively, as Robert Emmet Long does, calling it a
“very slight work,” a “curiosity of James’s apprenticeship,” James: The Early Novels (Boston: Twayne
Publishers, 1982), 10. Muriel Shine writes, “the novel is most noted for its certain quality of the writing,
which is embarrassingly naïve in its projection of certain erotic elements,” The Fictional Children of Henry
James (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 127. Although she acknowledges that when
given more serious scholarly attention the novel is most often noted for its introduction of themes and
characters that would recur throughout James’s body of work, Shine too dismisses the novel: “The novel
itself, unfortunately, has little relevance beyond the historical; its old-fashioned charm hardly compensates
for technical deficiencies,” of which she lists the unconvincing nature of Nora’s character (128). Even
“serious” treatments of the novel tend to simultaneously dismiss it.
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great that the sight of his heart’s desire, Miss Morton, causes him to imagine, “There
glimmered mistily in the young man’s brain a vision of a home-scene in the future—a
lamp-lit parlour on a winter night, a placid wife and mother wreathed in household
smiles, a golden-haired child, and, in the midst, his sentient self, drunk with possession
and gratitude” (10). Here, the “golden-haired” child is desired along with the “placid
wife and mother,” which readers might interpret as a fairly traditional male desire for the
family life that nineteenth century commentators convinced them was needed to combat
the wearisome and degrading influences of public life. Both Roger and his intended,
Miss Morton, fail to adhere to the seemingly “natural” nineteenth century gender norms.
Miss Morton, we learn, is a heart-breaker, a woman who was “supposed to wear some
dozen broken hearts on her girdle, as an Indian wears the scalps of his enemies” (8) and
has no intention of marrying Roger. The violent imagery of this analogy underscores the
unnaturalness of her character. As the narrator observes, “there was … so marked a want
of the natural” about her while Roger “was the most unobtrusively natural of men.”
James, in essence, reverses the traditional nineteenth century gender roles: Roger is the
good, virtuous man who desperately desires children, while Miss Morton is the playgirl,
completely uninterested in settling down. Of course, in asserting that Roger is “the most
unobtrusively natural of men,” when all we really know about him is that he desires
marriage and children, the narrator naturalizes the desire for marriage and children for
men. Miss Morton, meanwhile, echoes cultural fears about “modern” women since she is
unnatural in her desire not to marry, and presumably not to have children. Like the selfish
social butterflies of Weber’s film, she has abandoned her proper role as wife and mother
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in order to pursue her own selfish desires. It is not hard to imagine her visiting her own
Dr. Malfit if she found herself in the family way.
While this plot of failed romance is perhaps not unusual within the James canon,
it is unusual that this failed romance begins, rather than ends, the novel. In a plot move
not unlike the modern adoption or surrogacy story of the single, working woman who
doesn’t need a man in order to start her family, and like the real-life example of
Comstock, Roger adopts a child when he is unable to start his family through the
traditional means of marriage. When he meets Nora, he feels “in his heart the tumult of a
new emotion. Was it the inexpugnable instinct of paternity? Was it the restless ghost of
his buried hope?” (16) If Roger can’t have a “placid wife,” he can at least have a
“golden-haired” child.
Roger’s relationship to Nora in the novel also calls into question assumptions
about the level of men’s involvement in the caretaking of their children.91 Roger, contrary
to the assertion that men have little to no interest or aptitude in childcare, becomes deeply
involved in Nora’s upbringing and daily care. Giving us what is perhaps the first literary
example of a stay-at-home dad, James writes that Roger “withdrew altogether from his
profession, and prepared to occupy his house in the country. The latter was immediately
transformed into a home for Nora—a home admirably fitted to become the starting point
91

While much has been written on the role of children in James’s work, little critical attention has
been paid to the depictions of father/child relationships. The subject of children and the related theme of
parent/child relations abound in many of James’s novels, from Daisy Miller to What Maisie Knew to The
Awkward Age. Shine argues that, for James, these children are “vessels of consciousness” allowing James
to work out ideas of personhood and privacy. Maeve Pearson has recently argued that James uses children
in his works to expose problems inherent in the sentimental investment in the Romantic child and cast
doubt on this child’s inability to carry the burden of social regeneration. Pearson’s argument, like
Mizruchi’s, focuses on the transmission from one generation to the next with children as the vehicle of
these cultural transmissions, and in doing so, they represent a thread of Jamesian criticism that focuses on
children’s meaning in his novels by understanding what children represent. See Pearson’s “Re-exposing the
Jamesian Child: The Paradox of Children's Privacy,” The Henry James Review 28.2 (2007), 101-119.
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of a happy life” (20-21). The idea of a man withdrawing from the public sphere and
creating an idyllic private home life for his daughter indicates the extent to which James
is both inverting the conventional gender dichotomies of his day and referencing the
growing calls of advice writers and cultural commentators that father’s embrace their
roles as father and devote themselves to their children’s upbringing. Roger takes this
advice to its most extreme end. Even further, Roger involves himself in every aspect of
raising Nora and, echoing Mintz and Kellogg’s assertion of children as viewed as a
“tabula rasa,” wants “to drive in the first nail with his own hands, to lay the smooth
foundation stones of Nora’s culture, to teach her to read and write and cipher, to associate
himself largely with the growth of her primal sense of things.” He worries, one could
even say obsesses, about her education, whether she is getting too much exercise or too
little, her diet, even her sleeping habits. Roger’s caretaking of Nora does not seem to
differ in quality or quantity from what a nineteenth century mother would be expected to
perform. Indeed, one character acerbically asserts that Roger “ought never to marry; his
wife would die for want of occupation” (121).
If this new father is one who is supposed to be the playmate, the confidant, the
worried father concerned with not just with the moral and spiritual growth of his
offspring, but also the health, happiness, and well-being, then Roger is the new father
taken to the extreme. In fact, if as Franks argues, one of the primary duties of the new
father is to help his children find suitable mates, then Roger also takes this role to the
extreme by determining his daughter’s future suitor far in advance by appointing himself
as her intended. When he writes of his plan to Miss Morton, now Mrs. Keith, early in the
novel, he makes this clear: “I promised you once to be very unhappy …You know that,
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two years ago, I adopted a homeless little girl. One of these days she will be a lovely
woman. I mean to do what I can to make her one. Perhaps, six years hence, she will be
grateful enough not to refuse me as you did. Pray for me more than ever. I have begun at
the beginning; it will be my own fault if I have not a perfect wife” (34). He is, as
another character in the novel terms it, “fashioning of a wife to order” (61).92
This, of course, gets at a central issue in understanding James’s depiction of this
new father. Roger both reflects, and parodies, these perceived changes in the role of the
father, and in doing so, Roger foreshadows the early twentieth century concern with the
“maternal father.” After all, Roger is a weak, effeminate character, eaten alive by
women, overly fastidious, and willing to give up the stimulating, masculine world of the
public sphere to devote himself to the private world of home and family. Even in a
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The incestuous nature of this plotline is perhaps the most commented upon element in the novel.
In an anonymous review of the Watch and Ward published in the New York Times in 1878, the reviewer
writes of the novel, “The perilous experiment of a man taking a child and bringing her up to be his wife is
admirably depicted. That keen analysis Mr. James possesses permits him to show how in Roger the feeling
of paternity and the affection of the lover may go on together.” Robert Emmet Long makes a similar
argument about Roger’s relationship to Nora: “The idea of the artist is seen in his adoption and guidance of
Nora toward his ideal. He ‘creates’ Nora from shabby circumstances and unpromising materials, and
fashions her into his conception. The myth of Pygmalion, who falls in love with and weds his own
conception, is implied throughout Watch and Ward, and this analogy also makes Roger a ‘sculptor’ of a
kind” (21). Alfred Habegger reads the novel in terms of James’s harsh review of Louisa May Alcott’s
novel Moods and James’s engagement with the incestuous guardian-ward plot so central to the sentimental
fiction of the antebellum era. He argues, “What James did in this ungainly and immature work was to
adopt the guardian-ward love story and transform the pleasing father-daughter incest fantasy intended for
women readers into a nice-guys-finish-first daydream for good old boys” (74). And while his attempt to
historicize the narrative of Watch and Ward is a necessary and desirable one in terms of drawing out the
text’s significance, he seems to largely miss the mark by simplifying the novel and taking Roger’s motives
at face value. Habegger’s assertions that “what James devised in the novel was an exceptionally adroit
solution to the old problem given so much attention in the women’s novels he had been reading and
reviewing: How does one work out a pleasing incest fantasy without violating decorum?” and that “the key
to James’s solution was the transfer of power and mastery from the paternal lover to the unworthy rivals, a
solution designed to render guardian and ward equals and thus to purify their love of all sadomasochistic
elements” seems to grossly misread the novel (81). While ultimately Habegger does acknowledge that the
novel “masks dependency as love” and that while “James tried hard to eliminate the coercive pressure of
the intolerable middle-aged lover,” the fact is, however, “when all was said and done the coercion was still
there” (81). The coercion is so apparent, however, that it seems to invalidate the rest of Habegger’s
argument and makes the reader questions why he attempts to recover the novel on these grounds in the first
place. See Habegger’s Henry James and the “Woman Business”, (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2004).
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society that “cares for in a man” “not his household virtues, but his worldly ones,” Roger
is content to hone his parenting and household skills (121). Layering the traditional
incest narrative of the sentimental novel over one of paternal longing and maternal
fatherhood allows James to further mock these “maternal” fathers and calls into question
not only their masculinity but also their motives.93 James seems interested in exploring
this new father figure, but at the same time, he makes this figure a source of amusement
and even ridicule.
Clearly, then, James is not presenting Roger as the “norm” of masculine
fatherhood. However, his Roger is not abnormal either. As Stephen Frank argues,
What one historian has labeled a “masculine domestic dream” filled the
pages of popular fiction written between 1820 and 1860 by both male and
female authors. Significantly, themes that emphasized the importance of
marriage as a source of joy and fulfillment for men were featured not only
in fiction written for a female audience but also in novels written by men
and intended for a male readership. Such “men’s authors” as the
adventure writer William Gilmore Simms created narratives that
incorporated the belief that “a man without a loving woman and
comfortable home was incomplete.” (27)
Franks goes on to assert that advice manuals such as H. Clay Trumbull’s 1891 tract Hints
on Child Training showed “the ideal husband…was a practicing Christian, had no
immoral habits, and (reflecting the belief that the body was a temple) was in excellent
health. Such a man valued home life and carried out his paternal duties, although these
were not often specified” (287-28).
Roger meets and exceeds all of these qualifications. James is clearly poking fun
at this model of a husband (as evidenced by Roger’s lack of success finding a wife in a
traditional way) and a lot of that fun is had not only at Roger’s expense, but at the
93

Many critics have explored the common plot element of the incest narrative in sentimental novels.
See Cindy Weinstein’s Family, Kinship, and Sympathy for a particularly compelling discussion of the
sociocultural dynamics of this narrative element.
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expense of Miss Morton and her “man-eater” ways. But, despite the mocking attitude
James displays toward this type of husband and father, there seems to be some narrative
sympathy for Roger in the novel. As several critics of the novel have pointed out, the
novel reads very much as a nice-guys-finish-first fantasy fulfillment. Nonetheless, the
presence of this alternate narrative of fatherhood as early at 1868 further complicates the
long-held critical assumptions of the level of engagement that fathers exhibited in their
children’s upbringing, as well as the notion that they were not conflicted about their
changing role in their children’s life. Roger’s longing to be a father is not anomalous. It
is only our belief that men in the nineteenth century did not experience such feelings that
prevents us from imagining that women did not have a monopoly on parental longing.
Further, the novel offers yet another cultural example of the connection between
paternal longing and reproductive control. Roger, surrounded by women like Miss
Morton, who selfishly abandon their procreative duties to pursue their own selfish desires
and who refuse to give him the children for which he so longs, takes matters into his own
hands by adopting a child and raising her to be a wife-made-to-order, one who
presumably won’t shirk her reproductive duties. The novel reveals how the rhetoric of
paternal longing and the new father of the late nineteenth century offers a new solution to
the perceived problem of the lack of reproduction of middle and upper-class women. The
message seems to be that if “modern” women like Miss Morton and Mrs. Walton have
failed to do their procreative duty, perhaps future generations of women will be swayed
by the notion of fathers who actively long for, and willingly take care of, their children.
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The “Maternal” Father
Ultimately, then, the shift in the early twentieth to an embracing of the “maternal”
father and the emergence of the current notion of fathers as equal, involved partners in all
aspects of the caretaking of infants and children indicates how prevalent rhetoric of
paternal longing and new fatherhood had become. What for the late nineteenth century
was a source of ridicule—James’ Roger—became in the early twentieth century a
warmer, tongue-in-cheek joke and then, ultimately, an established cultural norm. By the
late 1930’s, as Ralph LaRossa argues, The New York City Maternity Center Association
“spawned what may have been the first non-humorous manual for prospective fathers,
Hazel Corbin’s Getting Ready to Be a Father” (85). Previous advice manuals directed at
fathers had a more “tongue in cheek” tone. As LaRossa asserts, “What [even] in the
1920s was considered a joke, in the 1930s was considered serious business” (85).
As with any new cultural idea, this shift toward taking the maternal father
seriously was not uncontested. The medical magazine Hygeia, published one man’s tirade
against the “maternal father” in which the author offers this scathing description of this
new figure and exposes the cultural conflicts at work:
The maternal father arrives home promptly after work. If he commutes he
has his hat on and sprinting for the train… On arriving home, he speedily
sheds his hat and coat, scrubs his hands with approved child study
technique, then, clucking gently, lifts the baby from the basket and takes
over the cares of the mother until bedtime for the small creature
approaches, and it is tenderly laid away for the night. He bathes and
diapers, and holds the bottle. With his mouth full of pins he coos in
ecstasy and calls on the world to marvel the baby’s growth. In the
meantime the adoring mother sinks into a comfortable chair to relax, or
tiptoes out of the room—leaving father and child together in gurgling
bliss. (87)
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The mocking tone of the writer makes clear the perceived problem with this picture: the
reversed gender roles (the womanly “ecstasy and gurgling bliss” the father experiences,
which is not unlike the “feminine” Roger, contrasted with the leisure time of the mother,
relaxing in a comfortable chair and careful not to disturb father and child) means that the
father is emasculated while the mother is empowered. As LaRossa argues, “The gender
politics surrounding infant care could not be clearer. A social movement that started out
small had become, in the minds of some, dangerous. If perceived threat is one measure
of success, then by 1942 New Fatherhood had become a force to be reckoned with” (88).
In the same letter, the letter writer expresses fears about how this new phenomenon of a
more involved, care-taking father affects women’s expectations of all fathers “by planting
in the minds of otherwise contended wives and mothers the feeling that their Tom or Bill
or Hugh was not properly interested in and attentive to the new, squirming baby in the
basket” (86). Indicating his true concern about this new “menace” to men’s proper role
as fathers, he goes on to assert, “We have no quarrel with the maternal father, or for that
matter the women who refuses to accept maternity … but we protest that neither should
he be glorified as representing a standard by which others should be judged” (87).
Tellingly, the letter writer places the new maternal father and the “women who refuses to
accept maternity” in the same category, indicating the extent to which the emergence of
the former speaks to the perception of the latter.
The cultural motivations for this shift toward a new fatherhood can be seen in the
Parents Magazine series devoted to new fathers. To take another look at an extended
portion of the “Confessions of a Newborn Father” column, we see the extent to which
even as early as 1930s, fatherhood begins look recognizable to modern readers:
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I’ll never forget the first time I held my youngster. I had gooseflesh all
over and chills down my back … Well I admit there’s nothing alluring
about crawling out of bed at 2 a.m. in mid-winter, getting the bottle out of
the refrigerator, heating it up, picking up a twelve-pound, warm, wet
bundle, unraveling it, redressing your future heir in a dry one, getting a
nipple that has the right size hole in it, and finally sitting for fifteen
minutes … Watch him go after that nipple. Watch him go to sleep and
keep right on working his suction pump. Listen to him ‘grunt’ (I know no
better word for it) for his highball de lait, urging you to hustle along as
your clumsy hands adjust the nipple. Hear his sigh of satisfaction when
that first spurt of warm milk trickles down his palate…Yes—the first year
of baby’s life is the hardest for Mother and Father and Baby, but it can be
one of the happiest if you get into the game.
This column could have been written in 2012 rather than 1932. The level of the father’s
involvement—and investment—in newborn’s care is clear: the admission to “crawling
out of bed at 2 am,” the knowledgeable preparation of the bottle, the intimate relationship
between the father and infant. As the letter indicates, he is an active, equal, and involved
caretaker of his infant, and this level of intimate care clearly gives the father a great deal
of personal satisfaction. This father seems like he could have been Mr. Walton, had his
wife not made the reproductive choices she did.
The motivation for this advice for new fathers to be heavily involved in the daily
work of infant care seems to connect to the ending assertion that while the first year of
infanthood is a work-intensive, difficult time, it will be “happiest” if the father is an
active participant, one who “gets into the game.” And while any mention of the mother is
missing from this account, the clear implication is that the mother is also “happiest” when
the father takes an active role in childcare. Clearly, then, reasons that might have
previously motivated women to limit or forgo having children altogether, reasons like the
burdens of their maternal duties, the lack of paternal involvement or help with childcare,
or the lack of the father’s investment in their children’s emotional well-being, are
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mitigated by a new ideal of fatherhood. These fathers actively long for parenthood, with
all its joys and burdens.
A closer analysis of the rhetoric of new fatherhood indicates the extent to which
new conceptions of fatherhood were tied to concerns about women’s changing roles in
the family, reproductive choices, and the perceived inadequate desire of women to be
mothers. Parents Magazine, a broad market, popular magazine devoted to all manners of
concern for parents, ran a parenting column from 1932 to 1937 aimed at fathers. Called
“For Fathers Only,” the column clearly attempts to tap into a growing market of invested
and involved fathers and explored the growing role of fathers in the daily lives of their
children.94 As the editor of the magazine stated, “So many fathers read this magazine that
we believe they deserve a special department edited by a father.” There are several
important implications here: first, that fathers were perceived as significant readers of the
magazine, both in terms of numbers of readers and in terms of their value as fathers;
second, that these fathers need to be addressed by a fellow “father” writer; and third, that
the information and ideas aimed at fathers needed to be separated from the general
material of the issue, clearly geared toward mothers, into a “special department.”
“Confessions of Newborn Father,” as the first column in the series, functions
rhetorically to describe, and prescribe, the role of this new, modern father. Written by a
new father named Charles Pelham, it begins, “The confession is for fathers only. It is
addressed to that gentleman who, coattails flying, waves to you and your adorable one as
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Despite the fact that the column was clearly an attempt to capitalize on a perceived emerging
market, the column does not seem have been successful in doing so. This is evidenced by the fact that the
column is highlighted in its early appearances in the magazine, appearing as the first column of the issue,
and in each issue throughout the year, but as the series went on, it clearly waned in popularity, or perhaps
never took off, as the column appeared less frequently and when it did appear, it did not appear as one of
the first articles.
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he runs to catch the 7:45 train or street car to town. This is the man who said he wanted
children, loved children, knew a baby would mean a lot to you both-and yet, has seemed
only vaguely interested in ‘the cutest, most wonderful cherub on earth’-your baby.” The
prescriptive nature of the column is clear. The writer is addressing the father who “said
he wanted children” but does not engage in the daily life of his offspring. He is
encouraging fathers to take an active, day-to-day role in the lives of their children. His
focus in the column on the fact that he’ll “never forget the first time I held my youngster”
and on holding “ten pounds of warm pink flesh” indicates the physical, visceral nature of
his role as father.
He further gives fathers a “pep talk” about the fact that fatherhood has a learning
curve. Arguing “the first year is the hardest for a father, that he feels like a fish out of
water with a diaper in one hand which he is expected to attach expertly to the ten pounds
of warm pink flesh in the other,” he goes on to claim that “what is quite as important is
that you can't fully appreciate or love your baby until you begin to do something personal
for him.” The use of the term “personal” seems to indicate his essential appeal to
fathers—that they make fatherhood personal. He argues that this is “maybe that's why
mothers really enjoy young babies so much more than fathers do. They make personal
sacrifices for them, while most of our contributions are abstract and impersonal-paying
the bills, for instance.” In other words, he argues that fathers need to develop personal
relationships to their children by making the type of “personal sacrifices” that women
make. This idea of making child care “personal” ties in with the overall argument that
this “new fatherhood” makes about reproduction. Rather than viewing reproduction as a
public good, something one does to ensure the continuation of their lines and the future of
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society, parenthood, and particularly fatherhood, are being posited as a personal good,
founded on personal relationships between fathers and their children, and personally
beneficial to all involved—the father, the child, and of course, the mother.
However, these columns, after this first one that introduces the concept of this
new, personally-invested and involved father, often divided into one of a couple of
themes—either in some way endorsing this version by encouraging fathers to take an
active role in everything in their child’s lives from nutrition to education to summer day
camps or by expressing concern about the father’s role in the family, and particularly, by
indicating a great deal of anxiety about whether the father has a positive place in the
family, essentially by determining whether the father is a loved, and loving, involved
member of the family unit or whether he is a “tyrant” whose only concern is disciplining
the children. Terms like “tyrant” and “despot” are used multiple times in various columns
to describe a type of father who is authoritarian, overly concerned with discipline, and
essentially unloving. One column focuses on the father’s role in disciplining the child
and asserts that fathers should not “rule our children despotically” (Sept 32). Another
discourages “don’ting” a child, telling a child what they ought not to do frequently, which
the writer argues makes for nervous and anxious children. All of the columns focused on
this tyrant father indicate the negative effect that he has, not only on the children, but also
on his own position in the family. These columns serve to emphasis the dangers to men if
they don’t adhere to this cultural idea of the new father.
An example of this rhetoric of the “tyrant” father occurs in the second column in
the series, written by Mary Elisabeth Overholt and one of the few columns not written by
a father or a man. She disavows this “tyrant” father and talks about the destructive

148

influence that such a father has on his place in the family. The writer’s concern with
disavowing the authoritarian father of old indicates her participation in the changing
cultural constructions of fatherhood. She writes of this type of father,
Father is the wet blanket on all good times, the family grouch, the tight
wad who spends money for the things the family doesn't want instead of
what is wanted, the authority that forbids all pleasant activity and
promotes that which is disagreeable. Sometimes he is feared and clever
boys and girls work out elaborate systems of outwitting him and are proud
of what they “put over.” Sometimes he is a tyrant whose good will must
be bought by some means or other if a concession is wanted. Sometimes
he just doesn't count at all, doesn't pay any attention to the children,
doesn't know of their activities, nor care what they do. And very, very
rarely he is the loved and respected confidant of his sons and daughters.
(July 1933)
In this conception of the father, the tyrant father is ineffectual, perhaps feared but not
respected or loved. The writer, though, is calling out this type of father, what can be
argued is the “traditional” version of the patriarchal father figure, for his lack of
involvement in the lives of his children. This is a father who “doesn’t pay attention,”
“doesn’t know of their activities,” and doesn’t “care what they do.” As a result, he is a
father who “just doesn’t count at all.” Clearly, the cautionary tale being told here is that
the tyrant father is an outdated, outmoded father who, like the telegraph or the oil lamp,
has become an irrelevant dinosaur in the modern family. What the writer calls for, then,
as a solution to this problem is mutual respect: “When your child was little it was natural
enough for him to accept your authority simply because he was inexperienced and
helpless and you were there to protect him. But as a boy grows toward manhood he needs
less and less of your protection and more and more of your understanding. The basis for
your easily won authority is gone; and you have to deserve his confidence and respect”
(Aug 1932). This writer’s concern with disavowing the authoritarian father of old
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indicates her endorsement of the new father. When she writes, “the basis for your easily
won authority is gone; and you have to deserve his confidence and respect,” it is hard not
to read that line in terms of the larger cultural shift from the patriarchy’s “easily won
authority,” which, as a result of the shifting dynamics within society and the family, is
gone. In her construction, the tyrant father must shift too to a model of fatherhood that
would “deserve” the respect and confidence of his children through having a personal,
involved, and respectful relationship with his children. In other words, by being a New
Father.
Another common rhetorical thread in the series related to creating a version of
fatherhood that is active and engaged in the lives of their children does so by focusing on
the father as a highly engaged playmate to his child. One such column encourages fathers
to spend time playing mechanic with their sons when they are young to help them
develop an aptitude for mechanical engineering later in life. Another column, written
from the perspective of a father who wanted a son and had a daughter instead, depicts the
father/daughter relationship as one of highly devoted and engaged playmates. The
columnist, Anson Lowitz, writes of traveling with his young daughter:
Contrary to general opinion, she was not burdensome nor did her presence
hamper us an iota in our travels. Indeed the very newness of the things in
the world about her was a constant joy and inspiration to us. Of course, we
always have made a point of including in our day things that would be of
special interest to her. I doubt if any boy could have been a better sport or
grander chum than this joyful bunch of girlhood. At night, when she's all
tucked in her bed with supper and bath but tail-end memories of a day that
is passed, I love to read and tell her stories, real stories of glamorous
people and far-away places” (Sept 1933).
This column reads like an advertisement for having children. He essentially talks her up,
referring to her as not “burdensome” and indicating how her “presence” did “not hamper
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us an iota.” In fact, she provides “constant joy and inspiration.” However, this positive,
mutually enriching relationship emerges not by limiting contact or involvement with her,
but by encouraging it. He writes of making a “point of including” things that are of
“special interest to her” and of being involved in her daily care, referring tucking her into
bed, of her daily routine of supper and bath, and of telling her stories of “glamorous
people and far-away places.” As a reward for his daily care and involvement, and his
eschewing of the role of the tyrant father, he has a “joyful bunch of girlhood” who
couldn’t be “a better sport or grander chum.” Despite these columns focus on play as the
primary role of the father, this father is clearly taking the advice of the first column’s
writer. He is making his relationship with his child personal by engaging himself in the
daily care of his daughter. And he is rewarded for his modern notions of fatherhood with
a “chum,” a child who is a source of deep personal fulfillment.
Of course, any new construction of, or shift in the views on, fatherhood can be
cause for anxiety in itself. Another column expressed anxiety about this new father, one
who is invested and interested, to this writer’s mind perhaps too much so, in the daily
care of his children. L. C. Moore, in a March 1933 column, writes of the young mother
today that she is “faced with the task of bringing up her children in accordance with
entirely new ideas, which more often than not clash with her instinct. Halfway between
the two, she is criticized by both the old and the new schools of thought.” This writer
clearly sees this new, involved father as “interfering” in the mother’s proper place in
child-rearing, one where the nursery is her sole province and where the father knows
better than to interfere. Clearly, this is a modern problem, as the writer argues that the
“young mother of today” faces “more interference from her husband than mothers have
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had at any other time in the history of the world.” Seeing the father in particular as at the
mercy of newfangled, modern views of parenting, the column implies that the mother is a
bit more immune to such dangerous and disruptive theories. As a result, this father has a
fundamental inability to effectively parent and lacks a full understanding of the real
situation. In other words, he is depicted as a dilettante, someone who dabbles in
parenting. This is clearly indicated in an example given concerning dealing with
disciplining the children:
He hears their mother speak sharply to them, and he disapproves because
to shout at a child is the worst thing a parent can do, according to all the
new theories. When his wife comes downstairs, more tired than ever, he
remonstrates with her. She should be more patient with the children and
have a little more self-control. If she tells him—as she does if she has any
spirit left—that in addition to having the children all day and every day
she also has the other cares of running the house as well, he feels
convinced that she is exaggerating. He expounds his ideas.
The scornful tone here, particularly with regard to “all the new theories,” indicates a
lamenting of the lost father role of old, the authoritarian but disengaged father that the
other columns are working so hard to convince men not to be.
Despite the multiple anxieties evidenced in these columns about exactly what
should be encouraged as the father’s role in childcare, one thing was consistently
evident—that fathers should take their paternal roles seriously. An April 1933 column
provides a good example of the seriousness with which fathers were encouraged
culturally to take their roles. A father writes introspectively about his role and his fear of
being a “dictator” that “probably every father resorts too often to the role of a dictator.
Explanations require time and he feels, perhaps, that he hasn't time enough to make them.
Again he may be tired and unwilling to goad himself to the effort which explanations
demand.” In his estimation, though, “the man who accepts the office of fatherhood
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should let no other activity interfere with the faithful discharge of his duties.” This
column, written from the perspective of a father, seems to address the concern about the
time commitment and emotional investment of being this new, involved father. As the
writer indicates, a father might be “tired” and “unwilling” to put in the extra effort to be
involved, to have a personal relationship with his children. He may just want to “resort to
the role of dictator,” to not have to “explain his decision whenever an explanation is
requested.” Despite these, as writer seems to indicate, perfectly natural feelings, he
encourages fathers to take their roles seriously, to discharge their duties faithfully. In
other words, he encourages them to see their roles as fathers as a vocation, for which they
take their oaths solemnly. For this writer, “the business of fatherhood profits from sober
reflection.”
Even further, throughout the columns, the immense value of the father’s
contribution to their children’s upbringing was stressed. In the August 1933 edition, a
psychologist writes, “Those of us who, as psychiatrists, work with parents in attempting
to straighten out behavior problems and personality difficulties of children, see a great
many more mothers than fathers,” indicating that this greater participation on the part of
the mothers is a problem. He goes on to explain, “When it is possible, however, the father
comes to the clinic to discuss the problem of the child. A factor which is immediately
noticeable in these interviews is the concern which fathers show in regard to their boy's
relation to his playmates, their critical attitude as regards their son's shortcomings and the
fear that the boy is going to be a ‘sissy.’” The concern here stems from the perception of
too much “mothering” and not enough “fathering” of the boy. The writer makes this clear
when he goes on to argue in a particularly telling passage,
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It is probably this fear on the part of fathers that makes them stern with
their sons, believing that in this way they will “harden” them. This is
especially likely to be true when most of the discipline, the care and
training of the child, has been left to the mother. There are many instances
in which fathers, from the very moment of the baby's arrival, have been
completely divorced from any share in the care of the child. It is not
surprising, then, that these fathers, in self-defense and to cover up their
hurt pride, should become rather indifferent toward the child's progress.
(Aug 1933)
In this construction, the “damage” done to the child results from the father’s “hands off”
approach to childcare, from the fact that he has been “completely divorced from any
share in the care of the child.” What is perhaps even more telling, though, is that the
father takes this hands-off approach to his children in “self-defense” and “to cover up
[his] hurt pride” regarding his child’s progress and development. In other words, the
writer stresses the negative emotional impact that the father’s lack of involvement in the
care of the child has, not only on the child, but also on the father. Clearly, being
“divorced” from the daily care of the child damages both of them The writer then
advocates “patience, understanding treatment” rather than “anger or ridicule” in helping
the son overcome the habits of being a “sissy.” The fascinating contradiction of
encouraging the father to exhibit more positive emotions (patience, kindness,
understanding) traditionally associated with the maternal rather than more negative
emotions (anger, harshness) traditionally associated with the patriarchal while at the same
time arguing that this feminized behavior results from too much maternal influence seems
to go completely unnoticed by the writer. What is clear, though, is that once again, being
involved in the daily care of their children is offered as a balm to cure the emotional ails
of both the child and the father.
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Continuing with this rhetorical theme of the dangers of excessive mothering,
another writer, John Scotford, writes disparagingly and dismissively about the mother’s
excessive focus on her children and the father’s ability to take a larger view. He argues
that the mother’s myopic focus is a danger to them that can only be mitigated by a
father’s involvement:
And then there are the worries which are the lot of a mother: first, the
health of the children, the problem of their progress or lack of progress in
school, and at all times the puzzle of stretching the family income to cover
the family needs… How to settle the war debts is as nothing compared
with the problem of curbing Johnnie's cough, while a panic in Wall Street
is a mere trifle beside the calamity which occurred when Jane spilled ice
cream down her new party dress.
In his construction, the mother’s myopic focus on the “health of the children” or their
“progress or lack of progress in school” means that she places undue significance on the
events and issues in her children’s lives. As he argues, “details have magnified
themselves until they have assumed calamitous proportions.” The sarcastic tone here
indicates clearly the writer’s view of this “problem” with modern mothers, which he sees
as making her “tired and nervous.” What is significant about his view, though, is the role
that he sees as fathers as playing in this family dynamic. He goes on to claim, “Often men
fail to realize the difference, which the presence of a father makes in the life of a home.
Probably they never spent a day in the exclusive company of a baby or a group of small
children. One of the finest services of the father is to distract the attention of the mother
from those very children,” indicating that although fathers probably never actually
experience a day in the lives of their children, their presence in family life is valuable
because of their ability to distract their wives’ attention from their children. In other
words, the father rescues the children from the overwhelming attention of the mother.
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However, the writer once again brings the column back to the restorative and
positive affect of children in the lives of men. He goes on at great length about the
troubles that modern men face in American public life and the way that children in
particular act as a balm for these modern wounds:
In American life today the man is usually subject to the strain of a direct
and concentrated effort to achieve success…Most men are doomed to
function as cogs in some sort of vast machine, a situation which is not at
all flattering to their egos. If they do achieve some degree of personal
responsibility, it is at the cost of shouldering terrific burdens. So the mind
of the husband is not exactly calm as he returns home at the end of the
day. He is tired out, not by a multiplicity of tasks so much as by doing 100
of one thing. His ego has been maybe troubled concerning the education
and future status of his children. He may question whether life is worth
living. But when he reaches home he knows it is. For there are his
children. It is his children which keep many a man plugging along at an
uninspiring job. He comes home, looks into the eyes of his son or
daughter, and says to himself, "Why should I be downhearted when I have
such a child as this growing up?” The virtue of having several children is
that usually there will be at least one out of the bunch who will be
bringing encouragement to the paternal heart. After all, there is no antidote
for the blues quite so effective as children. (Oct 1933)
Again, this reads almost like an advertisement for having children, and in particular,
having a good number of children as “usually there will be at least one out of the bunch
who will be bringing encouragement to the paternal heart.” But we again get the
hyperbolic enumerating of the blessings bestowed by virtue of children’s very presence in
the lives of fathers, the fact they that function as an “antidote for the blues,” one who
brings “encouragement to the paternal heart,” who just by virtue of “growing up” under
his or her father’s care, saves the father from feeling “downhearted,” and gives his life as
“cog” of society meaning and purpose. For the modern man, down trodden and depressed
by his place in the world, children are being offered as a solution, a way to give oneself
purpose and joy. While in some ways seeing the possession of a family and progeny as a
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source of pride and purpose is not new, the particular rhetorical construction offered
throughout the series—a construction of fatherhood that asserted that is not just by virtue
of being a father, not by being the “tyrant” of the house, but by being a loving, invested,
and most importantly, involved father that men gain a sense place and purpose in modern
society—indicates a new societal view of fatherhood that located personal fulfillment in a
man’s role as father.
It is this association of personal fulfillment and happiness with a man’s role as an
active, involved, and invested father that allows the new father to function as a form of
reproductive control. If reproductive control means not only limiting or preventing birth
through technological means but also channeling and encouraging reproduction through
cultural and societal rhetoric and constructions of gender, than the rhetoric surrounding
the emergence of new fatherhood which serves to encourage women to reproduce
indicates that new fatherhood aimed to control women’s reproductive choices. As women
moved into the twentieth century and embraced new ideals of womanhood, the mother’s
role, and their place in society, motherhood, with all of its traditional burdens placed on
the shoulders of women, increasingly seemed like a choice rather than an inevitable
certainty. More and more women could choose to opt out of, or at least reduce, these
burdens by avoiding, putting off, or limiting their reproduction. And while the rhetoric of
duty and obligation perhaps failed to sway women, a new father figure—one who longed
for children, who was emotionally and personally invested in his role as father, and one
who was willing to jointly take up the burdens of childcare alongside women—offered
women a new model of parenthood that mitigated the concerns they had about their roles
in the family and in society. Women could choose to reproduce, knowing that they would
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be able to share the duties and responsibility of parenting with a willing and able partner.
Ultimately, by making reproduction a personal choice, based on the needs of one’s family
and the desires of one’s partner, rather than a public good or civic obligation, society
changed not only the rhetoric of reproduction but also of fatherhood and in doing so,
created the modern notion of shared parental responsibilities so familiar to us today.

Copyright © Virginia Bucurel Engholm 2014

158

Chapter 6: Reproduction Gets Personal
Much critical examination of pregnancy and reproduction has lately revolved
around exploring societal and cultural understandings of miscarriage and infant loss. It is
an inherently ideologically fraught issue for feminist. On the one hand, anti-women
health and public policy initiatives often seize on these rhetorics of the trying-to-conceive
community and the babylost community, a community of women who have experienced
miscarriage, stillbirth, neonatal death and other forms of pregnancy and infant loss, to
argue for the personhood of fetuses and the resulting need to “protect” the fetus by
banning or severely limiting access to abortion and contraceptives. The recent, and
largely unsuccessful, attempt on the part of the state of Texas to ban the use of
abortifacient drugs, such as RU486 or Cytotec, in the thinly veiled guise of protecting
women’s health, is an example of this political tactic. On the other hand, denying the
grief that the women in the infertility or pregnancy and infant loss community face can
also play into traditional anti-woman rhetorics of denying the very real lived experiences
of large numbers of women, particularly when those experiences are ideologically messy
and expose the fractures and cracks within our own conceptions of gender, reproduction,
and motherhood.
Leslie Regan, in writing of her own experience with miscarriage, describes a
folder she received from the hospital on pregnancy loss. She writes, “That folder, and the
institutionalization of language that it represented, informed me that I was in the midst of
a social process that was remaking the meaning of miscarriage.”95 For Reagan, this
making of miscarriage into a “significant event infused with tragic meaning” is part of a
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highly problematic cultural movement to delegitimize pregnancy termination by imbuing
pregnancy with a special cultural and societal meaning. In other words, feminist scholars
worry that if we grant women the right to see their miscarriage or pregnancy loss as a
tragedy, are we not admitting that all pregnancy losses are tragedies? Her neat historical
trajectory of miscarriage and pregnancy loss as moving from “silence” to “hazard” to
“blessing” to “tragedy” falls into the trap, however, of denying the lived emotional
experiences of women throughout history and the messiness of reproduction generally.
Indeed, grief and loss are complex personal experiences, deeply rooted in cultural and
social meanings, but also deeply intimate. Historian and cultural critic Carrie Pitzulo
argues via the pseudo-scholarly blog Nursing Clio, a project that connects current debates
over gender and medicine to historical scholarship, that “women have myriad experiences
and feelings, but we are taught to deny the unpleasant, to hide what doesn’t conform to
unfair, unrealistic, simplistic expectations.”96 She goes on to assert that “we need to stop
assuming that women can ever conform to a one-size-fits all label, because our
experiences are historically, culturally, and personally contingent.” For Regan, and for
Pitzulo, their miscarriages were not imbued with tragedy. As we move into the twentiethfirst century as scholars, critics, and feminists, we must somehow come to terms with this
divide. Pitzulo’s answer of seeing reproductive experiences and practices as “historically,
culturally, and personally contingent” seems like a good place to start.
When I began writing this dissertation on the culture surrounding reproduction
and reproductive control, I had myself only experienced the “prevention” side of the
reproductive control equation. I had for years used various modern forms of
contraceptives—primarily hormonal birth control (“the pill”)—to prevent contraception,
96
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with little thought given to the sociocultural dynamics at play in my choice to delay the
start of my reproductive years, or the way that my doing so participated in appropriate
demographic trends for my time period, my nation, my age, and my education level.
However, over the course of the several years that I worked on completing the
project, I stopped taking my hormonal birth control. In the parlance of the virtual
community of women actively seeking to become pregnant, I was “TTC,” trying to
conceive. The rhetoric of the community aptly indicates the nature of it, the way that
reproduction is culturally and popularly imagined as something one “tries” for, something
one aims to achieve, and the way that conception itself is heralded as the end point—not
the start—of the process. As a society, we have come so far from the biological,
reproductive certainty of our foremothers and grandmothers that we have essentially
come full circle. Controlling reproduction, that is the ability to reliably prevent it, an
ability that had once largely eluded women, now has become so easy, so attainable, that
our attention in reproductive matters has turned to getting pregnant. There are no online
support groups for women trying, and failing, to prevent pregnancy. There are, though,
many support groups for women trying, and failing, to conceive.
However, though the TTC community and the larger culture of pregnancy, a
culture dominated by books like What to Expect When You’re Expecting, largely imagine
conception as the end of the reproductive journey, the reality of modern day pregnancy
does not differ that much from women in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. While
prenatal care has improved significantly in the past century, which drastically improves
the chances of a successful and healthy life birth, pregnancy, fetal development, and
neonatal care largely remain mysteries for modern medicine. Large numbers of women
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continue, as our foremothers and grandmothers did, to have unsuccessful pregnancies.
Fetuses fail to develop correctly, or are spontaneously miscarried, or endanger the life of
the mother, for reasons that modern medicine generally cannot determine, nor prevent or
treat. For these women, conception is not the end of the reproductive journey.
My own experiences “trying” to conceive demonstrate the difficulty of achieving
the holy grail of the TTC community—the “H&H,” a happy and healthy baby. My first
pregnancy, which took a year of “trying” to achieve, ended in the late-term termination of
my son Harrison at twenty-three weeks. He suffered from the fatal chromosomal
abnormality Trisomy 18. I was counseled by my perinatologist, after weeks of debate
and turmoil and a subsequent amniocentesis to confirm the diagnosis, to take Cytotec, a
miscarriage-inducing drug, to induce early labor and then admitted to the hospital to give
vaginal birth to my son, who was stillborn. And my experience, as I have learned, was
not that exceptional. While the numbers may be in modern medicine’s favor, the realities
of reproduction’s fragility are still harsh for many women and families.
Undaunted in my pursuit to reproduce, my reproductive story continued, and the
following year, I was once again pregnant, this time with twins. I lost one of the twins
very early in the pregnancy, a very common occurrence with twin pregnancies, but one
that increased the risk to the survival of the remaining twin and that complicated, and
ultimately made impossible, the ability to do an available in utero testing, the CVS or
chorionic villus sampling where the doctor takes cells from the placenta to test for genetic
abnormalities, which would have allowed the doctor to determine early in the pregnancy
whether this baby had Trisomy 18 as well. Ultimately, I did get my “H&H”, or in the
parlance of the “babylost” community, my “rainbow baby.” My very healthy and happy
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daughter is now almost three years old, and each year of her life takes me farther away
from the loss of my son, although the pain of that loss is one that I still feel acutely.
As a culture, we are in many ways obsessed with a particular version of pregnancy, one
that insulates us against the historical reality of the messiness of reproduction and
pregnancy, and imagine a sort of what-to-expect pregnancy where by virtue of reading
the right books, eating the right foods—and avoiding the wrong ones—and having a
women-centered birth plan, we can ensure a happy outcome. As Elizabeth McCraken
writes in her poignant memoir of her own experiences with stillbirth, An Exact Replica of
a Figment of My Imagination, as a society, we think of the fetus in the womb as a “sure
thing” (2). It is not surprising then that the idea of “babylost” is so hard for society to
face. Another popular term in the “babylost” community is “medusa,” a self-appointed
label for babylost mothers to describe a woman who has experienced a form of grief that
is unrecognizable, and unrecognized, by society.97
There are more forces at work in our individual choice to reproduce, or not, than
we realize. And the pursuit of controlling birth is fraught with even more political debate
everyday. Forced sterilization of inmates in a California prison, concern over the “baby
penalty” women pay over the course of a career and the decision to “opt out” of their
professions, political controversy over the scientific development of “post-fertilization”
contraceptives, new restrictive abortion laws requiring women to undergo a transvaginal
ultrasound before being allowed to receive an abortion in several states, headline97

One particular website within this virtual community of “babylost” is called Glow in the Woods,
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Place?). They further claim that it is a place a place “where us medusas can take off our hats, none minding
the sight of all the snakes. Because not only can we bear the sight of each other—we crave it” (“What Is
This Place?”).
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grabbing stories of surrogacy gone wrong—stories of the fault lines of reproduction
inundate our society. These stories reveal the cracks and fissures of current debates over
reproduction and reproductive control. As modern medicine advances and increases our
knowledge and understanding of the in utero development of the fetus, as medical
advances provide more choices for diagnosing, or even treating, the fetus even while in
the womb, as new forms of fertility treatment allow doctors, and women, greater levels of
control over conception, as new forms of contraceptives—post-conception options, for
examples, or the male “pill”—offer new relationships to preventing birth, we face a host
of new complicated issues surrounding women’s reproductive processes and practices. In
many ways, the central question of reproductive control—who’s controlling reproduction
and for what purpose—has also come full circle. The primary focus of reproductive
control has been moved from wrestling the prevention of birth from the hands of nature
to wrestling conception, pregnancy, and childbirth and their related reproductive
processes from capricious and mercurial Mother Nature. As science and medicine
increasingly allow us to accomplish this goal, the central question, though, remains—if
Mother Nature is no longer in control of these reproductive processes of women, who is?
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